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PLUTARCH'S *Life of Agesilaos*:

response to sources in the presentation of character

(In Two Volumes)

Volume Two

by

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PART SIX

CHARACTER

(Chapters 19-20)

CHAPTER 19

(2) Agesilaos at home

5 ἐπεὶ δ' ἀπενόστησεν οἴκαδε, προσφιλῆς μὲν ἦν εὐθύς τοῖς πολίταις καὶ περίβλεπτος ἀπὸ τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς διαίτης. 6 οὐ γὰρ, ὥσπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν στρατηγῶν, καινὸς ἐπανῆλθεν ἀπὸ τῆς ξένης, κατακεκλημένος ὑπ' ἀλλοτρίων ἔθων, καὶ δυσκολαίνων πρὸς τὰ οἴκοι καὶ ζυγομαχῶν.

In *Hellenika* Xenophon says nothing more about Agesilaos until at IV.iv.19 he describes the attack on the territory of the Argives, who had by then taken control of Corinth (*Hell.* IV.iv.6). In *Agesilaos* he goes straight on to record this invasion as Agesilaos' next action (ἐκ δὲ τούτου II.17), without indicating the passage of time. Plutarch deals with it in c.21, and, perhaps to denote an interval, has taken the opportunity of Agesilaos' return to Sparta to comment on qualities relevant to the resumed domestic context. He has selected and developed references found in several places in Xenophon's *Agesilaos*. The first topic is Agesilaos' conduct at home as a private individual, and the second, which occupies the next chapter, presents him as a public figure. In the prepositional phrase, the nouns referring to these two topics are in reverse order, βίος being the *Life* to be written, δῖαιτα being the style of living, and the order is again reversed in the following treatment. For the affection in which Agesilaos was held cf. Xen. *Agesilaos* VI.4: διὰ δὲ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸν ὄρχοντα.

Plutarch at this point appropriately praises Agesilaos as unaffected by service away from Sparta. The Athenian envoy at Thucydides I.87 voiced the cultural dangers that Spartans faced in going abroad. For Agesilaos' rejection of Asia in favour of Spartan traditions, Plutarch could draw on Xenophon's judgements:

ἐλόμενος ἀντὶ τοῦ μέγιστος εἶναι ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ οἴκοι τὰ νόμιμα μὲν ὄρχειν, τὰ νόμιμα δὲ ὄρχεσθαι

and: ὑπεστήσατο τῇ τοῦ Πέρσου ἀλαζονείᾳ (*Agesilaos* II.16, IX.1).

ἀλλὰ ὁμοίως τοῖς μηδεπώποτε τὸν Εὐρώταν διαβεβηκόσι τὰ παρόντα τιμῶν καὶ στέργων, οὐ δεῖπνον ἥλλαξεν, οὐ λουτρόν, οὐ θεραπείαν γυναικός, οὐχ ὄπλων κόσμον, οὐκ οἰκίας κατασκευήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς θύρας ἀφῆκεν οὕτως οὔσας σφόδρα παλαιὰς ὥς δοκεῖν εἶναι ταύτας ἐκεῖνας ὥς ἐπέθηκεν Ἀριστόδημος. 7 καὶ τὸ κάρναθρόν φησιν ὁ Ξενοφῶν οὐδέν τι σεμνότερον εἶναι τῆς ἐκείνου θυγατρὸς ἢ τῶν ἄλλων.

Xenophon treats Agesilaos' attitude to the pleasures of food and drink as part of a contrast with the King's expensive taste: ἡδέως πίοι . . . ἡδέως φάγοι (*Agesilaos* IX.1). Agesilaos is above such pleasures:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὅσαι γε ἡδοναὶ πολλῶν κρατοῦσιν ἀνθρώπων, ποίας οἷδέ τις Ἀγησίλαον ἡττηθέντα; (*Agesilaos* V.1).

Xenophon stresses the simplicity of his house, the doors and the furnishings, his furniture, his sacrificial meals, and the carriage which takes his daughter to the festival:

ὁ δὲ οὕτως ἀντεσκευάσατο τὸν οἶκον, ὥστε τούτων μηδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι. εἰ δέ τις ταῦτα ἀπιστεῖ, ιδέτω μὲν, οἷα οἰκία ἦρκει αὐτῷ, θεασάσθαι δὲ τὰς θύρας αὐτοῦ. . . . πειράσθω δὲ θεάσασθαι τὴν ἔνδον κατασκευήν, ἐννοησάτω δέ, ὥς ἐθοίναζεν ἐν ταῖς θυσίαις, ἀκουσάτω δέ, ὥς ἐπὶ πολιτικοῦ καννάθρου κατήει εἰς Ἀμύκλας ἡ θυγάτηρ αὐτοῦ (*Agesilaos* VIII.6-8).

Plutarch has drawn extensively on Xenophon, not only for the carriage, but he has made it clear by the context that the reference is to contentment with the Spartan standards. Agesilaos is satisfied not to renew the old doors, installed by a legendary king, but for simplicity, rather than pride in their antiquity. For Xenophon, however, the stress is on the match between expenditure and income.

9 ὁ μὲν οὖν Ξενοφῶν ὄνομα τῆς Ἀγησιλάου θυγατρὸς οὐ γέγραφε, καὶ ὁ Δικαίάρχος ἐπηγανάκτησεν ὥς μήτε τὴν Ἀγησιλάου θυγατέρα μήτε τὴν Ἐπαμεινώνδου μητέρα γινωσκόντων ἡμῶν. 10 ἡμεῖς δ' εὖρομεν ἐν ταῖς Λακωνικαῖς ἀναγραφαῖς ὀνομαζομένην γυναῖκα μὲν Ἀγησιλάου Κλεόραν, θυγατέρας δ' Εὐπωλίαν καὶ Πρόαυαν.

Antiquarian interest may be less significant here for Plutarch than the importance he attaches to details about members of Agesilaos' family, and especially the female members, perhaps brought to mind by the reference to the daughter's carriage. The prosopographical information is, however, potentially significant for hints of Agesilaos' political associates (P.A.Cartledge (1987) p.149). The daughters' names are not given at Xen. *Agesilaos* VIII.7. Plutarch indicates that he had

access to archives of some kind at Sparta, but Xenophon says nothing about these. The inclusion of these names in archives suggests a domestic collection, perhaps reminiscent of those in Lysander's house. The digression on the absence from the tradition of the names of Agesilaos' close relatives was perhaps intended to contrast with the erection by others of monumental inscriptions from which such information could be obtained: it required special research to find these names ἐν ταῖς Λακωνικαῖς ἀναγραφαῖς, which reveals Plutarch's interest in the family, matching that of Agesilaos.

11 ἔστι δὲ καὶ λόγχην ἰδεῖν αὐτοῦ κειμένην ἄχρι νῦν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι, μηδὲν τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρουσαν.

Again, the point is not the unique antiquarian value of the spear, but explicitly to show that what was on public display is exemplified by Agesilaos' very ordinary spear, a visual image with which Plutarch has rounded off the subject of Agesilaos' popular appeal through moderation in private self-advertisement, proving how ordinary the king's was. Xenophon contrasts the simplicity of Agesilaos' clothing with his concern for the army's equipment:

καὶ γὰρ ἐκαλλωπίζετο τῇ μὲν ἀμφὶ τὸ σῶμα φαυλότητι, τῷ δ' ἀμφὶ τὸ στράτευμα κόσμῳ, τῷ δ' αὐτὸς μὲν ὥς ἐλαχίστων δεῖσθαι (*Agesilaos* XI.11).

CHAPTER 20

Agesilaos' influence at Sparta

In c.19 Plutarch's moral comments arose from the point reached in the narrative. He described Agesilaos' influence on Spartan domestic life following his return home, advocating the gaining of respect and admiration without resorting to extravagant display and expenditure of wealth. Now Plutarch moves on to Agesilaos' influence in a more public context, and incidentally demonstrates the threefold nature of the *Life*, in which he interweaves the biographical element, the portrayal of Agesilaos' character, and the promotion of the moral values of Lykourgan Sparta. There is a series of five illustrations of Agesilaos' political influence, which focus on four named individuals and one anonymous group.

The theme of extravagant display is continued from the previous chapter in the first of these. Agesilaos aimed to divert the Spartans' competitive efforts towards a politically more serviceable end, by urging his sister, Kyniska, to enter a chariot in the contests at Olympia. Any victory she won would allow him to attribute this kind of success, not to *δρετή*, but to wealth and its expenditure. Next comes what Agesilaos viewed as *δρετή* instead. His instruction to Xenophon to bring his sons to Sparta for their education demonstrates that the best lesson to be learnt has nothing to do with extravagant display, but is the familiar *ᾀρχεσθαι καὶ ᾀρχειν*.

The third illustration continues this topic, *ᾀρχεσθαι καὶ ᾀρχειν*, in two parts, presenting a negative, unwanted aspect and a positive, desired aspect. Lysander's desire for *ᾀρχειν*, to be won by reforming the kingship, demonstrates his failure to learn its necessary counterpart, *ᾀρχεσθαι*, whereas Agesilaos, having learnt both, displays them by obeying his adviser, one of the *γέροντες*, in the exercise of his kingly function.

The last two illustrations of Agesilaos' influence concern the elimination of political opposition, reviving the topic dealt with at c.5. Agesilaos had an indirect method of controlling policy, presumably to be used when whatever discussion or debate there was had gone against him, perhaps to be seen as parallel to the Athenian practice of bringing the leaders of an opposing faction, or their friends, to trial. He arranged for those who had revealed their opposition to him to be appointed to offices in which their conduct could be observed, and any who erred in the exercise of their new powers could be brought to trial; he then provided assistance for them in their troubles and so converted their opposition to allegiance.

By contrast, finally, his junior colleague, Agesipolis, was brought under his influence in a different way, through the development of the personal relationship of an older with a younger man, which was typical in Spartan society, as it is presented in the tradition. The influence is here given positive definition by Plutarch's return to the use of the word ἀρετή, last used in the first section, and, by placing the reference to Lykourgos at the end of the treatment of this topic, he suggests a legitimacy which extends to the whole series, as if Agesilaos was in all this practising his interpretation of the main principles underlying the Spartan way of life, although the elimination of competition was detrimental, contrary to Lykourgan prescription.

The thematic links between the several illustrations of Agesilaos' influence show the application of the rhetorical skills of *inventio*, *ornatio* and *compositio* to the selection, presentation and arrangement of material. Plutarch has placed this topic appropriately where Agesilaos has returned to Sparta at the end of the major Asian campaign, and, as it is the twentieth chapter of the forty, he has also marked the halfway point with this prominent study of Spartan character and an unobtrusive hint that it may be flawed.

1 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὁρῶν ἐνίοις τῶν πολιτῶν ἀφ' ἵπποτροφίας δοκοῦντας εἶναί τινας καὶ μέγα φρονοῦντας, ἔπεισε τὴν ἀδελφὴν Κυνίσκαν ὄρμα κοθεῖσαν Ὀλυμπίᾳσιν ἀγωνίσασθαι, βουλόμενος ἐνδείξασθαι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὥς οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ πλούτου καὶ δαπάνης ἡ νίκη.

Xenophon has used Kyniska's victory in the chariot races at *Agésilao*s IX.6 as part of a proof that Agesilaos was, as a person, superior to the Persian King. Following the contrast with the King's seclusion and luxurious standards, he establishes Agesilaos' merit as a man of action in keeping hounds and war horses, instead of breeding chariot horses. The argument against relying on the glory of winning at chariot racing is also used at *Hiero* XI.5-9 in defining a ruler's true service to the state as τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον ἀγώνισμα. Plutarch has transferred the episode to the Spartan scene, and uses it to illustrate how Agesilaos, unaffected by foreign influences, attempted to discourage citizens who sought renown through display of their wealth. The wealthy citizens are not identified by name, but their existence was part of the problem of the unequal distribution of wealth in Sparta, recognized by Aristotle (*Pol.* 1270a18, 1307a36). Agesilaos' suggestion that by the use of great wealth to acquire and train a chariot team a woman might win at Olympia, where a woman was not allowed even to be a spectator (Pausanias V.6.7; M.I.Finley and H.W.Pleket (1976) pp.45-6; J.Swaddling (1980) pp.41-2), is presented here as a protest against the non-participating race-horse breeder. Efforts directed towards display of wealth, without making any contribution to the perceived interest of the city, damaged the harmony of Sparta's society of "Equals". A demonstration of ἀρετῆς, on the other hand, could be encouraged by the right sort of competition, though again it had to be in the right field, for he supported only Sparta's own competitive games, and, in particular, those for the young (c.21). In the competitions which he held in Asia and in the Chersonese, the only prizes awarded to individuals were for excellence in weapon training; the others were collective prizes awarded for the

best large contingents of soldiers (Xen. *Hell.* III.iv.16, IV.ii.6; cf. *Hipparchikos* I.26).

Inscriptional evidence from Kyniska's pedestal (Pausanias VI.1.6; J.Ebert (1972), no.33), dated to early fourth century by its lettering, may indicate that this passage refers to a time after Agesilaos' accession. She seems to have won more than once, for Pausanias speaks of her victories (VI.1). At III.8 he suggests that although she was the first woman competitor, she was not the last Lakonian woman to have won Olympic victories, which would indicate that Agesilaos' action may have had rather the reverse effect from that intended, and led the way to an increase in this form of the display of wealth. At V.12 Pausanias describes as less than life-size Kyniska's bronze horses, said to have been created by Apelles at VI.1, where he mentions chariot, team and driver as well as Kyniska, thus dispelling any doubt about whether she herself was a charioteer.

2 Ξενοφῶντα δὲ τὸν σοφὸν ἔχων μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ σπουδαζόμενον ἐκέλευε τοὺς παῖδας ἐν Λακεδαίμονι τρέφειν μεταπεμψάμενον, ὥς μαθησομένους τῶν μαθημάτων τὸ κάλλιστον, ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν.

Since joining him in Asia Minor, Xenophon was a friend of Agesilaos and was granted an estate at Skyllous, in territory annexed from the Pisatai by Elis early in the fifth century and then from Elis by the Spartan King Agis. Skyllous was not far from Olympia, and is described as in good hunting country (Pausanias V.6). In the ancient world Xenophon was regarded highly as a philosopher, but he has been overshadowed by the more powerful minds of his contemporaries and successors. He does not record his sons' education, but Diogenes Laërtius (II.54) quotes from Diocles' *Lives of the Philosophers* that they were educated at Sparta. The privilege of admittance to Spartan education equipped non-Spartans, probably only from among those friendly to Sparta, to serve as cavalrymen and hoplites, perhaps with the Spartan army, thus easing to some extent the ὀλιγονθρωπία. There

were ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων καλουμένων among those who accompanied Agesipolis to Olynthos after the death of Teleutias there (Xen. *Hell.* V.iii.9). Plutarch clearly wishes to combat foreign influences by encouraging Spartan ideals, particularly the familiar one of obedience and leadership (see c.1), which had a long history: οἱ νόμοι δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα δύο μάλιστα διδάσκειν, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ὄρχεσθαι (Xen. *Kyropaideia* I.vi.20; cf. *Agesilaos* II.16; *Lykourgos* 30). Plutarch gives priority to the obedience, and then adds the command. A case may be made for translating "obedience as well as command".

3 τοῦ δὲ Λυσάνδρου τετελευτηκότος, εὐρὼν ἑταιρείαν πολλὴν συνεστῶσαν, ἣν ἐκεῖνος εὐθύς ἐπανελθὼν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀσίας συνέστησεν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀγησίλαον, ὥρμησεν αὐτὸν ἐξελέγχειν οἷος ἦν ζῶν πολίτης.

Plutarch refers here to the discovery of the formation by Lysander of a political club directed against Agesilaos rather than specifically to change the Spartan hereditary monarchy. He does not say how the discovery of the club was made, having already referred separately at c.8 to Lysander's plan to reform the monarchy, again without revealing the means of discovery, whereas at *Lysander* 30 he, like Diodoros, links it with the search among documents at the late Lysander's home. It is always difficult for the historian to penetrate secret societies, and to authenticate their existence or aims. Xenophon omits the episode, no doubt not wishing to make a direct reference to any threat to Agesilaos' position as king, but when, in his report of the quarrel between Agesilaos and Lysander in Asia Minor, he mentions the contrast observed by those who visited them, he uses terms which might have been suggested by knowledge of what had been attempted: ὁ μὲν Ἀγησίλαος ἰδιώτης ἐφαίνετο, ὁ δὲ Λύσανδρος βασιλεύς (*Hell.* III.iv.7). The idea of Lysander as a king seems to have existed in Xenophon's mind: a "Freudian slip". The challenges that Xenophon has recorded, however, are none that threaten the monarchy, but appear to be expressions of social unrest, among the Perioikoi who defected

(VI.v.25, 32, VII.ii.2), and, among those close to the citizen class, only the protest led by Kinadon against his inferior status (*Hell.* III.iii.8). Plutarch adds a mutiny at c.32.

Lysander did not have very long in which to set up this society between his return from Asia Minor and his death at Haliartos. At *Lysander* 24 Plutarch assigns to him the attempted implementation of his plan to open the kingship either to all the Herakleidai or to all Spartan citizens, instead of only to the two royal houses. Although Plutarch suggests that the plan had been made earlier (*Lysander* 24), it is recorded at the time of his return from Asia Minor "in disgrace" after his quarrel with Agesilaos, when Lysander would be a less strong candidate than he had been before, but when the tradition of the quarrel in Asia Minor would be seen as contributing to his dissatisfaction. In the next chapter (25) he mentions the speech of Kleon of Halikarnassos and the attempts to win the support of the oracles. The plot is said to have been abandoned (26), when an accomplice failed to play his part in an elaborate deception, though it was not uncovered until after his death.

Plutarch attributes the record to Ephoros (*Lysander* 20, 25, 30), a source much used by Diodoros, who deals with the whole event in a single narrative. Diodoros describes it in three episodes: Lysander's plan for the reform of the monarchy, his visits to the oracles to obtain support, and the discovery of the speech (XIV.13.8). He puts Lysander's intrigues soon after the end of the Peloponnesian War (XIV.13.1), when his part in Sparta's victory had so enhanced his reputation, suggesting the support he might have been relying upon. Plutarch himself at *Lysander* 18 records Lysander's self-advertisement at Delphi at this time. At this time, too, Lysander might have been hoping in due course to become the successor to the ageing Agis. Diodoros here gives only ambition as the motive, whereas stronger reasons for aiming to become king are to be found in the political

disagreement with Pausanias over the Athenian settlement, mentioned at XIV.33.6, and in the change in policy denoted by the decree of the ephors, which at least withdrew support from Lysander's system of rule by dekarchies: ἐκπεπτωκυίας δὲ διὰ τοὺς ἐφόρους, οἱ τὰς πατρίους πολιτείας παρήγγειλαν (Xen. *Hell.* III.iv.2). By contrast, the quarrel with Agesilaos would have provided only a petty motive.

Plutarch here omits references to Lysander's contact with oracles and the impersonation of Silenus as Apollo's son, which he records at *Lysander* 20 and 26, for they occurred before the accession of Agesilaos and do not concern him, but he inserts the account of the foundation of the club at this point, and makes Agesilaos defend himself by attacking Lysander's character. Diodoros' three episodes do not include any reference to later intrigues, or to exploitation by Agesilaos of the discovery of the speech. For him the "plot" became public knowledge only when a copy of the speech urging the reform of the monarchy was found during a search of Lysander's house for other documents (Diod. XIV.13.8), and this followed Lysander's death, as here. Plutarch, but not Diodoros, makes Agesilaos responsible for carrying out the search. The earlier date of the attempted reform was known to Plutarch, for when he described Lysander's visit to Ammon, he mentioned the alternative explanation of its purpose offered by Ephoros (*Lysander* 20). The separation of the two events, the plot and its disclosure, in Diodoros' account, and even in that of Plutarch himself at *Lysander* 26, seems to have called for an explanation, and Plutarch evidently found it in the discontent of Lysander on his return from Asia. The public revelation at the later date indicated another crisis.

One of Lysander's possible political motives for change is indicated by the speedy arrangement of Agesilaos' Asia Minor campaign soon after his accession, suggesting that, if Lysander had himself become king, he would have been an effective leader of the aggressive imperial expansionists. The association of some of his possible

supporters with this policy for Sparta is indicated by a long-lasting trend of dissatisfaction with the so-called Lykourgan restraints on the accumulation and expenditure of wealth, early manifested by Lichas' extravagance in Thucydides (III.v.50), and later by Agesilaos' opposition to wealthy breeders of race-horses. This opposition, and the disappointing withdrawal from Asia Minor, may explain the unrest to which Plutarch here shows Agesilaos responding.

The intended disclosure at this time of Lysander's supposed plot is clearly not simply to discredit the memory of the man himself, for Plutarch, or his source, seems to see it as part of the machinery of Agesilaos' control of the Spartan citizens who were opposing him, and who evidently could be identified as seeking to return to the policies advocated in the preceding decade by Lysander, which they had then presumably supported. Agesilaos is therefore shown to have sought to discredit those who were currently members of opposition groups, by linking them also with the reformist plans of Lysander. Any attempt to change the laws would be sacrilegious and revolutionary, according to Lykourgos (*Lykourgos* 29), unless with the approval of Delphi, which Lysander had failed to obtain.

In the battle of Haliartos, Lysander's supporters lost their most powerful leader, but their remaining strength is indicated by Pausanias' flight into exile, rather than face trial. Not only they, however, but also those Spartans who had welcomed his policies, will have continued to cherish their hopes and to wish to change the restricted "imperialist" policies now being followed. The presentation of the expedition to Asia Minor, after Agesilaos' accession, as intended to prevent war coming to the mainland, indicates the range of imperialist slogans created for his supporters when Lysander obtained a military command for the king. Some would see imperialism as the means to secure Sparta's survival, whether in the Peloponnese or in the whole of Greece. Others would hope for positions of responsibility

and residence abroad, to enjoy using wealth for conspicuous consumption, or to create opportunities for accumulating further wealth. These clearly had continued in Agesilaos' reign to wish to use their wealth as before, on, in some cases, breeding and training race-horses. Their earlier determination may be illustrated from Thuc. III.v.50 and Xen. *Hell.* III.ii.21, referring to the wealthy Lichas, renowned for lavish entertainment, who in 420 had even entered his team as a Boiotian in order to avoid the Eleian ban on Spartan participation at Olympia. The Spartans paid Lysander many honours at his death (*Lysander* 30), and if, by claiming to be acting in his name, his associates were gaining support for unacceptable policies, they may have caused Agesilaos and the authorities to resort to blackening Lysander's record, by presenting him as aiming to take over from Agesilaos, as the quarrel in Asia could also be used to show (cc.7-8).

4 καὶ λόγον ἀναγνοῦς ἐν βιβλίῳ ἀπολελειμένον, ὃν ἔγραψε μὲν Κλέων ὁ Ἀλικαρνασσεύς, ἔμελλε δὲ λέγειν ἀναλαβὼν ὁ Λύσανδρος ἐν τῷ δήμῳ περὶ πραγμάτων καινῶν καὶ μεταστάσεως τοῦ πολιτεύματος, ἠθέλησεν εἰς μέσον ἐξενεγκεῖν.

G.Grote ((1869) Vol.IX p.59) suggested that the speech may have been one - perhaps unsolicited - of the many manifestations of enthusiastic support for Lysander at the time of the renaming in Samos of Hera's festival as Lysandreia (*Lysander* 18). Its preservation in a private house provides a parallel to the records found ἐν ταῖς Λακωνικαῖς ἀναγραφαῖς (c.19), and evidence for literacy at Sparta at this level of society, perhaps with professional assistance (P.A.Cartledge (1978) pp.28-9). Such documents may also have contained the information relevant to the dispute among the allies, for which Agesilaos was conducting the search (*Lysander* 30). In retailing Diodoros (XIV.13.8) or Ephoros Plutarch gives no evidence for this interpretation of Lysander's intentions and motives, which cannot be known without a special informant. If Lysander did intend to make his proposal in front of the people, his aim was evidently constitutional

reform rather than revolution. As Grote also argues (Vol.IX pp.60-1), though from a different starting point, the change in selecting the kings might have been validated in full legal form without any appeal to violence, if the kings' families and supporters formed the minority and were outvoted: "the extreme attachment of the Spartans to old and sanctified customs" would also necessitate divine validation of the changes, as Lysander's dealings with oracles demonstrate that he knew (*Lysander* 25).

5 ἐπεὶ δέ τις τῶν γερόντων τὸν λόγον ἀναγνοῦς καὶ φοβηθεὶς τὴν δεινότητα, συνεβούλευσε μὴ τὸν Λύσανδρον ἀνορύττειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον μᾶλλον αὐτῷ συγκατορύττειν, ἐπέισθη καὶ καθησύχαζε.

The fear gives a hint of the possible strength of the opposition and of the determination of the establishment to avoid weakening the state by open confrontation. The advice appears to refer to the publication of the speech, and possibly also of evidence that others were involved, but mainly it avoids creating a need for formal accusations of any kind. Suspicions may be aroused by the obscurity of the adviser, for he is not named in Diod. XIV.13, and, although he was said at *Lysander* 30, on the authority of Ephoros, to be the senior ephor, Lakratidas, he is otherwise unknown in the sources. Indeed, the unfulfilled intention to publicise details of the plot may further raise speculation that what took place at this time was all invented for the purpose of propaganda. The story of the suppression of publication is a particular case of convenient cover to put the accusations of conspiracy beyond any challenge. Agesilaos' agreement to suppress the speech would not preclude the mention of his discovery of the plot itself, or its use as a veiled threat to any participants who were generally known to have had links with Lysander; his opponents, referred to in the next section below (τοὺς δ' ὑπεναντιούμενους), were first made aware that they were marked men,

and then sent off with the chance to behave themselves on service, subjected to further manipulation, if need be. Revelation of the discovery would, of course, have to be publicised at about the time for it to have come into the record: this will have been enough to rally the king's loyal supporters to a show of strength to the opposition.

6 τοὺς δ' ὑπεναντιούμενους αὐτῷ φανερώς μὲν οὐκ ἔβλοπτε, διαπραττόμενος δὲ πέμπεσθαι τινὰς ἀεὶ στρατηγούς καὶ ἄρχοντας ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἐπεδείκνυε γινόμενους ἐν ταῖς ἐξιουσίαις πονηροὺς καὶ πλεονέκτας.

An account of other means of converting opponents into friends, which did not go unobserved or unpunished, is given at c.5. Plutarch may be starting a new topic here, but he could well be continuing the same incident. Agesilaos' use of deception is well documented in the *Life*. Plutarch may be enlarging on Xenophon's references to the treatment of opponents at *Agesilaos* VII, and of misdemeanours at *Agesilaos* XI.6. If this device may be compared with the Athenians' resort to the courts in political conflicts, what was going on would be less obvious to Agesilaos' victims, but in the end charges will have been brought, not for the act of opposition itself, but for some perceived malpractice in the later position of responsibility held by the man. There were evident risks in making these appointments, and διαπραττόμενος suggests that they, too, were not made easily or unopposed. Presumably some victims did not immediately perceive their opportunity to change their ways.

εἴτα κρινομένοις πάλιν αὖ βοηθῶν καὶ συναγωνιζόμενος, οἰκείους ἐκ διαφόρων ἐποιεῖτο καὶ μεθίστη πρὸς αὐτόν, ὥστε μηδέν' ἀντίπαλον εἶναι.

This constitutes the second of a double use of deception in Agesilaos' scheming, his response after their misuse of authority in office; the first lay in apparently making no response to their joining in the opposition. They had erred twice and would be doubly indebted to him when they realized what he had done.

7 ὁ γὰρ ἕτερος βασιλεὺς Ἀγησίπολις, ὅτε δὴ πατρὸς μὲν ὦν φυγάδος, ἡλικίᾳ δὲ παντάπασι μειράκιον, φύσει δὲ πρῶος καὶ κόσμιος, οὐ πολλὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἔπραττεν.

Plutarch attributes Agesipolis' limited political inactivity first to externally imposed restraints, his father's exile and his own youth, and then to the internal restraints imposed by his inborn character. Evidently he also inherited some of the ill-will experienced by Pausanias. The overlap between innate and acquired tendencies in Plutarch's view of the development of character is illustrated by the phrase φύσει δὲ πρῶος καὶ κόσμιος, used of Agesipolis, in so far as the latter refers to orderliness, which is a matter of training as well as temperament.

8 οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτον ἐποιεῖτο χειροήθη. συσσιτοῦσι γὰρ οἱ βασιλεῖς εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ φοιτῶντες φιδίτιον, ὅταν ἐπιδημῶσιν.

Plutarch emphasizes Agesilaos' influence even in the case of his colleague, where perhaps the kings might be expected usually to be more independent, and implies that what part Agesipolis did play in public affairs was sometimes in opposition to Agesilaos. Perhaps the similarity of the two names was deliberately created in the naming of the younger man: -λαος, by then associated with Agesilaos' alleged δημοτικόν καὶ φιλόανθρωπον (c.1), to be countered with -πολις, the man to unite the whole community. There was little chance of success, in the circumstances. In view of his father's record at Athens, Haliartos and Mantinea, he was not likely to be aligned with Lysander. His gentle nature suggests a less aggressive tendency, representing perhaps a third, more peaceful policy (G.L.Cawkwell (1976) pp.77ff; Diod. XV.19.4; S.Hodkinson (1983) p.279). Xenophon gives a hint of this difference indirectly, when he describes, perhaps in defensive terms, Agesilaos' response to the news of his colleague's death in Chalkidike, after the capture of Torone (*Hell.* V.iii.19-20). The kings did not go abroad on campaigns together.

9 εἰδὼς οὖν ἔνοχον ὄντα τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς τὸν Ἀγησίπολιν, ὥσπερ ἦν αὐτός, αἰεὶ τινος ὑπῆρχε λόγου περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾧρα· καὶ προῆγε τὸν νεανίσκον εἰς ταὐτὸ καὶ συνήρα καὶ συνέπραττε, τῶν Λακωνικῶν ἐρώτων οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν, αἰδῶ δὲ πολλήν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ ζῆλον ἀρετῆς ἐχόντων, ὡς ἐν τοῖς περὶ Λυκούργου γέγραπται.

Plutarch reverts to the topic of c.11, clearly with Xenophon in mind:

ὁ δ' Ἀγησίπολις τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ ἱκανὸς μὲν ἦν καὶ ἡβητικῶν καὶ θηρευτικῶν καὶ ἵππικῶν καὶ παιδικῶν λόγων μετέχειν· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὑπηδεῖτο αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ συσκηνίᾳ, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς πρεσβύτερον (*Hell.* V.iii.20);

καὶ μὴν μετεῖχε μὲν ἥδιστα παιδικῶν λόγων, συνεσπούδαζε δὲ πᾶν ὃ τι δέοι φίλοις (*Agesilaos* VIII.2).

Plutarch seems to have found hints of the situations and conversations that he describes here. Xenophon's vocabulary at ἱκανὸς ἦν and παιδικῶν λόγων suggests Plutarch's at ὥσπερ ἦν αὐτός and τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς. The context of *Hell.* V.iii.20, when Agesilaos heard the report of the death of Agesipolis with tears, not, as might be expected, with joy, as of an opponent (the word ἀντιπάλῳ is used also by Plutarch in this chapter), is presumably a reference to the friendly relationship which Xenophon appears to oppose to the not unknown mutual hostility of Spartan kings, who, of course, were unique in reigning together. Xenophon lists the topics of the conversations they shared, and the chiasmic pattern links the inner two together and the outer two together, so that these carry the same, apparently innocent, sense, considering that associated words occur at *Lak. Pol.* III-IV as terms for Spartan age groups. However, at *Agesilaos* V.4, dealing with control of affections, Xenophon compares Agesilaos' love for Megabates with the love that a most earnest nature feels for τοῦ καλλίστου, which in the abstract context, for a philosopher, should mean "that which is most honourable", neuter. Plutarch's version stretches Xenophon's meaning, but it is to be noted that he, like Xenophon, presents only the conversations of the two men. Plutarch's references to *Lykourgos* are found at 17.1 and 18.4. The emphasis there is on the friends' dedication to honour that results from these relationships. It seems

that Plutarch could not be single-minded on this subject, but at least he does give a fair-minded account.

Apart from the sources discussed above, *Apophth. Lak.* (Mor. 212) contains versions of many of the items used here. Thus of the five items, the first is in *Moralia* and Xenophon's *Agésilaios* IX; the second is in *Moralia* and is confirmed by Diokles, *Lives of the Philosophers*, as reported by Diogenes Laërtios II.54; the third is in *Moralia* and Diodoros XIV, and the fourth is in *Moralia* and perhaps Xenophon's *Agésilaios* VII and XI. The last is found only Xenophon's *Hell.* V.iii.20 and *Agésilaios* VIII. The indication here is that these *Apophth. Lak.* clearly go back to a source before Plutarch, whether or not he was the collector. Plutarch's material for the parts outside his narrative may not be wholly unreliable.

PART SEVEN

THE CORINTHIAN WAR

(Chapters 21-22)

CHAPTER 21

Games at Corinth contrasted with those at Sparta

1 Μέγιστον οὖν δυνάμενος ἐν τῇ πόλει, διαπράττεται Τελευτίαν τὸν ὁμομήτριον ὁδελφὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ γενέσθαι.

When Xenophon describes the joint expedition to Argos and Corinth (*Hell.* IV.iv.19), he does not record Teleutias' appointment by Agesilaos, but he does stress the relationship. On a previous occasion, too, Agesilaos had appointed a relative, Peisandros, to a high command (c.10), but it will have been harder to justify this appointment in Sparta than the earlier one in Asia Minor, where there were fewer eligible Spartans available. Of course, both Teleutias and Peisander were given charge of a fleet while the army was commanded by the king himself, but the defeat sustained by Agesilaos' first appointment will not have made the second any easier. Difficult negotiations and the use of devious methods are implied, perhaps, by Plutarch's choice of verb, which was also used of Agesilaos at c.13: μόλα μόλις διεπράξατο σὺν πολλῇ πραγματείᾳ, and the placing of this verb, alongside the claim that Agesilaos' power was supreme in the city, perhaps points to a wish to suggest influential opposition. Even in Sparta, however, at this time, and not only in Asia Minor, strong candidates were presumably in short supply. In any one generation or year group, there can have been only a limited and small number of talented Spartans, if the total citizenship was around 1,000. In numbers, the Spartan Assembly may be comparable with a school of 1,000 pupils at the present day. Leaders are required each year in a school as prefects, captains of sports teams, principals and administrators of other indoor and outdoor activities. The school's "year group" is the annual intake, approximately 120, and the school's age range is about 8 years. Sparta's hoplite age range is perhaps roughly (since some did not live to retiring age) four times as much, so that Sparta's "year group" would be in the order of 30. This is a

small pool from which to take men of excellence who will be responsible for the many state activities that called for qualities of leadership, but, of course, the organisation of the ἀγωγή was hierarchical, enabling selection at each stage to be based on sound practical experience, however fallible that might be. Teleutias turned out to be an able admiral and general (Xen. *Hell.* V.ii-iii). It is perhaps surprising that Plutarch, who was interested in the family, did not comment on the significance of his phrase, τὸν ὁμομήτριον ἀδελφόν, for the mother of the two successful commanders, whose delight was pointed out by Xenophon (*Hell.* IV.iv.19), though there is a lacuna in the text here.

2 καὶ στρατευσάμενος εἰς Κόρινθον, αὐτὸς μὲν ἤρει κατὰ γῆν τὰ μακρὰ τεῖχη, ταῖς δὲ ναυσὶν ὁ Τελευτίας . . . 3 Ἀργείων δὲ τὴν Κόρινθον ἔχόντων τότε καὶ τὰ Ἰσθμια συντελούντων.

Xenophon associates Teleutias' seizure of the dockyards with the first of Agesilaos' two expeditions, in which he ravaged Argive territory, and went on to Corinth to capture the walls. He records a second expedition ἐκ δὲ τούτου, during the games at the Isthmus, after which Agesilaos took the Peiraion (IV.v.1). Plutarch does not separate the two campaigns, perhaps influenced by Xenophon's phrase: οἴκαδε ἀπελθὼν εἰς τὰ Ὑακίνθια (*Agesilaos* II.17), which seems to indicate only a temporary absence. However, the essential military details are given in two parts, the second continuing in c.22, after the development in this chapter of the theme of competition in athletic contests.

The two cities, Argos and Corinth, had clearly united by now to become one, in some way (Xen. *Hell.* IV.iv.6), following a violent uprising against the supporters of peace with Sparta, but since Agesilaos was not involved, Plutarch has mentioned it only now. It was a unique development, which might, despite its origin, have been extended advantageously to other cities in the course of time, but the details are not so clear. Xenophon uses phrases that retail the hostile propaganda of his Corinthian friends (as also at *Hell.* IV.v.1, viii.15,

34), who wanted to re-introduce co-operation with Sparta, and Diodoros (XIV.92) may describe massive Argive intervention only when allied control of the city was under threat. The military situation of Corinth at the time suggests only a formal isopolity arrangement, made with Sparta's traditional enemy by the faction opposed to Sparta, to ensure reliable defence of the city against the Spartans, but it was "an experiment with considerable potential" (J.B.Salmon (1984) p.411), although the state of the evidence does not make it possible to accept full merger of Corinth into the Argive polity. Plutarch's main concern later in the chapter is with the celebration of the Isthmian Games by the Argives, as is implied by Xenophon: οἱ Ἀργεῖοι αὐτοῦ ἐτύγγανον τότε ποιοῦντες τὴν θυσίαν τῷ Ποσειδῶνι ὡς Ἄργους Κορίνθου ὄντος (*Hell.* IV.v.1). Clearly, the isopolity agreement allowed participation in religious matters, and this is not disputed, although sole Argive presidency is not proven (G.T.Griffith (1950) pp.236-56, C.D.Hamilton (1979) p.270, J.B.Salmon (1984) pp.357-62, 411). Even joint celebration would be a powerful announcement of the solidarity of the opposition to Sparta. Eventually, by the insistence of Agesilaos on the terms of the Peace of Antalkidas, the cities were separated again, as Sparta could not accept the legalizing of Corinth's transformation from a former ally into a new enemy, the enhancement of Argos, the old rival for leadership in the Peloponnese, and the combined strength of the new unit, occupying a position from which to control movement through the Isthmus.

ἐπιφανεῖς ἐκείνους μὲν ἐξήλασεν ἄρτι τῷ θεῷ τεθυκότας, τὴν παρασκευὴν ἄπασαν ἀπολιπόντας· 4 ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν Κορινθίων ὅσοι φυγάδες ἔτυχον παρόντες ἐδεήθησαν αὐτοῦ τὸν ἀγῶνα διαθεῖναι, τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐποίησεν, αὐτῶν δ' ἐκείνων διατιθέντων καὶ συντελούντων, παρέμενε καὶ παρέσχευεν ἀσφάλειαν. 5 ὕστερον δ' ἀπελθόντος αὐτοῦ, πάλιν ὑπ' Ἀργείων ἤχθη τὰ Ἰσθμια.

Xenophon says that when the Argives abandoned the games, Agesilaos encamped in the sacred enclosure, offered sacrifices to the god, Poseidon, and waited while the exiles conducted the games (*Hell.*

IV.v.2). Plutarch has not mentioned the sacrilege of interfering with the games after the due sacrifices, which his version more strongly implies. He now begins the development of Agesilaos' attitude to these and other Games. At this initial stage Agesilaos refuses the invitation, which does not occur in Xenophon, to hold the Games himself, and he does not even sacrifice here, as he does in Xenophon, but he provides protection while they are held. Agesilaos is thus in contrast with both the parties who have celebrated the games, the exiled Corinthians and the members of the *sympoliteia*. The use of the Argive name for the *sympoliteia* was one of the changes that some, οἱ βέλτιστοι, found impossible to live with, ἀβίωτον (Xen. *Hell.* IV.iv.3, 6). Plutarch has followed Xenophon in using οἱ Ἀργεῖοι for those in the city, to distinguish them from the exiles he still called Corinthian, also, perhaps, sharing some of Xenophon's disapproval of the situation in Corinth.

καὶ τινες μὲν ἐνίκησαν πάλιν, εἰσὶ δ' οἱ νενικηκότες πρότερον, ἡττημένοι δ' ὕστερον, ἀνεγράφησαν. 6 ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὲ πολλὴν ἀπέφηνε δειλίαν κατηγορεῖν ἑαυτῶν τοὺς Ἀργεῖους ὃ Ἀγησίλαος, εἰ σεμνὸν οὕτω καὶ μέγα τὴν ἀγνοθεσίαν ἡγούμενοι, μάχεσθαι περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν.

This confused, slightly humorous, situation is not quite as Xenophon has described it: ἔστι μὲν ἃ τῶν ἄθλων δις ἕκαστος ἐνικήθη, ἔστι δ' ἃ δις οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐκηρύχθησαν (*Hell.* IV.v.2). The change seems to cast doubt on the value of a victory which is not repeated, just as the Argives' refusal to fight for the conduct of the games causes Agesilaos to question the sincerity of their respect for the festival, and so to devalue the institution.

7 αὐτὸς δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα πάντα μετρίως ᾤετο δεῖν ἔχειν· καὶ τοὺς μὲν οἴκοι χοροὺς καὶ ἀγῶνας ἐπεκόσμει, καὶ συμπαῖδων αἰεὶ φιλοτιμίας καὶ σπουδῆς μεστὸς ὢν, καὶ οὔτε παίδων οὔτε παρθένων ἀμίλλης ἀπολειπόμενος, ἃ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἑώρα θαυμάζοντας ἐδόκει μηδὲ γινώσκειν.

Plutarch portrays Agesilaos as regarding this as a complex question. It seems that μετρίως δεῖν ἔχειν involves the exclusion of attendance at the Isthmian Games, and no doubt the other similar

international games, as a competitor. The reason for the exclusion is not specified. Sparta's record at Olympia reveals a decline from about half the victors in running down to 600 BC, to barely 20 per cent in the fifth century, the majority in equestrian events (M.I.Finley and H.W.Pleket (1976) p.70). This may indicate that the Spartan attitude to athletic contests changed. Increasing professionalism produced specialists with narrow physical development, and the Spartans perhaps recognized that training specialist athletes for speed was incompatible with their own emphasis on toughness and general fitness, with a view to military service. Nevertheless, while competition in international sprinting was sacrificed, speed for military purposes was not neglected in the Spartan training, for young Lakedaimonian hoplites once overtook enemy peltasts (Xen. *Hell.* IV.iv.16).

Local (Spartan) games receive different consideration. ἀγῶνες at Sparta were an essential part of the ἀγωγή, including, perhaps, the organized battles between the boys' units (*Lyk.* 16-17). χοροί, which will have included the Hyakinthia, were again an essential part of Spartan life. That these were to be enhanced and attended by Agesilaos always, was the result, no doubt, both of Agesilaos' own participation in the ἀγωγή, and of his desire to encourage particularly the young participants he was watching. The distinction between the two forms of competition is clear: Spartan youths, if not in real life, at least in the traditional view, which Plutarch seems to have admired, often fought each other when they met. The combatants were separated, not by competitive rules, but by watching adults (*Lak. Pol.* 4), or even by the death of one, as may possibly have happened to cause Drakontios, one of Xenophon's few Spartiate colleagues in Asia, to leave Sparta as a boy, because he had accidentally killed another boy with a dagger, perhaps in such a fight (*Anabasis* IV.8): "No real Spartan ever surrendered" (M.I.Finley and H.W.Pleket (1976) p.71). For Plutarch's purpose of revealing Agesilaos' attitude, the emphasis is on

courage. The Argives' refusal to fight for control of the Games, though the victories were subsequently celebrated by the competitors, is contrasted with Agesilaos' moderate attitude to his own recent victories: as if to show that he had fought and won the battle that gave him control of the Games, if he had wanted it, but had rejected it as worthless display. The contrast is between Spartan real achievement and the empty glory of competitive games, and forms a bridge to the next section, Agesilaos' view of empty glories that have impressed others.

8 καί ποτε κτλ.

Three anecdotes, found also in *Apophth. Lak.* (Mor. 212-3) and elsewhere, are given, from which the reference in πρὸς ταῦτα πάντα μετρίως ᾤετο δεῖν ἔχειν, as now defined, may be discerned. The first two introduce the tragic actor, Kallipides, known for his pride (Xen. *Symp.* III.13), and an anonymous imitator of the nightingale. The admiration they enjoy here has been earned by them as theatrical entertainers who pleased their audiences, and they relish the fame of their successes. Douris of Samos recorded (*Alkibiades* 32.2) that Kallipides the tragic actor gave the rhythm of the stroke to the crew of the ship that brought Alkibiades into the harbour of Mounychia on his triumphant return from Samos, and, although Plutarch prefers a different account, the fame, and perhaps the flamboyance of Kallipides, may be proved by Douris' use of his name. The third anecdote introduces Menekrates, who was an unusually successful medical doctor, still known to Athenaios (VII.289) and Aelian (*Var. Hist.* XII.51), whose grateful patients called him Zeus. These three have in common not only their fame, but also their presumptuous demands to be acknowledged by Agesilaos, in insisting on recognition at sight, on the acceptance of an invitation to witness a performance, and on the return use of a flatteringly complimentary form of address. Although

their eminent achievements, two of them highly valued, cannot be in doubt, Agesilaos refuses each demand. The less worthy case of the anonymous imitator of the nightingale, however, suggests that his objections to international games may now be seen to have been directed against the quest for immoderate fame and against participation in trivial activities. Praise for success even in war was restrained at Sparta, though there is to be an exception (c.33): normally, only men who died in battle, and women who died in child-birth, were allowed gravestones (*Lykourgos* 27.2, if the reading is correctly interpreted; P.A.Cartledge (1979) p.309, citing *IG* V.1, 713). International games were thus unworthy activities, and victory in them did not earn the competitor an entitlement at Sparta to admiration for proven ἀρετή. Plutarch has continued the character study of c.20 in this way, and completes the Olympic reference by extending it here to the non-equestrian events in the games at the Isthmus. The Spartan view must be distinguished from the Roman aristocratic disdain for popular entertainment, which would substitute for it political or literary pursuits. In Plutarch's Sparta the preference of Agesilaos was for activity which benefited the state, in respect of its survival against its enemies, but he has added the moral dimension, too, of moderation and self-control, which even Kallipides and Menekrates lacked.

CHAPTER 22

Retribution at Corinth: rehabilitation in Akarnania

Plutarch continues the narrative of Agesilaos' second campaign, from before the digression in c.21. He has selected three military actions, which are complimentary to Agesilaos, and has separated these with two rather longer passages in which moral failures are associated with the humiliation of Sparta. In this way he illustrates and judges both competence and character.

1 Διατρίβοντος δὲ περὶ τὴν Κορινθίων αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ Ἡραῖον εἰληφότος καὶ τὰ αἰχμάλωτα τοὺς στρατιώτας ἄγοντας καὶ φέροντας ἐπιβλέποντος.

In Xenophon, Agesilaos approached the site of the Isthmian Games, near the shore of the Saronic Gulf, from Corinth to the west. He then moved north to reach the Peiraion, still in Corinthian territory, where refugees from the city had evacuated their stock (*Hell.* IV.v.1). The remains of the temple of Hera are in a very beautiful setting on the sea-shore near the tip of the Perachora peninsula, facing the city of Corinth across the Corinthian Gulf (H.Payne (1940) pp.10-18). The adjacent tiny harbour was probably used by the pilgrims from Corinth who came here at festival times, and it was now providing an alternative to Lechaion for communications across the gulf between Corinth and the allies (*Xen. Agesilaos* II.18), for there is also convenient access to the Boiotian coast, through the port of Kreusis which lies to the north-east across the Halkyonic Gulf. There is another port, too, lying further to the east, Aigosthena, which is convenient for Athens. Xenophon speaks of Agesilaos watching the booty being brought from the Peiraion, seated in a circular building: καθήμενος δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν λίμνην κυκλοτεροῦς οἰκοδομήματος (*Hell.* IV.v.6). Two such buildings have been identified at Perachora, the more likely one higher up the peninsular from the sanctuary area (R.A.Tomlinson (1985) p.261). Another, partly or mostly submerged, can

be observed on the sea shore, near the lake, now a lagoon. The purpose of the buildings cannot be determined, but in the vicinity of the upper circle are several elaborate constructions concerned with a water-supply. Following the loss of control of this area, the early surrender of those in the Heraion would be inevitable, since there would be no water for men or for animals.

The events of this campaign are given in detail by Xenophon at *Hell.* IV.v.3-6, but Plutarch has chosen to set the scene briefly with his statement of Agesilaos' military achievement on the peninsula of Peiraion, conveying the full measure of Agesilaos' success with just two participles, leading off the livestock and carrying off other objects, and one noun, τὰ αἰχμάλωτα, including people, animals and goods. Here Xenophon records that Agesilaos also handed over to the exiles those who had been involved in the violent uprising and massacre (*Hell.* IV.iv.2), but he has omitted this at *Agesilaos* II.19, where it would be unsuitable for the encomium. Plutarch, too, has omitted this, since he did not record the massacre. He has also ignored the two mistakes revealed in Xenophon's account, the first, of the Corinthians in wrongly anticipating that Agesilaos had committed his army to the attack on the city, and the second, of Agesilaos in sending his men κατὰ τὸ ἀκρότατον, without suitable clothing. These topics would contribute nothing to the military and moral themes of the chapter.

ἀφίκοντο πρέσβεις ἐκ Θηβῶν περὶ φιλίας. 2 ὁ δὲ μισῶν μὲν αἰεὶ τὴν πόλιν, οἰόμενος δὲ τότε καὶ συμφέρειν ἐνυβρίσαι, προσεποιεῖτο μήθ' ὄρῶν αὐτοῦς μήτ' ἀκούειν ἐντυγχανόντων.

Plutarch has substituted Thebes for Xenophon's Boiotians, making it possible for him to present Agesilaos' regular hatred of the city as the cause of his moral lapse. The desire to negotiate for peace indicates that the allies' situation was serious, although Plutarch has not explained this. The presence of the Spartan forces at the Isthmus had already imperilled their communications by land, and the capture

of the harbour here by Agesilaos, following the seizure of Lechaion to the north of the city, deprived the northern allies in Corinth of their remaining access both to supplies from Boiotia and Athens, and also to their line of retreat by sea. Iphikrates had been guarding this area, but when he had been called away to the defence of Corinth itself, Agesilaos returned overnight to capture the undefended Peiraion peninsula and its fort, Oinöe. Xenophon reports several embassies in addition to the Boiotian, but he does not indicate the purpose of the other envoys, or what response Agesilaos made to them. Such important peace negotiations may well have needed higher authorization, although the envoys' sudden change of heart seems to have been locally motivated.

Plutarch has adjusted the order of events in Xenophon's account. The envoys approach Agesilaos when he is already supervising the booty, with the result that the impact of the insult has been increased, by juxtaposing it with the sudden arrival of the messengers. In Xenophon, after the insult, there is an interval in which Agesilaos is only now supervising the booty, and the messengers come just as the envoys are leaving. Xenophon remarks on Agesilaos' rudeness: *μόλο μεγαλοφρόνως τούτους μὲν οὐδ' ὁρᾶν ἔδόκει*, but gives him a further act of *ὑβρις*, for when the messenger brings news of the disaster, he finds Agesilaos seemingly in excessive exultation - *ἐοικότος ἀγαλλομένῳ τοῖς πεπραγμένοις*. Plutarch uses juxtaposition again, and an oxymoron, with the two infinitives, *συμφέρειν ἐνυβρίσαι*, and enlarges Xenophon's phrase with another two infinitives, *μήτε ὁρᾶν αὐτοὺς μήτε ἀκούειν*, which specify the complete process of perception available, sight and sound. He has created a passage which indicates strikingly the unsoundness of Agesilaos' thinking here, and prepares the way for his moral comment below. There can, in the religious view, be no lasting advantage to be won from acts of *ὑβρις*.

3 ἔπαθε δὲ πρᾶγμα νεμεσητόν· οὕτω γὰρ ἀπηλλαγμένων τῶν θηβαίων ἤκόν
τινες ἀπαγγέλλοντες αὐτῷ τὴν μόραν ὑπ' Ἰφικράτους κατακεκόφθαι.

The theme of religious retribution has been made explicit here by Plutarch, although he has not exploited the air of mystery introduced by Xenophon earlier, regarding the unknown cause of the fire in the temple of Poseidon (*Hell.* IV.v.4). The world view of the two writers is similar (O.Murray (1972) pp.200-13): actions on the human plane seem to have a causal influence on, or are a response to, other actions on the same or a higher plane. The Spartans were on several occasions conscious of being punished by the gods for contravening "natural law", over the start of the Peloponnesian War (*Thuc.* VII.18) and, at least in the opinion of his enemies, over the restoration of Pleistoanax (*Thuc.* V.16-7). Plutarch, too, was conscious of the intervention of the gods at Aulis, as he has made most explicit at *Pelopidas* c.21.

The report to Agesilaos follows immediately upon the act of ὕβρις, suggesting the link between Agesilaos' ἐνυβρίσαι and the disaster, but clearly the punishment had already been inflicted on the μόρα. No doubt, it was taken as confirming Plutarch's optimistic view of the omniscience and absolute competence of the gods in pre-arranging things, a view which Xenophon evidently shared: ἤδη γάρ, ὥς ἔοικε, τὸ δαιμόνιον ἤγεν (*Hell.* VI.iv.3); and, in circumstances more favourable to the Spartans: ἔδωκε γὰρ τότε γε ὁ θεὸς αὐτοῖς ἔργον οἷον οὐδ' ἡὔξαντό ποτ' ἄν (*Hell.* IV.iv.12).

4 καὶ πάθος τοῦτο μέγα διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνου συνέπεσεν αὐτοῖς· πολλοὺς γὰρ ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς ἀπέβαλον κρατηθέντας ὑπὸ τε πελταστῶν ὀπλίτας καὶ μισθοφόρων Λακεδαιμονίους.

The noun, πάθος, recalls the verb, ἔπαθε, above. The disaster, and not the report, was the πρᾶγμα νεμεσητόν, although the assumed link with divine revenge was made possible by the timing of the report. For Plutarch this moral problem marks the start of the down-turn in Spartan affairs, almost immediately after the half-way stage in the *Life*. It is not a continuous slide from this point on to

the end, parallel with a decline in the behaviour of Agesilaos. Plutarch rather presents, in both Sparta and Agesilaos, a complex character, neither perfect nor wholly bad, but the imperfections are manifested in the steps of the decline, and the high standards still become visible from time to time.

Plutarch perhaps has in mind a comparison with the disaster at Koryphasion. Xenophon records the deep distress throughout the army, but describes the disaster only as ἀήθους τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις γεγεννημένης τῆς τοιαύτης συμφορᾶς (*Hell.* IV.v.10). He stresses the contrast between the opposing forces, hoplites and peltasts, and records the Spartan commander's confidence that his men would not be attacked (*Hell.* IV.v.10). Plutarch here uses the pattern of words to bring this aspect into sharp contrast. The interweaving of the light and heavy armed troops, and the mercenary and allied forces, highlights the paradoxical nature of the result of the engagement, which impressed Xenophon, and required some revision of the traditional concept of the relative values of the different military units. Plutarch has also held back the word Λακεδαιμονίους, so that it is placed in the emphatic position at the end of the sentence, as if, by the delay, to heighten the sense of shock to the Spartan army, hitherto considered invincible. Even more paradoxical, then, is the defeat of the Lakedaimonians, prefiguring for Plutarch, perhaps, what he regards as the decline in Spartan power in the rest of Agesilaos' reign.

5 Ἄνεπήδησε μὲν οὖν εὐθὺς ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ὡς βοηθήσων· ἐπεὶ δ' ἔγνω διαπεπραγμένους, αὖθις εἰς τὸ Ἡραῖον ἦκε, καὶ τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς τότε προσελθεῖν κελεύσας, ἐχρημάτιζεν.

As commander, Agesilaos' response to the crisis is immediate, as indicated by the placing of the verb first, and a truly Spartan response, described by Xenophon in greater detail, as he organized the rescue force. For Plutarch, clearly, the down-turn is not in his

qualities as general: it is a decline in his moral character, though it is a military loss that Sparta has suffered, and Agesilaos, for all his generalship, cannot retrieve it. His show of willingness and readiness to do business is an ineffectual attempt to recover the initiative.

6 Ὡς δ' ἀνθυβρίζοντες ἐκεῖνοι τῆς μὲν εἰρήνης οὐκέτ' ἐμέμνηντο, παρεθῆναι δ' ἠξίουν εἰς Κόρινθον, ὀργισθεῖς δ' Ἀγησίλαος εἶπεν·

The retribution continues in the envoys' change of heart, adequately motivated by their knowledge of the serious loss of Spartiates. The number of Spartans still in the area had also been reduced by the departure, to attend the festival of the Hyakinthia, of all the Amyklaian members in the army, for Agesilaos had deliberately left them behind at Lechaion (Xen. *Hell.* IV.v.11). On the other hand, Iphikrates had, no doubt, revived the confidence of the allies at Corinth. The envoys' request was unlikely to be granted by Agesilaos, who would not wish it to be reported to the allies that he had suffered such losses, and the Spartan habit of secrecy still prevailed (cf. Thuc. V.68). Xenophon's report of Agesilaos' rejection of the request describes the external display that accompanied his words: ὁ δ' ἐπιγελάσας . . . ἔφη (*Hell.* IV.v.9), an example of ἐνόργεια allowing the readers to observe the scene for themselves. He has not made explicit what lay behind that display, but his account suggests that Agesilaos was still in control of the situation. Plutarch, however, has preferred to present the effect on Agesilaos of the frustrating reversal of his successful progress in the war. His account suggests that the new attitude of the envoys reveals their revived confidence, leading Agesilaos into further moral decline in succumbing to anger, which is often taken by Plutarch to precede downfall (e.g. *Pelopidas* 22, *Alexander* 62).

Εἶγε βούλεσθε τοὺς φίλους ὑμῶν ἰδεῖν μέγα φρονούντας ἐφ' οἷς εὐτυχοῦσιν, αὔριον ἀσφαλῶς ὑμῖν τοῦθ' ὑπόρξει.

Agesilaos' irony is perhaps matched by the irony of Plutarch in

his close repetition of the words Xenophon used in criticizing Agesilaos himself, μόλα μεγαλοφρόνως above, for keeping the envoys waiting (*Hell.* IV.v.6). Agesilaos' display of force may have made a deeper impression on his own troops, perhaps as he intended.

7 οὕτω δὲ τοὺς Κορινθίους ἐξελέγξας ἀμύνεσθαι μὴ τολμῶντας, ἀφῆκε τὴν πρεσβείαν.

The Corinthians were clearly not likely to accept the challenge in these circumstances. The moderate effect of the disaster on the strength of the whole Lakedaimonian army was not commensurate with its impact on the resources of the Spartiates themselves.

8 αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς περιλελειμμένους ἄνδρας ἐκ τῆς μόρας ἀναλαβών, ἀπῆγεν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα, πρὸ ἡμέρας ποιούμενος τὰς ἀναζεύξεις καὶ πάλιν σκοταίους τὰς καταλύσεις, ὅπως οἱ μισοῦντες καὶ βασκαίνοντες τῶν Ἀρκάδων μὴ ἐπιχαίρωσιν.

This perhaps is the more valid indication of the real state of the conflict than Agesilaos' freedom of movement around Corinth. Plutarch has presented this more clearly than Xenophon, who postponed the account of the disaster, and used it to separate the Spartan challenge (*Hell.* IV.v.10) from the departure of the army for home (*Hell.* IV.v.18). It was unsafe for Agesilaos to stay in the Corinthia. The Lakedaimonians held on to Lechaion, but Iphikrates recovered all other places taken by Agesilaos. The secrecy observed on the march home is explained by Plutarch, following Xenophon, as Agesilaos' wish to avoid exposing the troops to humiliation. He no doubt also wished to avoid being attacked at critical stages, and, by lengthening the day's march, also to expedite his arrival in Sparta. Since he had with him only the remnant of the defeated μόρα (*Hell.* IV.v.18), it was, perhaps, of paramount importance for the Spartans not to allow its reduced strength to be observed by an enemy that had recovered some of its high spirits.

The route through the more friendly western Arkadia, which avoided the powerful enemy Argos, passed through the territory of

Orchomenos, Mantinea and Tegea, before Lakonia was reached. Arkadia had been invaded and ravaged by Iphikrates, but the Mantineans had once been mocked by the Spartans for their flight before an onslaught by peltasts, outside the Lechaion wall (Xen. *Hell.* IV.iv.16-17).

9 ἔκ τούτου χαριζόμενος τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς διέβαινεν εἰς Ἀκαρνανίαν στρατιῇ μετ' αὐτῶν καὶ πολλὴν μὲν ἡλόσατο λείαν, μάχῃ δὲ τοὺς Ἀκαρνᾶνας ἐνίκησε.

Agesilaos needed to respond, in order to keep the route open through Arkadia and its northern neighbour, Achaia, to give access to the Isthmus and across the gulf to Central Greece. The Achaians in possession of Kalydon, in ancient times an Aitolian town near the border with Akarnania, had been attacked by the Akarnanians, who were helped by their Athenian and Boiotian allies, for the Akarnanians had deserted Sparta, and joined the allies of the Council of Corinth (Diod. XIV.82.2); and they were on the Athenian side at the battle of Nemea (Xen. *Hell.* IV.ii.17). The Arkadians had called on the Spartans to repay them for their support, under threat of abandoning them (Xen. *Hell.* IV.vi.1-14). Plutarch ends the chapter with a brief but exaggerated account of the successes won against the Akarnanians, omitting the historical background given by Xenophon, and portraying Agesilaos still as a formidable general. Yet Xenophon has not described Agesilaos' campaign as an unqualified success, except in the devastation of the countryside, while he was advancing at the rate of ten or twelve stadia a day, and in the capture of cattle, horses and slaves (*Hell.* IV.vi.1-14). The Akarnanian peltasts were superior in guerrilla actions, but the Lakedaimonian hoplites won an engagement for which Agesilaos set up a trophy. Xenophon stresses his failure to capture any of the towns he assaulted, and further implies his inability to recover Naupaktos for the Aetolians. This important base, where Messenians from Ithome had been settled by Athens, was retaken after the end of the Peloponnesian War (Paus. IV.26.2, X.38.10; Diod. XIV.34.2)

and then occupied by the Lokrians. Its recovery for friends of Sparta would have been a major achievement. Clearly Plutarch's selection from Xenophon (*Hell.* IV.vi.6, 13; vii.1), shows a favourable picture of the generalship of Agesilaos.

10 δεομένων δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ὅπως τὸν χειμῶνα παραμείνας ὀφέληται τὸν σπόρον τῶν πολεμίων, τοῦναντίον ἔφη ποιήσῃν· μᾶλλον γὰρ φοβήσεσθαι τὸν πόλεμον αὐτούς, ἐὰν ἐσπαρμένην τὴν γῆν εἰς ὥρας ἔχωσιν· ὃ καὶ συνέβη.
11 παραγγελλομένης γὰρ αὔθις ἐπ' αὐτοὺς στρατείας, διηλλάγησαν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς.

Agesilaos' generalship is further enhanced by this account of the end of the campaign, presenting him as a skilled strategist. The crops would be vulnerable, but also the invaders would have supplies at hand, which would both facilitate their own operations, and thereby increase the inhabitants' anxiety. The conclusion of the chapter is the biographical point that Agesilaos' military judgement was correct, and consequently the decline suffered by Sparta was not due to any deficiency in Agesilaos' competence as commander. Plutarch has not stressed the historical significance of the campaign: in Xenophon the Akarnanians transferred their allegiance and joined the Spartan alliance.

PART EIGHT

THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS;
PHOIBIDAS AND SPHODRIAS

(Chapters 23-25)

CHAPTER 23

Failures of Spartan justice: the Peace of Antalkidas and the Kadmeia

Plutarch deals favourably with Agesilaos during the making of the Peace of Antalkidas, but in the second section of the chapter he is critical of his part in Phoibidas' seizure of the Kadmeia. He then gives a favourable analysis of Agesilaos' theoretical attitude to justice, and in the final section returns to Phoibidas with the criticism of his practice. The issues here are both historical and biographical, leading Plutarch to make a shrewd assessment of the decline in the maintenance of the Spartan ideal.

1 Ἐπεὶ δὲ Κόνων καὶ Φαρνάβαζος τῷ βασιλέως ναυτικῷ θαλαττοκρατοῦντες ἐπόρθουν τὰ παράλια τῆς Λακωνικῆς, ἐτειχίσθη δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄστυ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, Φαρναβάζου χρήματα δόντος, ἔδοξε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις εἰρήνην ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς βασιλέα.

Whereas Xenophon apparently prefers to give precedence to Pharnabazos in this episode (*Hell.* IV.viii.1), Plutarch puts the Greek commander first, as if he, like Diodoros (XIV.81.4), considers Konon to be the initiator of the enterprise. Persian naval development was first mentioned in c.6, as one reason for Agesilaos' expedition to Asia Minor. The King had been persuaded by Pharnabazos to make available the means of building a fleet, and Konon, the Athenian, had been given supreme command (Diod. XIV.39.1-2), but he and Pharnabazos were later made joint commanders (Diod. XIV.81.4). The Persian fleet was initially intended to help in dealing with the Spartan interventions on behalf of the Greek cities of Asia Minor, and with the trouble in Cyprus and Egypt (Diod. XIV.35.3-4, 98.2). While the fleet was still being assembled, Pharax, the Lakedaimonian commander, was operating with one hundred and twenty ships from Rhodes (Diod. XIV.79.4), and just before Agesilaos was sent to Asia Minor, Derkylidas was ordered by the ephors to combine with him, against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos, in Karia (Xen. *Hell.* III.ii.12). The defeat off Knidos of the Spartan fleet

under Peisander (c.17) led to the subsequent activity in the Aegean, and at this time it was clear that the whole of the King's hostile activity against Greece had been concentrated on Sparta.

After the Akarnanian campaign, which gave some relief to the Spartans, Plutarch has immediately recorded the raids on Lakonia and the re-fortification of Athens, as leading to the Spartans' desire for peace. Xenophon does not mention this desire until after he has turned back several years to describe the war at sea, and so he has not connected it with the fighting on land. He has also passed lightly over the raids on Lakonia, saying only that Kythera received an Athenian garrison (*Hell.* IV.viii.8). For him it was the re-building of the Athenians' walls, and the activities of Konon in gaining islands and cities for Athens, which led the Spartans to contact Tiribazos in an attempt to arrange peace (*Hell.* IV.viii.12), yet the sense of insecurity created for Sparta by the presence of hostile forces threatening Lakonia itself may be judged by the consternation caused by the similar occupation of Koryphasion (*Thuc.* IV.1-41).

2 καὶ πέμπουσιν Ἀνταλκίδαν πρὸς Τιρίβαζον, αἰσχίστα καὶ
παρανομώτατα τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας Ἕλληνας, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐπολέμησεν
Ἀγησίλαος, βασιλεῖ παραδιδόντες.

There was perhaps good reason for the choice of Antalkidas to undertake this mission: he got on well with Tiribazos (*Xen. Hell.* V.i.6) and had Persian connections as a long-standing ξένος of Ariobarzanes (*Xen. Hell.* V.i.28), who replaced Pharnabazos as satrap at Daskyleion. He is thought to be the son of the Leon (*Artax.* 21) who was, among other things (P.Poralla (1913) p.23), the Olympic victor in 440, the *oikist* of Herakleia (*Thuc.* III.92.5) and ephor of 419/8 (*Xen. Hell.* II.3.10). His mother was most likely Teleutia. The family tree is given by Poralla on p.83 under Λέων. In Greece Leon was a common name (A.Andrewes (1981) on VIII.28.5) but the father of Antalkidas may still be the Leon known to Thucydides (P.A.Cartledge (1987) pp.145-6).

This peace initiative failed, however, although Plutarch does not mention that. Xenophon (*Hell.* IV.viii.13) records that when the Athenians learned of the Spartan mission, envoys were sent also by Athens, the Boiotians, Corinth and Argos, who prevented agreement because their cities did not want to be deprived of their various dependencies. About five years later, by Xenophon's account, Antalkidas was navarch, and, sailing from Aigina to Ephesos, made his way from there to the King of Persia, with whom he agreed a Spartan alliance, and the conditions of the peace named after him (*Xen. Hell.* V.i.6, 25, 36: *Diod.* XIV.110: *Artax.* 21). Plutarch has apparently attached the second, successful, mission to the preliminaries of the first, which was inconclusive. He has omitted the new motivations for peace: Artaxerxes' transfer of support to Sparta with the arrest of Konon; Sparta's weariness of the situation at the Isthmus; the reverses at sea inflicted on Athens by Teleutias; the concession that Athens was to be allowed to retain Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros. Control of Abydos also appears to have been a crucial factor on both sides, since it was in a position where it could prevent shipping from the Pontos from sailing to Athens (*Xen. Hell.* V.i.28). Iphikrates had besieged the city for Athens, taking it when its Spartan governor, Anaxibios, had been killed (*Xen. Hell.* IV.viii 39). Antalkidas sent Nikolochos, his ἐπιστολεύς, to re-occupy it, but he was blockaded by the Athenians. Antalkidas eventually relieved him and the Spartan ships under siege there, forcing the Athenians finally to desire peace. It was after winning this struggle that he negotiated with Persia, and agreed that the cities in Asia should belong to Artaxerxes (*Xen. Hell.* V.i.7, 25-28, 31).

Plutarch shows more concern and moral outrage over the betrayal of the Greek cities in Asia Minor than is evident in Greece in the fifth and early fourth centuries. The domination of Ionia had frequently been endured, ever since the reign of the Lydian, Gyges, in the

seventh century, and it is likely that, by the payment of tribute to the King, some Greek cities preserved their independent status, just as non-Greeks in the area did. (D.M.Lewis (1977) 'p.122; J.M.Cook (1983) pp.178-82.) The possible exchange of their autonomy for Persian money or support had been referred to first by King Archidamos before the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. I.82), and during the war both sides had been willing to compromise themselves over the autonomy of the Greeks in Asia Minor, in order to compete for Persian financial support, perhaps as early as at Thuc. II.67 and IV.50. There were at times, too, Greeks in the cities who were willing to cooperate with the Persians in return for political power (Xen. *Hell.* III.i.6). The attitude changed, in literature at least, when Isokrates and others used the prospect of a crusade for liberation to urge the abandonment of wars between Greeks and Greeks. (See below.)

3 ὅθεν ἥκιστα συνέβη τῆς κακοδοξίας ταύτης Ἀγησιλάῳ μετασχεῖν.

There is no trace of κακοδοξία in Xenophon's accounts of the two occasions when Antalkidas took his proposals to Asia Minor. The allies' responses were fears that the autonomy clause would deprive them of possessions. Later, Diodoros (XIV.110), using a different source, claims that the Athenians, the Thebans and some of the other Greeks were concerned over the abandonment of the cities, but without power they agreed of necessity. There is in this no personal attack on anyone, except that the King of Persia is said to have specified the terms, though Xenophon suggests that he rather followed Sparta's terms. There was concern seven or eight years later, when, according to Lysias' Olympic oration (XXXIII.521), much of Greece was subject to the foreigner, and Isokrates (*Panegyrikos*) uses the shame of the Peace in order to inspire Greece to a crusade against Persia as the only way to end internal rivalries and hostilities (see below).

ὁ γὰρ Ἀνταλκίδας ἐχθρὸς ἦν αὐτῷ, καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ἐξ ὅπαντος ἔπραττεν ὥς τοῦ πολέμου τὸν Ἀγησίλαον αὔξοντος καὶ ποιοῦντος ἐνδοξότατον καὶ μέγιστον.

Agesilaos is not mentioned by Xenophon as concerned directly in the diplomacy that led to the peace - it was a Lakedaimonian initiative - and it appears that Plutarch took his absence from the record to mean that he was opposed to peace. This could be a reasonable interpretation for him to make, in view of Agesilaos' earlier campaigns against the Persians, and given the tendency to personalize policy-making. He may have had it in mind, indeed, that at *Agesilaos* II.21 Xenophon mentions opposition from Agesilaos: not on principle, however, but only, apparently, as a service to his friends, φιλεταιρίᾳ, to ensure the restoration in the cities of exiles loyal to the Lakedaimonians. Perhaps the opposition was remembered, but not the explanation. Plutarch consequently now needed to explain the political difference between the two men. In c.26.3 he quotes the anecdote in which Antalkidas claimed that Agesilaos' wound was a tuition fee for teaching the Thebans in so many battles how to fight. Clearly, however, this is hardly enough to prove that the two were enemies, and rivalry with Agesilaos is not the only possible explanation of Antalkidas' prominent part. It was surely Agesilaos' record of hostility to Persia that required him to be excluded personally from the negotiation of the peace. That Xenophon refers to the peace as τῆς ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνης (*Hell.* V.i.36) rather than associating it with Agesilaos does not therefore prove any political disagreement. Plutarch, in giving personal rivalry as the reason for the political difference between Agesilaos and Antalkidas, suggests that the latter wanted peace to be made in order to prevent further enhancement of the king's military record. He is here portraying character in "Homeric" fashion, indirectly, through one of the people present, for Antalkidas' thought expresses an implied criticism of Agesilaos as φιλονόλεμος, a word also found in Diodoros (XV.19.4). He has, however,

already given his two adequate reasons for the Spartans' decision to make peace; mention of the personal differences allows the remarks expressing his strong feelings about the betrayal of the Asian cities to be diverted away from Agesilaos. Indeed, Antalkidas' criticism of Agesilaos is a somewhat inappropriate one at this point, following the references to Sparta's plight, his humiliating return with the remains of his army from Corinth, and the limited success he achieved in Akarnania. Some later successes had been more positive, but the credit for them did not belong to Agesilaos, the most decisive, that indeed forced Athens to accept the peace, being won at sea, by Teleutias in the Saronic Gulf, and by Antalkidas himself - clearly no pacifist - at Abydos. The statement could perhaps have been more truly made about the campaigns in Asia Minor, though still only with some qualification, as has been seen above.

4 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μηδίζειν ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ἀπεκρίνατο μᾶλλον τοὺς Μήδους λακωνίζειν.

Plutarch continues now with a saying which reveals Agesilaos' attitude to the peace: that the peace enhances Sparta's position as leader of the Greeks, for the word used of the Persians is not ἑλληνίζειν, but λακωνίζειν. This thought is therefore favourable and complimentary to Sparta. The statement will be closer to the truth, if the terms of the peace are attributable to the Spartan side originally. Immediately preceding this is Antalkidas' criticism of Agesilaos as gaining power and glory from the war. However, Antalkidas' hostility has been introduced by γάρ as an explanation of Agesilaos' escape from any share in the ill-repute arising from the peace terms, and γάρ makes its sentence a parenthesis, thus allowing the connecting particles, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ (see Endnote 6), to link up with the preceding ὅθεν sentence. The two lines of thought, in brief, will now be: "Agesilaos took no ill-repute" and "In fact, it was the Persians, having suffered so much in his wars for the liberation of Asia Minor,

who wanted peace with Sparta". The intervening sentence is an explanatory parenthesis.

The remark of Agesilaos here is in chiastic order of word stems, Λακ- μηδ- Μήδ- λακ-. It occurs in a different form at *Artax.* XXII.2, where there is chiastic order of the parts of speech: verb, noun, noun, verb: μηδίζουσιν οἱ Λάκωνες .. οἱ Μῆδοι λακωνίζουσι. This word order is again used at *Mor.* 213C, but in reported speech: μηδίζειν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους . . . τοὺς Μήδους λακωνίζειν. The three different patterns show Plutarch's versatility, but evidently he did not feel tied to any one form which he could claim to be the original one of Agesilaos himself. Perhaps he relied on memory or deliberately rephrased and even used different names - the form Λάκωνες of *Artax.* 22.2 gives the closest correspondence with the verb stem, while the endings of τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους . . . τοὺς Μήδους strengthen the pattern. Since it is, of course, not possible to put these words together without some form of chiasmus, Spartan rhetoric is not necessarily illuminated.

Emotion and reason have provided different judgements of the Peace. It was the true character of this "incident of serious and mournful import" that Plutarch described (G.Grote (1869) Vol.IX p.215). This view presents Athens in a more favourable light than Sparta and follows Plutarch's emotional judgement. The contrasting argument, rejecting the "emotional judgement" of the issue of the freedom of the Greek cities of Asia Minor, is that "Practical politicians, dealing with the everyday needs and ambitions of their states, saw no danger in medizing" (N.G.L.Hammond (1967) p.467). The fact that both sides sought Persian support, when it seemed to suit them to do so, does not validate, but illuminates, the morals of the politicians. It was not necessarily that they felt they were or were not a part of a "brotherhood of nations", but that they wished to benefit themselves, even at the expense of fellow Greeks, and disregarded the danger,

until, when it was thrust upon them, they were forced into war. This was at times true of all cities, not only of those having relations with Persia: understandably, since their often very precarious existence was continually threatened by forces beyond their control. Altruism is not to be expected in diplomacy, but, in seeking solutions to such problems, the philosopher would wish politicians, in Sir Isiah Berlin's phrase (BBC broadcast (1978)), "to do their best", exploring all the possibilities. The theoretical approach appears not to have been attempted, but in practice the cities seem to have enjoyed increased prosperity after the peace (S.Hornblower (1983) p.175); and the King was occupied with affairs in Cyprus and Egypt (Diod.XIV.110, XV.2).

5 τοῖς δὲ μὴ βουλομένοις δέχεσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην ἀπειλῶν καὶ καταγγέλλων πόλεμον, ἠνάγκασεν ἐμμένειν ἅπαντας οἷς ὁ Πέρσης ἐδικαίωσε, μάλιστα διὰ τοὺς Θηβαίους, ὅπως αὐτόνομον τὴν Βοιωτίαν ὀφέντες ὁσθενέστεροι γένωνται.

The Thebans claimed that they should take the oath for all Boiotians and later refused to send troops on campaign. The Corinthians had taken the oath but then refused to dismiss the Argive garrison. Both were forced to comply, after Agesilaos had threatened war on the ground of the autonomy clause. Passage through the Isthmus was freed, and Thebes was not allowed to be powerful enough in Boiotia to block the route to the north. Hostility towards Thebes has already been said to have determined several of Agesilaos' actions. The autonomy clause in the Peace now becomes a powerful weapon in his armoury, but equally it may be seen as the main external factor contributing to the hostile attitudes to Sparta. Its enforcement in Sparta's interest not only offended many allies; it also spurred Thebes to re-establish leadership of the Boiotian Confederacy. The clash between these two cities represents the conflict of opposing policies which, though it cannot be claimed that they were designed primarily for this purpose, yet on fulfilment might each have united Greece in peace, Sparta through military supremacy, Thebes through expandable

confederation. Even Alexander's later achievements left the Greeks still warring, though on a larger scale and for greater prizes. At this time "land empire in Greece was not within the powers of any Greek state to maintain indefinitely " (G.L.Cawkwell (1972) p.275). Spartan strength failed. Thebes also failed, partly through lack of strength, partly through the loss of inspired leadership, but partly, it seems, through reliance on federal idealism, after the restraining threat of Spartan domination had been removed, permitting the resurgence of continuing rivalries.

The history of the Boiotian Confederacy is of great interest, both because of its unique promise at the time, and because to ignore it leaves unexplained the emergence of a power strong enough, not only to recover from almost total extinction during the Spartan occupation of the Kadmeia, but even to achieve, by repeated military success, the liberation of the subject population of Messenia. The success of surviving Athenian historiography has created a tradition unfavourable to the proper appreciation of the points of view of the more peripheral Greek cities, always overshadowed by Athens and Sparta, and modern commentators often retain this prejudice. The Spartans' right to take the oath for the allies has been pronounced justified, on the ground that "it was a very different thing" from the Theban right: of old the Peloponnesians had had "an autonomous voice in decisions about war and peace" (I.Bos (1947) p.162). This view ignores the more democratic procedures of the Boiotian Council, to which representatives were elected, to some extent in proportion to the distribution of the population of its members (*Hell. Ox.* XI; J.A.O.Larsen 1968). If Sparta's "boast that the cities she led were autonomous had some substance" (A.Andrewes (1978) p.95 n.14), the same should have been clearly recognized in the case of the Confederacy.

Boiotia is a rich agricultural area, and seems to have shared with Sparta, once Messenia had been won, such self-sufficiency as to make

colonization and further conquest economically unnecessary, but, while Lakonia has natural defences, the plains of Boiotia make the cities so vulnerable to attack that more peaceful means of co-existence needed to be tried. Orchomenos was always an important Boiotian city, but Thebes was better placed centrally to become the leading power; it had at an early date, as the remains of the palaces and the legends used by the tragedians show, one of the most advanced cultures in Greece, and was in later times not too remote to benefit from the influence of central and southern cities. The vulnerability of the country led the Thebans to co-operate with the Persians during Xerxes' invasion, though perhaps not immediately, for they may have joined the Thessalian expedition (Herodotos VII.173; *Mor.* 864E), and some of them were at Thermopylai (Herodotos VII.205). Their medism partially explains their unpopularity in the literary tradition, as does, among the writers who favoured Athens, their participation in the Peloponnesian War on the Spartan side. At the end of the Peloponnesian War Thebes had reason to be proud of its military record and was powerful enough to be a focal point of attraction, after its quarrel with Sparta, for anti-Spartan elements such as the Athenian democratic exiles.

Theban culture is indicated by the presence there of the philosopher, Lysis, a Pythagorean refugee from Italy (*Mor.* 583), who perhaps taught Epameinondas (N.H.Demand (1982) p.80). With this background, and a willingness to develop new ideas in the formation and use of the phalanx, it may not be strange that Thebes found the potentiality to challenge the established leadership of Greece. Thebes found also the vital necessity to make that challenge, when the threat to its very existence was imposed by Sparta, in creating the ring of hostile garrisons inside the borders of Boiotia - chiefly at Thespieae, Haliartos and Orchomenos. When the chance came, Thebes was also fortunate in having in Epameinondas, Pelopidas and others, men of courage with the ability to take it. Plutarch, as one on the periphery

of Greece and Boiotian, had some sympathy with the Theban position and in this way viewed Sparta critically. Since both Thebes and Sparta felt themselves hemmed in by potentially hostile neighbours, neither should be faulted for being motivated by self-protection: what may be judged is their respective treatment of each other.

δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο τοῖς ὕστερον ἐποίησεν. 6 ἐπεὶ γὰρ φοιβίδας ἔργον εἰργάσατο δεινὸν ἐν σπονδαῖς καὶ εἰρήνῃ τὴν Καδμεῖαν καταλαβών, καὶ πάντες μὲν ἡγανόκτουσιν οἱ Ἕλληνες, χαλεπῶς δ' ἔφερον οἱ Σπαρτιῶται.

For topography, see S.Symeonoglou (1985), and the review by G.Huxley (1987). Thebes, like Sparta, had no unassailable citadel. The Kadmeia is a striking feature, but hardly a formidable stronghold. The substantial stone wall round it now visible has been identified as of late fourth century construction. Its main importance, particularly for the Spartan occupation, was its use as the meeting place for the Council of the Confederacy. Some such meeting may even, though there is no record of this, have continued despite the autonomy clause, until now.

Plutarch condemns the action of Phoibidas as a violation of the Peace, overlooking Xenophon's report (*Hell.* V.ii.26-27), perhaps intended as uncomplimentary to Thebes by its author, whoever that was, of the betrayal to Phoibidas by one of the polemarchs, Leontiades. Secret arrangements of this kind cannot readily be checked, but other features of the event render this aspect less important: what matters more is why and how the seizure was accomplished. From Xenophon's account (*Hell.* V.ii.11-36), it is clear that Sparta was continuing an interest in the northern region, which he calls Thrace, and the cities of Chalkidike. This can perhaps be understood only as a design to frustrate Theban interests, and to prevent the securing of friends who might counteract the encirclement of Boiotia by Spartan garrisons. Xenophon records three other matters: the decision of the assembly of

the allies to allow the Lakedaimonians to impose a fine upon any who failed to supply troops when required; also that according to Leontiades a proclamation had been made forbidding Thebans to serve in the force which Phoibidas was collecting for the Thracian expedition; and, further, that Phoibidas, who had been sent in response to appeals from Apollonia and Akanthos for help against the encroachments of Olynthos, had himself encamped near the *gymnasion* outside Thebes. He gives no reason why Phoibidas should have delayed his march north in this manner, but it seems reasonable to suppose that the three recorded facts are relevant, and that Phoibidas was there to collect either the troops or the fine. Collusion with Leontiades, who was friendly to Sparta, and may well have used Phoibidas to score over his opponent, Ismenias, clearly would make the task much easier. When Leontiades later came to Sparta to address the Lakedaimonians, he promised that Thebes would now fulfil all demands that were made. Xenophon says that as a result the Lakedaimonians were now in better spirits for the expedition: presumably they had ensured a friendly Thebes that would not hinder their communications, or block any retreat of the allies. However, Plutarch's complaint is still justified, for occupation exceeded the collection of the fine that was allowed. Even Xenophon has admitted that it caused the annoyance of the ephors and Spartiates and aroused the indignation of the gods (*Hell.* V.ii.32, iv.1).

καὶ μάλιστα οἱ διαφερόμενοι τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ μετ' ὀργῆς ἐπυνθάνοντο τοῦ Φοιβίδου τίνος ταῦτα κελεύσαντος ἔπραξεν, εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὴν ὑπόνοιαν τρέποντες.

If the above interpretation is correct, Phoibidas will have been empowered to deal with the question of the Theban contribution to the expeditionary force, and that may explain Diodoros' statement (XV.20) that Spartan commanders were given secret instructions to take any

opportunity to seize the Kadmeia, although according to the ephors and the majority of the citizens the occupation of the Kadmeia was not so authorized (Xen. *Hell.* V.ii.32). Xenophon's account, at this point, ignores the question of the fine, and instead stresses the personal element, first in Leontiades' flattery of Phoibidas, next in the criticism of Phoibidas' character (*Hell.* V.ii.27-8), and finally where Agesilaos suggests that Phoibidas was right to have acted on his own initiative, if Sparta benefited (*Hell.* V.ii.32). The seizure of the Kadmeia is separated by Xenophon from the decision to keep a guard there, for that was taken only after Leontiades had advised it (V.ii.33-5), transferring the guilt from the Spartans. Plutarch seems to have been dissatisfied with Xenophon's failure to confront the issue directly, and implies the existence at Sparta of some suspicion that there were secret instructions.

7 οὐκ ὤκνησε τῷ Φοιβίδῳ βοηθῶν λέγειν ἀναφανδὸν ὅτι δεῖ τὴν πράξιν αὐτὴν εἶ τι χρήσιμον ἔχει σκοπεῖν· τὰ γὰρ συμφέροντα τῇ Λακεδαιμόνι καλῶς ἔχειν αὐτοματίζεσθαι, κἂν μηδεὶς κελεύσῃ.

In c.20 Plutarch described how Agesilaos made friends by helping men in their difficulties, and he later appointed Phoibidas harmost at Thespiai (Xen. *Hell.* V.iv.41-6). In practical politics, the interest of the state - ultimately the secure survival of the state - is paramount. Even if the distinction is to be drawn between the short term and the long term, the guiding principle will still be the national interest. Plutarch records Agesilaos' equation of national interest with honourable action, an equation found also in the Melian Dialogue (Thuc. V.105), where the Athenians quote the Spartans' belief that what suits their interest is just. Xenophon reports Agesilaos' view, based on ancient practice, that authorization is not required for service to the state: εἰ δ' ἀγαθὰ, ὀρχαῖον εἶναι νόμιμον ἐξεῖναι τὰ τοιαῦτα αὐτοσχεδιόζειν, and the moral implication of his question, πότερον ἀγαθὰ

ἡ κακὰ ἐστὶ τὰ πεπραγμένα, is shown clearly to be related not to ethical principle but only to the initial pragmatism: ὁ μέντοι Ἀγησίλαος ἔλεγεν ὅτι εἰ μὲν βλαβερὰ τῇ Λακεδαίμονι πεπραχῶς εἴη, δίκαιος εἴη ζημιοῦσθαι (*Hell.* V.ii.32). Thus Spartan justice regards a crime as an injury to the state, while service to the state is simply part of the Spartan tradition, a matter not for the laws of morality but for individual decision and endeavour. Agesilaos is extending domestic justice to international affairs: unless the deed is injurious to the state, the law does not operate. Xenophon records no punishment of Phoibidas, and it is Leontiades the Theban who convinces the Spartans that it is in their interest to continue the occupation. Plutarch here introduces the moral element, by substituting καλῶς ἔχειν for Xenophon's ἐξεῖναι, and so can take the discussion further into the theory of individual ethics in the rest of the chapter. The world view has changed (O.Murray (1972) pp.200-13).

8 καίτοι τῷ λόγῳ πανταχοῦ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀπέβαινε πρωτεύειν τῶν ὀρετῶν· ἀνδρίας μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι, μὴ παρούσης δικαιοσύνης, εἰ δὲ δίκαιοι πάντες γένοιντο, μηδὲν ἀνδρίας δεήσεσθαι.

Plutarch attributes to Agesilaos a contradiction between the above policy and his statement of the primacy of the principle of justice, in which the quiet virtue is said to have priority over all others, so that Phoibidas' unjust action (ἔργον εἰργάσατο δεινὸν) is not to be defended successfully by expediency. To facilitate Plutarch's *e fortiori* argument, the expedient action of Phoibidas requires to be replaced by the example of the chief active virtue, courage (ἀνδρεία). "Courage is useless if it lacks justice; courage is useless if there is justice already there." The instability of the active, competitive virtue, courage, contrasts with the stability of the quiet, co-operative virtue, justice. Courage is desirable in order to make a change *to*, not *in* or *from*, a just situation.

9 πρὸς δὲ τοὺς λέγοντας ὅτι ταῦτα δοκεῖ τῷ μεγάλῳ βασιλεῖ, τί δ' ἐκεῖνος ἐμοῦ, εἶπε, μείζων, εἰ μὴ καὶ δικαιότερος; ὀρθῶς καὶ καλῶς οἰόμενος δεῖν τῷ δικαίῳ καθάπερ μέτρῳ βασιλικῷ μετρεῖσθαι τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ μείζονος.

The argument is questioned by a reference to an invalid counter example, which concedes the supposed Persian lack of courage: the King would not be disadvantaged in a world which dispensed with the need for it. He would then, however, have to prove his greatness - "that he was more entitled to be called Great King" - by being more just, but, of course, justice is another, even clearer, supposed Persian deficiency. Agesilaos' belief in the primacy of justice is thus confirmed. In suggesting that "Justice must be the standard by which to measure the quality of a king", he departs from the Homeric standard of ὀρετή, as seen in the comparison of Achilles and Agamemnon:

εἰ δὲ σὺ καρτερός ἐσσι, θεὰ δέ σε γείνατο μήτηρ,
ἄλλ' ὃ γε φέρτερός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πλεόνεσσιν ἀνόσσει
(*Iliad* I.281-2).

But another poet, Terpander, attributes justice to the early Spartans as some form of open assessment of worthy actions:

Ἐνθ' αἰχμὰ τε νέων θάλλει καὶ μῶσα λίγεια
καὶ δίκη εὐρυάγυια, καλῶν ἐπιτόρροθος ἔργων.

10 ἦν δὲ τῆς εἰρήνης γενομένης ἔπεμψεν αὐτῷ περὶ ξενίας καὶ φιλίας ἐπιστολὴν ὃ βασιλεύς οὐκ ἔλαβεν, εἰπὼν ἐξορκεῖν τὴν κοινὴν φιλίαν καὶ μηδὲν ἰδίας δεήσεσθαι μενούσης ἐκείνης.

Having disposed of the chief rival contender for primacy, ἀνδρία, Plutarch now returns the argument to the absolute value of the quiet virtues, for, in Agesilaos' response to the King, the security of the friendly relationship implies the primacy of the quiet virtue of honour. Friendship is said to have binding force, presumably even at the expense of expediency, and personal commitment is as reliable in public treaties as it is in private agreements, requiring no institutional re-inforcement. In the King's world, Agesilaos had observed that personal ties were exploited, as in the marriage of Cotys and

Spithridates' daughter (c.11), which he had himself arranged.

11 ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔργοις οὐκέτι ταύτην διαφυλάττων τὴν δόξαν, ἀλλὰ τῇ φιλοτιμίᾳ καὶ τῇ φιλονεικίᾳ πολλαχοῦ συνεκφερόμενος, καὶ μάλιστα τῇ πρὸς Θηβαίους.

Plutarch now resumes the case of Phoibidas and the theme of the decline of Agesilaos. The biographer believed that a man's character was displayed in his actions. Although, in a sense, words and actions are equivalents, as in Thucydides I.23, a man's actions and his words may not be consistent, and the actions need to be assessed. Socrates' perfect man, *knowing* what is right, will not do wrong; a lesser man may have τὴν δόξαν and may be judged adversely if he does not follow it (*Protagoras* 345d; G.M.A.Grube (1935) p.216). Thus what Agesilaos does is more revealing than what he says, and it is by the two competitive virtues attributed to Agesilaos, τῇ φιλοτιμίᾳ καὶ τῇ φιλονεικίᾳ, for which he was praised at c.2, that his actions are determined, rather than by the abstract professions that have just been assigned to him. At c.5 Plutarch warned that, although these virtues were introduced by the Spartan lawgiver, there were reservations, and the quarrel between Agesilaos and Lysander at cc.7-8 illustrated the dangers caused by indulging them to excess. Here the key word is συνεκφερόμενος: Agesilaos is at fault in indulging his hatred of Thebes to excessive lengths. Plutarch approves the Lykourgan ideal, but finds fault with Agesilaos' deviation from it.

οὐ μόνον ἔσωσε τὸν φοιβίδαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔπεισεν εἰς ἐαυτὴν ἀναδέξασθαι τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ κατέχειν τὴν Κορμεῖαν δι' ἐαυτῆς, τῶν δὲ πραγμάτων καὶ τῆς πολιτείας Ἀρχίαν καὶ Λεοντιάδαν ἀποδεῖξαι κυρίους, δι' ὧν ὁ φοιβίδας εἰσῆλθε καὶ κατέλαβε τὴν ἀκρόπολιν.

With the saving of Phoibidas, Plutarch returns to the beginning of the argument, when Agesilaos helped him by defending him. There is a continuity in the argument, in that the active virtues activate the principle of the interest of Sparta, overpowering the quiet virtues, and this leads to the injustice of the acquittal of Phoibidas. Plutarch now

shows that there are consequences on a higher level, for Sparta is persuaded, first, to involve itself in the action by taking on the responsibility for the seizure, and, then, to authorize the continued occupation of the Kadmeia. The city is thus also guilty of the injustice, explicitly so called to give definition to the original ἔργον δεινόν above. The city may now be expected also to share in the eventual decline, having compounded the crime by putting Thebes in the hands of the traitors, Archias and Leontiades. Xenophon names only Leontiades as the conspirator and as leader of the government set up by the Spartans, but at V.iv.2 Archias is polemarch, and both are killed by the liberators. It is only here that Plutarch mentions Theban collaborators, having allowed attention to focus on the moral argument, and the parts played by Phoibidas, Agesilaos and Sparta.

CHAPTER 24

Spartan interventions in Thebes and Attika

1 Ἦν μὲν οὖν εὐθὺς ἐκ τούτων ὑπόνοια φοιβίδου μὲν ἔργον εἶναι, βούλευμα δ' Ἀγησιλάου τὸ πεπραγμένον· αἱ δ' ὕστερον πρόξεις ὁμολογουμένην ἐποίησαν τὴν αἰτίαν.

The opponents of Agesilaos were suspicious when the seizure of the Kadmeia was first known, in c.23, and since then, two new factors have more publicly directed attention towards Agesilaos: the rescue of Phoibidas and the retention of the Kadmeia, and these have suggested that planning for the long-term had determined the action. The accumulation of grounds for the growing public suspicion, culminating in general agreement, seems to indicate Plutarch's own acceptance of Agesilaos' involvement. Plutarch has omitted much of Xenophon's narrative for the next three years, but he seems to have noted his admission that it was under Lakedaimonian control that Thebes had been subjected to the rule of tyrants: βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίοις δουλεύειν τὴν πόλιν ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν (*Hell.* V.iv.1), and the correspondence between this statement and Agesilaos' reluctance to risk being accused of helping tyrants: ὅπως βοηθήσειε τοῖς τυράννοις (V.iv.13). He evidently takes this as indicating that Agesilaos had had a hand in installing the tyrants at Thebes.

2 ὥς γὰρ ἐξέβαλον οἱ Θηβαῖοι τὴν φρουρὰν καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἡλευθέρωσαν, ἐγκαλῶν αὐτοῖς ὅτι τὸν Ἀρχίαν καὶ τὸν Λεοντιάδαν ἀπεκτόνεσαν, ἔργῳ μὲν τυράννους, λόγῳ δὲ πολεμάρχους ὄντας, ἐξήνεγκε πόλεμον πρὸς αὐτούς.

Plutarch gives fuller accounts of the liberation of Thebes at *De Genio Socr.* 594Bff. and *Pelopidas* 7-13. He avoids duplication where Agesilaos is not concerned directly, and here makes only this brief reference, but he supplies later, when they are needed, the relevant details of the events at Olynthos and Phleious which occupied the intervening three years in Xenophon's account.

Neither Xenophon nor Diodoros mentions Agesilaos' accusation against the Thebans, but both record the punishment of the Spartan

commander or commanders of the garrison. Xenophon makes the Lakedaimonians call out the ban, as if to recover Thebes, but not to punish anyone else. The ephors then send Kleombrotos in command "on receiving information about those banished after the slaughter in Thebes", evidently to restore them to power there, for it was "tyrants" that Agesilaos really wished to avoid being seen to be helping, when he declined the command, though he made out that it was because of his age (*Hell.* V.iv.13). No doubt, Plutarch assigns the accusation to Agesilaos as the motive for the declaration of war, in order to advertise more emphatically the fact that they were tyrants.

3 καὶ Κλεόμβροτος ἤδη βασιλεύων Ἀγησιπόλιδος τεθνηκότος εἰς Βοιωτίαν ἐπέμφθη μετὰ δυνάμεως.

Agesipolis died of fever on the campaign against Olynthos, of which he eventually became the commander, after first Phoibidas and his brother, Eudamidas, and then Teleutias, too, had been sent. Since Agesilaos was not involved, Plutarch has not included the episode. He has mentioned the relevant part of it now to fill the gap in the information available to the reader.

ὁ γὰρ Ἀγησίλαος, ὥς ἔτη τεσσαράκοντα γεγονώς ἀφ' ἥβης καὶ στρατείας ἔχων ἄφεσιν ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων, ἔφυγε τὴν στρατηγίαν ἐκείνην, αἰσχυνόμενος εἰ φλιασίοις ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν ὑπὲρ φυγάδων πεπολεμηκώς αὐθις ὀφθήσεται θηβαίους κακῶς ποιῶν διὰ τοὺς τυράννους.

Plutarch fills another gap that he has left in the narrative, by referring to the campaign against Phleious for the restoration of exiled aristocrats. Xenophon had already recorded this at *Hell.* V.iii.10-25, mentioning the comment of some of the Lakedaimonians there, that they were making themselves unpopular ὀλίγων ἔνεκεν ἀνθρώπων. Plutarch seems to have associated this with Xenophon's mention here of the tyrants at Thebes. Xenophon's account indicates that there would have been opposition to Agesilaos at Thebes, as at Phleious. Plutarch's comparison implies that the oligarchic exiles at Phleious were in the same category as tyrants, in Agesilaos' view, if the interpretation is

correct, and perhaps this was Plutarch's view, too. Xenophon's view is expressed clearly: τὰ περὶ Ἀρχίαν τε τὸν πολεμαρχοῦντα καὶ τὴν περὶ Φίλιππον τυραννίδα (*Hell.* V.iv.2). The government of Archias had been a tyranny, and the exiles to be restored would no doubt have been similar. Agesilaos is imagined as quoting the adverse criticism he feared in the phrase Θηβαίους κακῶς ποιῶν. The residual moral element in the adverb clearly indicates the attitude of Plutarch.

4 ἦν δέ τις Λόκων Σφοδρίας ἐκ τῆς ὑπεναντίας στάσεως τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ τεταγμένος ἐν Θεσπιαῖς ὁρμοστής, οὐκ ἄτολμος μὲν οὐδ' ἀφιλότιμος ἀνὴρ, ἀεὶ δ' ἐλπιδὼν μᾶλλον ἢ φρενῶν ἀγαθῶν μεστός.

Plutarch's narrative and technique are treated here and the other evidence for this episode is discussed separately at Endnote 7. This type of opening, like "Once upon a time", gives Plutarch the opportunity to present relevant pieces of background information, and also key words denoting the characteristics which will determine the progress of the episode, Sphodrias' daring, enterprise, optimism and intellectual weakness. Xenophon gives no character study of Sphodrias, and Diodoros (XV.29.5) has only φύσει δ' ὄντος μετεώρου καὶ προπετοῦς. Although Xenophon records both the raid into Attika and the subsequent reactions to it in *Hellenika*, in *Agesilaos* the episode receives no mention at all. It would be inappropriate in the encomium to suggest Agesilaos' personal involvement in what, as Xenophon himself says, many judged to have been the most unjust decision ever made in Lakeldaimon (*Hell.* V.iv.24), and what is reported in *Hellenika* fails to penetrate to the central issues.

5 οὗτος ἐπιθυμῶν ὀνόματος μεγάλου, καὶ τὸν φοιβίδαν νομίζων ἔνδοξον γεγονέναι καὶ περιβόητον ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ θήβας τολμήματος, ἐπείσθη πολὺ κάλλιον εἶναι καὶ λαμπρότερον εἰ τὸν Πειραιᾶ καταλάβοι δι' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀφέλοιτο τὴν θάλασσαν, ἐκ γῆς ὁπροσδοκῆτως ἐπελθών.

Plutarch continues the idea of Sphodrias' enterprising character and daring, attributing to him the wish, which Xenophon does not mention, to rival the achievement of Phoibidas. The surprise

occupation of the Peiraeus from well to the west across the Thriasian Plain, out of sight of Athens, was itself not an impossibility as regards topography. The significance of the port is Athens' vital need of imported corn, and consequently any threat to the supply was of great advantage to an enemy. Teleutias had made a successful and daring attack on Peiraeus from the sea at Xen. *Hell.* V.i.19, finding the Athenians totally unprepared, and Konon's repaired walls may have been breached again after the Peace (ὅτι δὴ ἀπύλωτος ἦν *Hell.* V.i.20). The port will certainly have seemed vulnerable.

6 λέγουσι δὲ τοῦτο μηχανήμα γενέσθαι τῶν περὶ Πελοπίδαν καὶ Μέλωνα βοιωταρχῶν. ὑπέπεμψαν γὰρ ἀνθρώπους λακωνίζειν προσποιουμένους, οἱ τὸν Σφοδρίαν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ μεγαλύνοντες ὡς ἔργου τηλικούτου μόνον ὄξιον, ἐπῆραν καὶ παρώρμησαν ἀνελέσθαι πρᾶξιν ἄδικον μὲν ὁμοίως ἐκείνῃ καὶ παράνομον, τόλμης δὲ καὶ τύχης ἐνδεᾶ γενομένην.

Plutarch shows Sphodrias' weakness in being persuaded to undertake the mission. He has retained the Theban connection, from Xenophon's account (*Hell.* V.iv.20), but only to reinforce by flattery the existing temptation to undertake the enterprise, and he has discarded Xenophon's suggestion that bribery was suspected (χρήματα δόντες, ὡς ὑπωπτεύετο), as he almost does explicitly, after mentioning it, at *Pelopidas* 14. Plutarch has named the Thebans as Pelopidas and Gorgias at *Pelopidas* 14, where, too, they use a single merchant as intermediary. At the start of the action he gives a clear indication of its unjust nature, repeats the key idea of the daring involved, and adds that the essential requirement of good luck was missing.

7 ἡμέρα γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ θριασίῳ πεδίῳ κατέλαβε καὶ κατέλαμψεν ἐλπίσαντα νυκτὸς προσμίξειν τῷ Πειραιεῖ. καὶ φῶς ἀφ' ἱερῶν τινῶν Ἐλευσινόθεν ἰδόντας λέγουσι φρῖξαι καὶ περιφόβους γενέσθαι τοὺς στρατιώτας. 8 αὐτὸς δὲ τοῦ θράσους ἐξέπεσεν, ὡς οὐκέτι λαθεῖν ἦν, καὶ τινα βραχεῖαν ἀρπαγὴν θέμενος, αἰσχυρῶς ἀνεχώρησε καὶ ἀδόξως εἰς τὰς Θεσπιάς.

That Sphodrias was unlucky to be overtaken by daylight is suggested by Plutarch's choice of verb, and it is the consequence of this, that the hope of reaching Peiraeus in darkness was unfulfilled,

which immediately warns of the ultimate failure of the mission, forming a turning point in the story. It seems that Plutarch, or at any rate the soldiers, believed that the light that appeared was an indication of a divine warning. Sphodrias' failure of nerve, however, is more rational, but that Plutarch wished to emphasize the moral aspect of the failure may be indicated by the elaborate chiasmic pattern of the composition at this point. In describing the nervousness of the soldiers, he has placed one of the verbs first and the accusative subject last: φρῖξαι καὶ περιφόβους γενέσθαι τοὺς στρατιώτας. In describing Sphodrias' failure of nerve, however, he has placed the verb last and the subject nominative first: αὐτὸς δὲ τοῦ θρόσους ἐξέπεσεν, reversing the order. The commander is thus contrasted with the men by juxtaposition, and the reasons for their nervousness are given in prominent positions, that of the commander explaining his next course of action. This is presented by Plutarch with condemnatory adverbs, thus closing the action with a return to his initial description.

9 ἐκ δὲ τούτου κατήγοροι μὲν ἐπέμφθησαν εἰς Σπάρτην ἐξ Ἀθηναίων, εὖρον δὲ κατηγόρων μηδὲν ἐπὶ τὸν Σφοδρίαν δεομένους τοὺς ὄρχοντας, ἀλλὰ θανάτου κρίσιν αὐτῷ προειρηκότας, ἦν ἐκεῖνος ὑπομένειν ἀπέγνων, φοβούμενος τὴν ὀργὴν τῶν πολιτῶν, αἰσχυνομένων τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ βουλομένων συναδικεῖσθαι δοκεῖν, ἵνα μὴ συναδικεῖν δοκῶσιν.

Plutarch omits entirely Xenophon's report of the three Lakedaimonian envoys who happened to be in Athens at this time. It is, perhaps, not unlikely that Athenian accusers went in person to Sparta to reinforce the envoys' complaint, and the two versions could be complementary rather than contradictory. The capital charge brought by the magistrates in the end is the same. Plutarch ends with Sphodrias' assessment of the expected reaction of the Spartan citizens, which corresponds in function, though not in content, to the assertions of the envoys in Athens, suggesting that the enterprise was not authorized by the city. The episode is closed with the two

compound infinitives whose stems return to the first description of the action as πρᾶξιν ᾧδικον.

A major problem in attempting to penetrate this secret operation is the Theban involvement. Xenophon records it explicitly, and adds that bribery was suspected:

Οἱ Θηβαῖοι . . . πείθουσι τὸν ἐν ταῖς Θεσπιαῖς ἄρμοσθην Σφοδρίαν, χρήματα δόντες, ὥς ὑπωπτεύετο, ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν, ἵν' ἐκπολεμώσῃε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. κἀκεῖνος πειθόμενος αὐτοῖς, προσποιησάμενος τὸν Πειραιᾶ καταλήψεσθαι (*Hell.* V.iv.20).

Plutarch, indicating some uncertainty with λέγουσι, ignores the bribe here, although he admits its slight influence at *Pelopidas* 14. Thereafter he and Xenophon make no further reference to Theban responsibility. The Athenians were apparently in no doubt, for they at once denounced Sphodrias to the Spartans, and it is difficult to see that the Athenians could so readily have joined the Thebans at V.iv.34, if they had suspected them of complicity. Theban involvement may therefore be discounted, and it would be a difficult task to explain how the Thebans might expect to bring Athens into war with Sparta in this way, since they could not be at all sure that Sparta would not disown Sphodrias' action. Plutarch's other suggestion is that Sphodrias acted on his own initiative, but there is no mention of the use of this in his defence here, although Agesilaos had approved of Phoibidas' use of his initiative, and it was employed successfully in his defence (*Xen. Hell.* V.ii.32).

Plutarch has not distinguished between an invasion of Attika and the capture of Peiraeus, which Xenophon attributes only to the mind of Sphodrias. The distance involved makes Peiraeus an impossible destination for an overnight march, one which an experienced Spartan harmost is unlikely to have attempted, and since it was not attained, the expedition may be considered as what it turned out to be. Plutarch follows Xenophon in recording the final plundering of the land, but while Plutarch says it was no longer possible to escape

observation, Xenophon says that Sphodrias was doing nothing to avoid it even at Thria. This suggests that Sphodrias' task was perhaps to demonstrate the vulnerability of the unguarded frontier of Attika, and the night march would then have been timed accurately to ensure penetration into Athenian territory in darkness. The purpose may even have been to establish Spartan control of the pass by the garrison of Thespiiai, which Agesilaos certainly made use of at *Hell.* V.iv.37, without further dispute. Once in Athenian territory, according to Xenophon, Sphodrias made no effort to avoid detection, and, indeed his presence was noticed and reported to the Athenians, who arranged to intercept him. There is no justification at this stage in Xenophon's account for criticism of Sphodrias, and he has made no comment in breaking off his account at the start of the return to Thespiiai. Plutarch ends the action with the Spartans' loss of nerve, absent from Xenophon's account. He is explaining what he sees as the failure of the expedition, and, having already described Sphodrias as ἐλπίδων μᾶλλον ἢ φρενῶν ἀγαθῶν μεστός, and his objective as something λαμπρότερον, he has imputed weakness of character. Xenophon gives no characterization of Sphodrias, but he had described Phoibidas at *Hell.* V.ii.28: οὐδὲ πᾶν φρόνιμος, and his objective as something λαμπρόν. Plutarch may have adapted these phrases in describing Sphodrias and analysing his performance.

The King's Peace was still being observed at this time, yet the situation was becoming highly charged, for, as Plutarch records at c.26 and Xenophon at *Hell.* V.iv.34, the Athenians prepared for war as the eventual consequence of the whole episode, and the outrage was the occasion for the breaking of the Peace, and the cause of the resumption of hostilities. It was believed also to have led Athens to found the Second Confederacy, until the reliability of Diodoros' account (XV.25-35) was largely reinstated, and the Confederacy was shown to have been founded early in 378, before Sphodrias' raid, for which it

was therefore responsible (G.L.Cawkwell (1973) pp.46-60, followed by R.M.Kallett-Marx (1985) pp.127-51, with the further modification in the chronology, that the events of Diodoros XV.28.2 precede even those of XV.27.3).

The affairs of Athens and Thebes, from the seizure of the Kadmeia down to 379/8, even omitting the foundation of the Confederacy, reveal clearly enough that Athenian relations with Sparta had been tense, and further embroilment in Theban politics in 379/8, at the liberation, meant that Athens was in a far from secure position regarding possible reprisals. There had been a strong Spartan garrison in Thebes and another at Thespiiai, and Plataia still supplied help to the Spartans in response to the harmost's appeal (Xen. *Hell.* V.iv.10). The Athenians were already alert to some danger at the frontier when they sent Chabrias out to guard the pass at Eleutherai (Xen. *Hell.* V.iv.14-16), and the guard was retained, conceivably in case Kleombrotos returned that way from Thespiiai. It may also have been keeping the Athenians' line of retreat open, for according to Diodoros' account, Athenian help in the liberation of Thebes included the dispatch of an expedition by formal decree (XV.25.4-26.1). Some Athenians were at Thebes attacking the Akropolis soon after the city was recovered:

ἔπεμψαν δ' ἱππέας οἱ κατεληλυθότες καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς πρὸς τοῖς ὀρίοις Ἀθηναίων δύο τῶν στρατηγῶν . . . καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρίων ἤδη παρήσαν (Xen. *Hell.* V.iv.9, 10),

and Athenians were still there to save some endangered citizens, after the garrison's withdrawal from the Akropolis (Xen. *Hell.* V.iv.12). If the decree mentioned by the orator Dinarchos at I.39 about help to be sent for the Theban exiles refers to the recovery of the Kadmeia (G.L.Cawkwell (1973) p.57), it is evidence that the Athenians' presence was officially sanctioned. Whether they were officially sent or not, however, Kleombrotos, who was sent to Boiotia, may, perhaps, not have wished to break the Peace by engaging them. It was after his return that the two generals were brought to trial: again, perhaps, to

preserve the Peace. Xenophon gives no evidence to show whether the Athenian assistance was official or unofficial, but he indicates that the condemnation of the generals was not because of their guilt, but for fear of war with Sparta, making them the scapegoats (*Hell.* V.iv.19: οὕτως ἐφοβοῦντο). He had already claimed that Sparta had secured Athenian isolation: Ἀθηναίους δ' ἡρημῶσθαι (*Hell.* V.iii.27), and the troops that Kleombrotos had left at Thespiiai would not have diminished anxiety at Athens (*Xen. Hell.* V.iv.15).

This isolation, however, refers only to Sparta's hold on Olynthos and Central Greece, and Sparta also had reason to be anxious, for Athens had begun to make treaties with states soon after the King's Peace, and an inscription (Tod 118) shows Chios in alliance by 384/3. This Athenian diplomatic activity, the shelter provided for the exiles, always a threat to the puppet government in Thebes, and the support given to the liberators, could appear to the Spartans as indications of an approaching crisis, and if the new Theban regime continued to enjoy this support, it would be indebted to the Athenians and friendly to them, an intolerable prospect requiring prompt action from Sparta. The raid and the embassy, which Xenophon records at Athens without specifying its purpose, have been perceived as a Spartan reaction to the same event, viz. the foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy (G.L.Cawkwell (1973) p.55), and even if this Confederacy was not yet fully in existence, it still presented a potential threat to Sparta while it was evolving in its early stages, long before Sphodrias' raid. The embassy was intended, it may be conjectured, to put pressure on Athens to remain neutral, and also to discourage the new League, if it was one of those mentioned by Diodoros (XV.28.4), as is probable (G.L.Cawkwell (1973) p.55). Sphodrias' expedition may have been intended to exert more pressure, perhaps, and to make a demonstration of force, in impatience with a stubborn resistance, on the part of the Athenians, to Sparta's diplomatic reaction to the Athenian alliances. If

this was so, the plan failed, for according to Xenophon the Athenians were alerted and defended themselves: οἱ μὲν δὴ ταχὺ ὀπλίσσμενοι καὶ ἱππεῖς καὶ ὀπλῖται ἐν φυλακῇ τῆς πόλεως ἦσαν (*Hell.* V.iv.21).

Negotiating the acquittal of Sphodrias

1 Εἶχεν οὖν υἷδν ὁ Σφοδρίας Κλεώνυμον, οὗ παιδὸς ὄντος ἔτι καὶ καλοῦ τὴν ὄψιν Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ Ἀγησιλάου τοῦ βασιλέως υἱὸς ἦρα.

Xenophon introduces Kleonymos in the same narrative style that Plutarch used to introduce Sphodrias at c.24. Plutarch has varied the form, but retains the story-teller's stance. Although both authors use the terminology of a legal trial, they record only the development of attitudes which determined in advance the decision of any formal court that may have heard the case. Of such a trial only the verdict is known. The context for the resolution here of the different political and social alignments is provided by the sort of relationship which was clearly important for both Xenophon and Plutarch. It has occurred already at cc.2, 11, 13, and now involves Agesilaos' son, Archidamos. Xenophon describes Kleonymos as κάλλιστός τε καὶ εὐδοκιμώτατος τῶν ἡλίκων (*Hell.* V.iv.25), while Plutarch is more restrained: καλοῦ τὴν ὄψιν.

2 καὶ τότε συνηγωνία μὲν ὡς εἰκὸς αὐτῷ κινδυνεύοντι περὶ τοῦ πατρός, συμπράττειν δὲ φανερώς καὶ βοηθεῖν οὐκ εἶχεν· ἦν γὰρ ὁ Σφοδρίας ἐκ τῶν διαφόρων τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου.

Archidamos' involvement is recorded by Xenophon only in response to Kleonymos' request for help, but Plutarch has portrayed as spontaneous his desire to help, and records its frustration by the opposing political alignments of their fathers. Xenophon does not speak of this opposition directly, though it is implied later in the reference to the views of Agesilaos' friends (*Hell.* V.iv.32). He refers initially only to the friendship of Sphodrias with the other king, Kleombrotos. That the friendship of the king's son involves the son of a friend of the other king indicates a degree of social mobility, which may, perhaps, have been reflected in their attendance earlier at the same φιλότιον or φιλίτιον (*Xen. Hell.* V.iv.28; cf. *Agesilaos* V.1, *Lak. Pol.* III.5; S.Hodkinson (1983) p.252). It may be that Agesilaos exploited his

son's relationships, either by planning this connection from its inception or manipulating it now, in order to infiltrate his colleague's circle, as has been suggested (P.A.Cartledge (1987) p.147).

3 τοῦ δὲ Κλεωνύμου προσελθόντος αὐτῷ καὶ μετὰ δεήσεως καὶ δακρύων ἐντυχόντος, ὅπως τὸν Ἀγησίλαον εὖνουν παράσχη, μάλιστα γὰρ ἐκεῖνον αὐτοῖς φοβερόν εἶναι, τρεῖς μὲν ἢ τέσσαρας ἡμέρας αἰδούμενος τὸν πατέρα καὶ δεδιώς σιωπῇ παρηκολούθει. 4 τέλος δὲ τῆς κρίσεως ἐγγὺς οὔσης, ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὸν Ἀγησίλαον ὅτι Κλεώνυμος αὐτοῦ δεηθείη περὶ τοῦ πατρὸς.

In recording Kleonymos' approach, Plutarch again presents a spontaneous action, whereas Xenophon specifically mentions that it was Sphodrias' suggestion that his son should seek Archidamos' help. The spontaneity enhances the relationship, and its impact in the context. The son's fear of Agesilaos, implying that he and his friends would be hostile to Sphodrias, here replaces the anxiety, in Xenophon, of Kleombrotos and his friends, whose inclination was to acquit Sphodrias. In neither version does Agesilaos declare himself at this point.

Where Xenophon says καὶ τῇ ὕστεραίᾳ δὲ ταῦτά ταῦτα ἐποίησεν, Plutarch seems to exaggerate the interval, but there is also a time during which the friends did not meet (*Hell.* V.iv.29), which Plutarch puts after Agesilaos' disappointing response below. In both versions, Agesilaos is shown as untypically unapproachable. Plutarch suggests, using the participial phrases, αἰδούμενος τὸν πατέρα καὶ δεδιώς, that Archidamos felt that he should not convey his friend's request, but Xenophon makes him actually acknowledge Sphodrias' guilt, first in telling Kleonymos that he could not look his father in the face, and then in agreeing with Agesilaos' condemnation (*Hell.* V.iv.27, 31). Plutarch reverses this impression of general unapproachability when he ends the chapter with Agesilaos' strong love of children, but Xenophon makes much more of it, repeating Archidamos' own hesitations because of the difficulty (*Hell.* V.iv.27-31).

5 ὁ δ' Ἀγησίλαος εἰδὼς ἐρῶντα τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον οὐκ ἔπαυσεν· ἦν γὰρ ὁ Κλεώνυμος εὐθύς ἐκ παίδων ἐπίδοξος, εἴ τις καὶ ἄλλος, ἀνὴρ ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖος. 6 οὐ μὴν ἐνέδωκέ τι τότε χρηστὸν ἢ φιλάνθρωπον ἐλπίσαι δεομένῳ τῷ παιδί, σκέψεσθαι δὲ φήσας ὅ τι καλῶς ἔχοι καὶ πρεπόντως, ἀπῆλθεν.

That the friendship had been noticed, and not stopped, may have been suggested to Plutarch by Xenophon's reference to Agesilaos' suspicion of Archidamos' movements: οὐδὲν μέντοι ἠρώτα, ἀλλ' εἷα αὐτόν (*Hell.* V.iv.29). Agesilaos' approval of his son's friendship here may also have been transferred from the commendation of Sphodrias' behaviour as a youth, when he was giving his final judgement: παῖς τε ὢν καὶ παιδίσκος καὶ ἡβῶν πάντα τὰ καλὰ ποιῶν διετέλεσε (*Xen.Hell.* V.iv.32). Plutarch curtails Xenophon's narrative by allowing the request to be made on only one occasion, instead of Xenophon's two. He had, of course, already used Archidamos' second suggestion at c.13 in illustrating Agesilaos' attitude to friendship with the letter about Nikias. While in Xenophon Agesilaos clearly asserts Sphodrias' guilt on both occasions, Plutarch only makes him resolve to consider what is right and proper.

8 τῶν Ἀγησιλάου φίλων Ἐτυμοκλῆς ἔν τινι κοινολογίᾳ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀπεγύμνωσε τὴν γνώμην τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου. 9 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔργον ὥς ἐνι μάλιστα ψέγειν αὐτόν, ἄλλως γε μὴν ἄνδρα τὸν Σφοδρίαν ἀγαθὸν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὁρᾶν τοιούτων στρατιωτῶν δεομένην.

Plutarch does not reveal any reason why Etymokles was chosen to carry the news. Xenophon names him as one of the three envoys at Athens at the time of the raid, suspected there of involvement in the plot (*Hell.* V.iv.22). Their expressed sense of outrage is consistent with that of the ephors in recalling Sphodrias to face the death penalty, and with Agesilaos' apparent reluctance to respond positively to his son's pleas for help. The friend of Sphodrias, in Xenophon's account, questioned Etymokles as one of the friends of Agesilaos who were going to execute Sphodrias, and so his change of attitude indicates the end of the danger. In Plutarch, Etymokles conveys this news unasked, suggesting, perhaps, that he had been sent to do so by Agesilaos, and

again curtailing Xenophon's account. It is only at this point that Agesilaos' criticism of Sphodrias is revealed by Plutarch, and it is followed immediately by the mitigating factor. The new prospect of war, with declining numbers of men eligible to be citizens and soldiers, will explain Agesilaos' reluctance to lose Sphodrias, bearing in mind particularly the effect of casualties on the small Spartiate community (cf. c.21 n.), but the emphasis, here and in Xenophon, is on quality.

10 τούτους γὰρ ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ἐκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἐποιεῖτο περὶ τῆς δίκης, τῷ παιδὶ χαρίζεσθαι βουλόμενος, ὥστε καὶ τὸν Κλεώνυμον εὐθὺς αἰσθάνεσθαι τὴν σπουδὴν τοῦ Ἀρχιδάμου, καὶ τοὺς φίλους τοὺς τοῦ Σφοδρίου θαρροῦντας ἤδη βοηθεῖν.

This is Plutarch's interpretation of Agesilaos' thoughts, not Xenophon's, though he has suggested it by making Agesilaos respond directly to Archidamos' plea for pardon ἡμῶν ἔνεκον (*Hell.V.iv.31*). Xenophon offers no other considerations which might have led Agesilaos to seek a reason to acquit Sphodrias despite his persistent condemnation of the raid. Plutarch has avoided this violent reversal, since he has not committed Agesilaos to such clear statements of guilt. He ends the account of the working of the friendship with only the immediate effect of Agesilaos' pronouncements on the friends of Sphodrias, and so he does not report Kleonymos' grateful promise to repay Archidamos by loyal service, and the fulfilment of the promise with his death at Leuktra, which conclude Xenophon's account. Xenophon's opinion of the affair is expressed at *Hell. V.iv.24*: καὶ πολλοῖς ἔδοξεν αὕτη δὴ ἀδικώτατα ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ἢ δίκη κριθῆναι. The unsatisfactory elements in his account are the result, perhaps, of his own personal embarrassment in recording the means by which the charges of bribery, and of acting against the interests of Sparta, were handled, and his final reference to loyalty seems to divert the reader's attention from Agesilaos to more pleasing aspects of traditional Spartan friendships.

11 ἦν δὲ καὶ φιλότεκνος ὁ Ἀγησίλαος διαφερόντως.

At the end of the chapter Plutarch returns the focus to Agesilaos with the anecdote about his playfulness when his children were young. He thus reverts to the personal ties on which the narrative has concentrated, suggesting that they were so strong in Agesilaos' nature as to justify the part they have been said earlier to have played. Plutarch reveals his interest in domestic life, here and in his several references in this *Life* to the female members of the family. The result of the trial is not given until the next chapter.

PART NINE

THEBES

(Chapters 26-28)

CHAPTER 26

Growing unpopularity of Agesilaos

1 Ἀπολυθέντος δὲ τοῦ Σφοδρίου, καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἐπύθοντο, πρὸς πόλεμον τραπομένων, σφόδρα κακῶς ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ἤκουσε δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἄτοπον καὶ παιδαριώδη δοκῶν ἐμποδὼν γεγονέναι κρίσει δικαίῳ καὶ τὴν πόλιν παραίτιον ἀπειργάσθαι παρανομημάτων τηλικούτων εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

To motivate the start of the next topic in the new chapter, Plutarch has used the delayed announcement of the verdict in the trial, and the Athenians' subsequent turning to war. The two participial phrases, arranged in a chiasmic pattern, give an ominous start, and may be compared with the similarly patterned phrases at the beginning of c.15, just before the arrival of the order for Agesilaos' recall from the east: Κινουμένης δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ πολλαχοῦ πρὸς ὁπίστροσιν ὑπεικούσης. At *Agesilaos* II.22 Xenophon defines Agesilaos' purpose in campaigning against Thebes as to help friends, but in *Hellenika*, having himself admitted the injustice of Sphodrias' acquittal, he links it with the Athenian preparations for war, and disingenuously gives the impression of political manipulation at Athens:

τῶν μέντοι Ἀθηναίων οἱ βοιωτιάζοντες ἐδίδασκον τὸν δῆμον ὡς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐχ ὅπως τιμωρήσαιντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαινέσειαν τὸν Σφοδρίαν, ὅτι ἐπεβούλευσε ταῖς Ἀθήναις (V.iv.34).

Plutarch disregards this further reference to Sphodrias' guilt, and even suggests that there were some Spartans, presumably Agesilaos' opponents, who complained of the shame incurred outside Sparta, for the unjust verdict and the injustice of inflicting a war on Greece. He continues to concentrate on Agesilaos' involvement rather than on Sphodrias', and seems to be rejecting the Athenians' interpretation, found in Xenophon, that the Spartans as a whole were responsible, though he may also have had local Boiotian sources, too. The attitude of Agesilaos' fellow citizens is used here to show the continued decline in his reputation, indirectly, in Homeric fashion, Ὀμηρικῶς, and Plutarch says nothing to make the reader dissent from their judgement. The frequent *P* sounds in this passage may suggest

emphasis, contempt, and indignation.

2 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸν Κλεόμβροτον οὐχ ἑώρα πρόθυμον ὄντα πολεμεῖν τοῖς
Θηβαίοις, οὕτω δὴ χαίρειν τὸν νόμον ἑάσας ᾧ πρόσθεν ἔχρητο περὶ τῆς
στρατείας, αὐτὸς εἰς Βοιωτίαν ἐνέβαλλεν ἤδη καὶ κακῶς ἐποίει τοὺς
Θηβαίους καὶ πάλιν ἀντέπασχεν, 3 ὥστε καὶ τρωθέντος αὐτοῦ τότε τὸν
Ἀνταλκίδαν εἶπεῖν.

Plutarch records other cases of action running counter to
professed principle. At c.13 Agesilaos disregarded strict justice, which
he approved in other cases, in order to win friends. Here his purpose
was the more effectively to harm enemies. Plutarch has given
Agesilaos the initiative for the invasion of Boiotia and has suitably
adjusted the motive, missing an opportunity to repeat Agesilaos'
readiness to comply with the city's needs. In contrast, Xenophon has
made two complimentary points, for it was the ephors who preferred
him: καὶ τὸν Ἀγησίλαον νομίσαντες φρονιμώτερον ἂν σφίσι τοῦ
Κλεομβρότου ἡγεῖσθαι, ἐδέοντο αὐτοῦ ἄγειν τὴν στρατιάν, and Agesilaos
willingly agreed: εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἂν ὅ τι τῇ πόλει δοκοίη ἀντειπεῖν
(*Hell.* V.iv.35). Clearly Xenophon has now moved away from criticism,
and has not explained Agesilaos' disregard of his former attitude to
military service, as stated at *Hell.* V.iv.13. Plutarch apparently has
noticed the inconsistency, and has not interrupted his critical account
with praise for Agesilaos. Plutarch has also overlooked an opportunity,
taken by Xenophon, to praise Agesilaos for good generalship, in
arranging that the Kithairon passage was in friendly hands before he
invaded Boiotia. Instead, he has again continued the critical theme,
juxtaposing damage inflicted and damage suffered, with the implication
that an element of retribution was involved in the campaigns (cf. c.27).
Although his summary is brief, giving only one campaign, it is
otherwise accurate, for Xenophon, too, describes reverses, including
the death of Phoibidas, as well as successes, for Agesilaos (*Hell.*
V.iv.35-55). Xenophon records two campaigns in Theban territory,
which was protected with Athenian help, and also, to some extent, by

innovatory strategy of ditch and stockade (M.H.Munn (1987) 106-38). Agesilaos twice ravaged the countryside, but did not attempt to blockade the city, and on his departure the Thebans' situation was gradually eased, especially at Thespias as a result of a citizen uprising, in respect of the Spartan garrison (*Hell.* V.iv.55), though Xenophon does not report its loss until later (*Hell.* V.iv.63). Xenophon also does not record that Agesilaos was wounded here, and Plutarch's following anecdote is not necessarily in context chronologically.

Ἡ καλὰ τὰ διδασκάλια παρὰ Θηβαίων ἀπολαμβάνεις, μὴ βουλομένους αὐτοὺς μηδ' ἐπισταμένους μάχεσθαι διδάξας. 4 τῷ γὰρ ὄντι Θηβαίους αὐτοὺς ἐαυτῶν πολεμικωτάτους τότε γενέσθαι φασί, ταῖς πολλαῖς στρατείαις τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ὥσπερ ἐγγυμνασμένους. 5 διὸ καὶ Λυκοῦργος ὁ παλαιὸς ἐν ταῖς καλουμέναις τρισὶ ῥήτραις ἀπεῖπε μὴ πολλάκις ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς στρατεύειν, ὅπως μὴ πολεμεῖν μανθάνωσιν.

Agesilaos' reputation was now, as Plutarch has it, being attacked also on other grounds by an opponent, exploiting one of the several occasions of his wounding. (See also c.36.3.) This passage is a powerful indictment of Agesilaos as the aberrant king who departed from the principle clearly set out in one of the "rhetras" of Lykourgos, the highest authority, in his view, on what was in the best interest of Sparta. The anecdote occurs among the *Apophth. Lak.* (*Mor.* 213), at *Pelopidas* 15, and at *Lyk.* 13.6, where it is also recorded that the *rhetra* was quoted in criticism of Agesilaos. There is, no doubt, some truth in the charge, but the source of the anecdote is clearly in the Spartan tradition, since it enhances the Spartans' reputation for military prowess. Later, in the literary historians, too, generals tend to praise an enemy and disparage previous achievements in order to make a coming engagement more glorious. (See Tacitus *Agricola* 8, 16-17, 29.3-4.) The improvement in the Theban fighting qualities probably came largely from the confidence that grew gradually, through having at least survived several conflicts with Spartan armies. The Thebans also recognised the value of organization and training, as Plutarch says (*Pelopidas* 17-18) and even Xenophon acknowledges (*Hell.*

VII.5.19), and it began, in part, before they met the Spartans as enemies. The success of the Theban army stems mainly from Delion, where the heavy concentration of the phalanx was introduced (Thuc. IV.93.4). This would not have been developed, if what Plutarch suggests were true and the Thebans had been taught only by observing Spartan tactics. The Theban practice demanded not only training, but also creative observation and imagination, which was not inculcated at Sparta by the Lykurgan system of education (G.L.Cawkwell (1983) pp.385-400). Plutarch, however, takes the opportunity to indict Agesilaos' disregard of the Lykourgan "Rhetra".

6 ἦν δὲ καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπαχθὴς ὁ Ἀγησίλαος, ὥς δι' οὐδὲν ἔγκλημα δημόσιον, ἀλλὰ θυμῷ τινι καὶ φιλονεικίᾳ τοὺς Θηβαίους ἀπολέσαι ζητῶν. οὐδὲν οὖν ἔλεγον δεόμενοι φθείρεσθαι δεῦρο κἀκεῖσε καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνῆλυτον ὀλίγοις τοσοῦτοι συνακολουθοῦντες.

Plutarch now traces Agesilaos' declining reputation further afield. The criticism progresses to the allies from the natural hostility of external enemies, the Athenians, and then from that of his opponents in Sparta. It is given again, Ὀμηρικῶς, as the observation of people who were there, that Agesilaos had compounded his aberration, not as he perhaps thought, in the interest of Sparta, but for a private complaint against Thebes. The allies had a valid point, even discounting the personal motive, for the alliance was not to be only for the Spartan interests in view here. This was made clear at a meeting in the Peloponnese, following Kleombrotos' failure to penetrate beyond Kithairon, when it was decided that naval warfare against Athens should replace the exhausting land campaigns against Thebes (Xen. *Hell.* V.iv.60). Xenophon has shown that Agesilaos could starve the Thebans, but could not take their city (*Hell.* V.iv.56).

Plutarch uses θυμός in a blemished character as an irrational factor leading to catastrophe. Pelopidas brought about his own death in battle:

οὐ κατέσχε τῷ λογισμῷ τὴν ὀργήν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν βλέψιν ἀναφλεχθεὶς καὶ τῷ θυμῷ παραδοὺς τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς πράξεως (*Pelopidas* 32.9).

Xenophon, too, stresses the point, when Teleutias, ὀργισθεὶς, followed the enemy too close to the wall of Olynthos and was killed (*Hell.* V.iii.6). An excess of φιλονεικία was attributed to Agesilaos as a contributory cause of the quarrel with Lysander (c.7).

7 ἔνθα δὲ δὴ λέγεται τὸν Ἀγησίλαον ἐξελέγξαι βουλόμενον αὐτῶν τὸ πλῆθος τόδε μηχανήσασθαι. πάντας ἐκέλευσε καθίσαι τοὺς συμμάχους μετ' ἀλλήλων ἀναμεμιγμένους, ἰδίᾳ δὲ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν.

There are two aspects of the numerical problem. The proportion of Spartans in an army was clearly a small one, because Sparta demanded that each of the allies should contribute the same fraction of their total manpower, and the size of the eligible citizen body at Sparta was small and diminishing. It is hard to believe that Agesilaos devised this performance now, for the insult would not increase morale, but would aggravate the present allied mood, and the isolation of the Spartan contingent, sitting apart, would reveal to all the other contingents their own numerical supremacy. One aspect of the story not usually commented upon is that the allied hoplites would, presumably, have no more been literally potters, and so on, than the Spartan hoplites. Not everyone would be deceived or convinced by the trick.

9 ἀπείρητο γὰρ αὐτοῖς τέχνην ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ μανθάνειν βάνουσον.

At *Lykourgos* 9 Plutarch attributes the ban on craft to Lykourgos' attack on luxury. It is rather the case that it was ὀλιγανθρωπία that necessitated the legal prohibition of banausic occupations for citizens, and Agesilaos' device may be used as a further illustration of the tradition of the Spartans' exclusive need to be τεχνῖται καὶ σοφισταὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν (*Pelopidas* 23.3). Excavations reported in *BSA* as early as 1905/6 indicated that Sparta was not always so austere, and by the time of Epameinondas' invasions there

were again houses to be plundered that contained many valuables (Xen. *Hell.* VI.v.27). The need for military preparedness from the sixth century on meant that other activities were progressively curtailed, as the citizen population was reduced by concentration of landed property ownership (Aristotle *Pol.* 1270a29-33; Xen. *Oik.* IV.2-3; M.I.Finley (1975) Ch. 10; P.A.Cartledge (1976a) p.119, and (1987) pp.37-43). In the interval between the composition of Xenophon's two works just cited, there appears to have been in Sparta a change in attitude to the austerity of the (Lykourgan) regimen.

οὕτω δὴ γελάσας ὁ Ἀγησίλαος, Ὁρᾶτε, εἶπεν, ὧ ἄνδρες, ὅσῳ πλείονος ὑμῶν στρατιώτας ἐκπέμπομεν ἡμεῖς.

It is not clear whether by laughing Agesilaos is further mocking the allies or making light of their discomfiture. His speech suggests that the anecdote originated in the private braggadocio of the Spartan *sussitia*.

The weakness of Agesilaos and Sparta: the Theban influence emerges

1 Ἐν δὲ Μεγάροις, ὅτε τὴν στρατιὰν ἀπῆγεν ἐκ Θηβῶν, ἀναβαίνοντος αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ ὄρχεϊον εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, σπᾶσμα καὶ πόνος ἰσχυρὸς ἔλαβε τὸ ὑγιὲς σκέλος· ἐκ δὲ τούτου διογκωθὲν αἵματος ἔδοξε μεστὸν γεγονέναι καὶ φλεγμονὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν παρεῖχεν.

Like Thebes, Megara was the victim of a hostile tradition in the surviving literary sources: "the widespread anti-Megarian attitude . . . projects the stereotype of an ignorant, brutish and vulgar folk" (R.P.Legon (1981) pp.11, 33-4, 266-85). Routes through the Megarid were vital for Sparta's activities in Central and Northern Greece (N.G.L.Hammond (1974) pp.103-122), and so Megara suffered a long history of being alternately courted and threatened for the privilege of unhindered military passage through the Isthmus, while proximity to Corinth's superior facilities for trade at times denied Megara compensatory access to great wealth (J.Tavlos (1978)). Eventually, in the fourth century, the Megarians seem to have favoured a policy of friendly relations with all, a neutral attitude permitting passage without promoting retaliatory hostilities (R.P.Legon (1981) pp.264-5), though a hostile Corinth, especially in the Corinthian War, forced Sparta to use, instead, the sea crossings of the Corinthian Gulf (to Phokis (Krissa), or to Kreusa in Boiotia (Xen. *Hell.* IV.iii.15, iv.1, V.iv.46, 60.3, VI.i.1; cf. Thuc. I.102f.)). Agesilaos' visit to the ὄρχεϊον may have had a diplomatic purpose concerning the use of the land route. There are two small hills, close together, about 300 metres in height, the eastern Karia, according to Pausanias, with a sanctuary (ἱερόν) of Aphrodite Epistrophia (I.xl.6), and the western Citadel of Alkathous (I.xlii.1), with a βουλευτήριον (I.xlii.4) and the πρυτανεῖον (I.xlii.7). Pausanias also reports a βουλευτήριον at I.xliii.3, perhaps on lower ground, ἐν τῇ πόλει, and the Ἀφροδίτης ναός at I.xliii.6. Xenophon does not use the same terms, but he indicates that an ascent was involved: ἀναβαίνοντος αὐτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ Ἀφροδισίου εἰς τὸ ὄρχεϊον (*Hell.*

Plutarch's attempt to detail Agesilaos' symptoms, to follow the development of the crisis, and to account for the cure, is reminiscent of observations described in the Hippocratic writings, and illustrates the interest of historians in recording and circulating useful medical information. There was a twofold affinity in methodology and purpose between history and medicine: a concern to discover early signs of developing conditions (diagnosis) and a wish to observe and record the course of those developments for future reference (prognosis) (J.Longrigg (1980) p.212). The nature of Agesilaos' injury cannot now be diagnosed on the basis of the insufficient evidence available. Muscular strain may have caused swelling and internal bleeding. The fainting would be caused by the Syracusan doctor's blood-letting. The flow of blood would cease only when the clot formed, rather than, as τοῦτο (Matritensis N 55) suggests, because of the fainting. The ancient world's lack of knowledge of the circulation of the blood, and of other modern discoveries, means that their descriptions cannot be related to modern practice, and the attempt to do so is not very helpful. Instead the texts themselves may be used to indicate some of the theory on which the treatment was based, though only very superficially.

For Homer, blood distinguished mortals from the gods:

οὐ γὰρ σῖτον ἔδουσ', οὐ πίνουσ' αἶθονα οἶνον
Iliad V.341.

It came from food and drink in the diet, and was αἱματική τροφή, the nourishment (Aristotle (*De generatione animalium* 726b10, *Historia animalium* 511b30ff.) quoting Diogenes of Apollonia; J.Longrigg (1985) pp.278-82, who kindly provided me with the references). It was distributed to the parts of the body as in an irrigation system (id. (1988) pp.477-9). The theory of the four elements of Empedokles of Akragas was influential in suggesting the analogue of the four cardinal body humours or fluids recorded in later medical literature, of which

one was blood (id. (1989) pp.14-22). This allows a connection to be made with Agesilaos' Sicilian doctor, who would have the benefit only of the earliest ideas, some of which were to be incorporated into the Hippocratic corpus. He may have followed the thinking of the Sicilian Empedokles, with which the theory of disease became linked, as it appears in the Hippocratic treatise *Nature of Man* (id. (1988) p.21). Loss of harmony among the body's four fluids disturbed its well-being, and this could be caused by excessive eating or excessive exercise (id. (1988) pp.477-9). The doctor would attempt to restore the balance, by reducing the excess.

Xenophon and Plutarch record that Agesilaos was climbing up to the acropolis, perhaps indicating physical exercise as the cause of the malady. Plutarch has omitted the bursting vein, mentioned by Xenophon as allowing the blood from the body to flow into the leg, which became swollen between the knee and the ankle, but he retains the swelling, and adds inflammation, perhaps from his own experience, or from later medical writers such as Erastistratos (ibid. pp.477-9). The swelling, here attributed by Xenophon to excessive supply of blood in the leg, presumably indicated that there was internal piercing of a vein, which had allowed it to flow there from its proper place. Purging and control of diet would eventually lead to a reduction in the supply of blood, but a speedier remedy might be desirable. The body was thought to have channels running through it and out of it, carrying the various fluids (Helen King (1989) pp.22-3). Other excess fluids could be encouraged by the doctor to escape through the body's open-ended tubes, so as to restore the harmony: excess of blood necessitated its own separate treatment.

Two later cases of the natural discharge of blood through the nose, which are described at *Aphorisms* 5.33, *Epidemics* 7.123 (ibid.), perhaps provide a helpful illustration here. Blood, normally within the body unseen, conveying its nourishment, "flowed" visibly only when

excess was passing out through the body's channels, as in the reported cases of nose-bleeding (*ibid.*), or when the outer skin was accidentally pierced. Otherwise, to discharge excess blood from the leg a channel must be provided artificially, by opening a vein. The danger was that an artery might be severed, as may have been the case with Agesilaos, since the loss of blood was great. Phlebotomy was a practice which became popular, perhaps, because of the link with Empedokles and the influential theories of the four humours. That there was controversy, some centuries later, between its advocates and those who preferred starving the patient, is shown by Galen's revision of his attitude to the theories of Erasistratus (J.Longrigg (1988) p.20-1). In an emergency, however, speed was paramount. The modern reaction is naturally one of horror, for Agesilaos' "serious injury . . . had been aggravated by incompetent medical attention" (P.A.Cartledge (1987) p.232), but modern practices are unreliable witnesses to ancient literary data. The authorial intention may have been quite different, for Agesilaos recovered, and this case perhaps enhanced the reputation of the Syracusan doctor, and that of the theory of venesection.

3 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε τὴν φορὰν τοῦ αἵματος ἔπαυσε· καὶ κομισθεὶς εἰς Λακεδαίμονα, πολὺν χρόνον ἔσχεν ὀρρώστως καὶ πρὸς τὰς στρατείας ὀδυνάτως.

Plutarch may have accepted a causal connection, of course, between checking the loss of blood and the release of Agesilaos from danger, though the two may have only coincided in time, as in Xenophon, who gives τότε μέντοι ἐπαύσατο. There, however, τὸ ῥεῦμα is readily supplied as the nominative from the previous clause, but this is not in Plutarch.

Xenophon introduced the injury at *Hell.* V.iv.58, in the springtime, during the visit to Megara. Agesilaos was ill for the rest of the summer and through the winter. He was still ill at VI.iv.18, and from here, except for the Peace Conference at VI.iii.19, he is not mentioned

by Xenophon, during a period of Spartan decline, until at VI.v.4 he was sent to Mantinea as an envoy. He does not take command again until VI.v.11.

4 ἐν δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ πολλὰ συνέβη πταίσματα τοῖς Σπορτιάταις καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν.

In this brief summary, Plutarch expresses the full purport of the events of several campaigns in which Agesilaos was not engaged. At *Agesilaos* II.23 Xenophon passes from the campaigns in Boiotia to the events at Tegea in the year following Leuktra, bridging the gap by claiming that Sparta and Agesilaos had prospered until then, and denying that Agesilaos' generalship was responsible for the subsequent failures. The events detailed in *Hellenika* are summarized in a single word, σφάλματα, embracing the two fruitless efforts to contain the Thebans' recovery of the neighbouring cities of Boiotia, the discontent among the allies, and the naval operations. The Spartans' fleet had had little success in the Saronic and Corinthian Gulfs, and in the Ionian and Aegean Seas, against Timotheus, Chabrias and Iphikrates, and the fleet of the Athenians, who were still angry because of Sphodrias' raid. In *Hellenika* Agesilaos re-emerged as the key figure in Spartan affairs, before Leuktra, at the oath-taking ceremony (VI.iii.19), when the Athenians had dissociated themselves from the ever more powerful Thebans, and had initiated another peace conference in Sparta.

ὧν ἦν τὸ περὶ Τεγύρας μέγιστον, ὅπου πρῶτον ἐκ παρατόξεως κρατηθέντες ὑπὸ Θηβαίων ἡττήθησαν.

This Theban victory, which Xenophon does not mention, continues for Plutarch the theme of weakness, adding substance to the brief reference to the Spartan reverses. At *Pelopidas* 16-17 Plutarch not only claims it as the preliminary to Leuktra and, as he does here, as the first victory against Sparta won in a pitched battle, but also describes the failure of the Spartan tactical manoeuvre of creating a

path though their line, in expectation of letting the Thebans pass to the other side, as they had done at Koroneia. (See c.18.n.; cf. Frontinus (*Strat.* 2.6.6); Polyainos (2.1.19); Xen. *Hell.* IV.3.19). Pelopidas is said to have ignored the temptation to escape through the gap, and instead attacked πρὸς τοὺς συνεστῶτας, the cramped formation that resulted from the Spartans' manoeuvre perhaps explaining the cause of the rout. The same source seems to have been used by Diodoros, who also records Pelopidas' victory at Tegyra as the first against Sparta to be celebrated by a Theban trophy (XV.81.2). Since only two *morai* were present, the importance of the defeat for the Spartans has no doubt been exaggerated in the Boiotian tradition, but this does not, perhaps, detract from its importance for the Boiotians' spirits and reputation.

5 ἔδοξεν οὖν πᾶσι θέσθαι πρὸς πάντας εἰρήνην· καὶ συνῆλθον ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πρέσβεις εἰς Λακεδαίμονα, ποιησόμενοι τὰς διαλύσεις.

Xenophon (*Hell.* VI.iii.1) suggests that the initiative for peace came from Athens, because they no longer approved of Theban actions against Plataia, Thespiai and Phokis. At VI.ii.38 he reports that Iphikrates was about to ravage Lakonian territory, and although a commendation of the Athenian now intervenes to obscure the timing, at VI.iii.18 he reveals that there was pressure on the Spartans: ἐψηφίσαντο καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι δέχεσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην. There is also a hint of Persian pressure at *Hell.* VI.iii.12, when, in denying Athenian fear of the King's money, he indicates that Antalkidas' arrival from Persia is imminent (S.Hornblower (1983) p.217).

6 ὦν εἷς ἦν Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ἀνὴρ ἔνδοξος ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ, στρατηγίας δὲ πείραν οὐπω δεδωκώς.

Thebes became the home of the Pythagorean philosopher Lysis of Tarentum, when he was expelled, and he may then have become Epameinondas' tutor. Plutarch seems to present a contrast with the Spartan system of education, as he described it in cc.1, 2. In c.33 he,

like Aristotle (*Pol.* 1271b), notes the intellectual deficiency in the system. The usual picture of Thebes is not a valid one (N.H.Demand (1982) Chs.1, 5). The museum at Thebes reveals material and cultural riches, and noteworthy signs of the acceptance of innovatory techniques, including the contemporary and possibly unique black stones commemorating warriors, who perhaps fell at Delion, and whose etched portraits are reminiscent of the decoration on Etruscan hand-mirrors (K.Ninou ed. (1981) pp.74f. and Pl.39).

7 οὗτος ὁρῶν τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας ὑποκατακλινομένους τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ, μόνος ἐχρήσατο φρονήματι παρρησίαν ἔχοντι, καὶ διεξῆλθε λόγον οὐχ ὑπὲρ Θηβαίων, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὁμοῦ κοινόν, τὸν μὲν πόλεμον ἀποδεικνύων αὖξοντα τὴν Σπώρτην ἐξ ὧν ἅπαντες οἱ λοιποὶ κακῶς πάσχουσι.

In the first part of the sentence, recording Epameinondas' view with the participle, ὁρῶν, Plutarch has expressed indirectly, Ὀμηρικῶς, the suggestion that Agesilaos owed his predominance to the moral, rather than the military, weakness of the other Greeks. The double compound, ὑποκατακλινομένους, with eight syllables, is one of the longest words in this *Life*, like περιστρατοπεδεύσαντα at c.16, and, since it is also a very strong metaphor, it expresses, perhaps, a deeply-felt judgement, and may indicate, significantly, what was for Plutarch one of the morals of this work, the danger of submission to injustice, which the Theban envoys learnt at Perachora (c.22). Then, in the second and third parts of the sentence, Plutarch shows his national pride as a Boiotian. He attributes to Epameinondas, first, the courage to speak frankly, involving an exploration of the inner landscape of the man's mind in order to determine the spring of his action, φρονήματι, and then the patriotism, to speak for all Greece, ὁμοῦ κοινόν, giving objectively an evaluation of the words about to be reported. Then, in the next part, Epameinondas employs the same piece of rhetoric that was used by Antalkidas against Agesilaos at c.23, but the substitution of Sparta here suits the context, and makes the point more soundly. Xenophon, although he records the Athenian invitation to the

Thebans to join the conference, does not record their dispatch, but he acknowledges a Theban presence for the signature. He does not name Epameinondas, and mentions only the speeches made by three of the Athenian envoys. At *Hell.* VI.iii.7-9 he has Autokles, one of the Athenians, express, in greater detail, the identical criticism of Sparta, in a speech showing sympathy with Thebes. Plutarch may be right to assign this statement to Epameinondas instead of an Athenian. The suggestion of Athenian sympathy is not wholly consistent with the change in the Athenian attitude towards Thebes, which was given by Xenophon as the reason why Athens desired peace (*Hell.* VI.iii.1), and is also expressed by the third speaker, Kallistratos, in his objection to the Thebans' recovery of control over the formerly independent cities (*Hell.* VI.iii.11, 13). The Athenian speakers present, in order, three arguments for peace: the friendship between Athens and Sparta from legendary times, the need to abandon Sparta's domination, and the renewal of the dual leadership. Diodoros agrees with Plutarch in giving the case against Sparta to Epameinondas (XV.38.3), and Nepos also attributes to him the condemnation of Spartan tyranny:

sic Lacedaemoniorum tyrannidem coarguit, ut non minus illa oratione opes eorum concusserit quam Leuctrica pugna. tum enim perfecit, quod post apparuit, ut auxilio Lacedaemonii sociorum privarentur (*Epaminondas* 6.4).

Xenophon seems to have substituted a more acceptable Athenian, avoiding mention of the Theban. His account of the conflicting ambassadorial views has been explained as an ingenious strategy designed "to make Athenian neutrality acceptable" (T.T.B.Ryder (1963) pp.240-1). Autokles' speech is too frank:

"There could scarcely be a more offensive summary of Spartan duplicity and bad faith, and this by a member of an embassy dispatched to secure peace" (J.R.Grant (1965) p.264),

but that scholar's alternative suggestion of Greek individualism makes no room for the expression of the Theban view.

τὴν δ' εἰρήνην ἰσότητι καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ κτᾶσθαι κελεύων· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν διομενεῖν, ἴσων ὁπάντων γενομένων.

Epameinondas' rhetoric gives way to his implied criticism of the selfish use of the autonomy clause in the Peace of Antalkidas by Sparta, in the interest of - and only of - Sparta. The proposed alternative, on the basis of equality and justice for all, is in line with the idealist interpretation of the principles of federation in the earlier Boiotian League (*Ox. Hist.* XI; I.A.F.Bruce (1967) p.158) and later in the democratic elements of Theban leadership of Boiotia, and again in the attempted Theban settlement of the Peloponnese (J.Buckler (1980) pp.23ff., 36ff., 220ff.). The promise of an enduring peace seems here to rest on the philosophical theory of the perfect balance, as of a sphere, in contrast with the flawed, one-sided settlements that were imposed, but did not last. Epameinondas' suggestion is a more idealist expression of Kallistratos' proposal, requiring something more general than collaboration between Athens and Sparta, for the Athenians and the Spartans had each had the military strength needed to enforce their will, yet failed. The Thebans, especially Epameinondas, had training in philosophy and advocated higher principles. Perhaps it is less true to say that the Thebans had no ideology to offer than that the other states could not respond. In practical politics, however, the need was for a combination of powerful enforcement with enlightened statesmanship. Neither Sparta nor Thebes could now provide both these needs. If Plutarch was thinking of his own times in these terms, perhaps Rome, instead of Sparta, could supply the element of power, while other parts of Greece offered philosophical enlightenment. Diodoros gives some support for Epameinondas' enlightened attitude at XV.88.3.

Confrontation in conference and in battle

1 Ὅρῳν οὖν ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ὑπερφυῶς ἀγαμένους καὶ προσέχοντας αὐτῷ τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἠρώτησεν εἰ νομίζει δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ ἴσον αὐτονομεῖσθαι τὴν Βοιωτίαν.

The metaphor ὑπερφυῶς, from natural growth, perhaps suggests that Plutarch was trying to show that the Greeks were recovering their true nature, encouraged by the example of Epameinondas. The two adjectives, δίκαιον . . . καὶ ἴσον, repeat the sense of the two nouns, ἰσότητι καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ, in Epameinondas' speech in c.27, in the reverse order, forming a chiasmic pattern. "Without injustice to anyone and with the same treatment for all". Plutarch had recorded the Peace of Antalkidas at c.23 without referring to Xenophon's account of Agesilaos' hatred of the Thebans and his refusal to allow them to take the oath as Boiotians (*Hell.* V.i.32-33), apparently reserving the argument for Epameinondas, and avoiding some of the repetition. In Xenophon's account of this Peace (*Hell.* VI.iii.19-20), the confrontation arises only on the day after the treaty has been made, when the Thebans ask that Boiotians be substituted for Thebans in the text, and Agesilaos, who is not named until now, refuses the request. Plutarch has consolidated his treatment of the events and used reported dialogue to display the characters of the two opponents. The Greeks' attitude to Epameinondas, also reported by Xenophon in the speech of Autokles (*Hell.* VI.iii.7-9), perhaps presents Plutarch's judgement indirectly, Ὀμηρικῶς, that Thebes' relationship with Boiotia corresponded to Sparta's with the allies, who were autonomous because they had a vote in the Peloponnesian League, rather than with the Messenians, who did not. The issue is complicated, perhaps deliberately, by Xenophon, in his choice of words. He has the Lakedaimonians take the oath ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων, with no mention of Messenians (cf. *Hell.* VI.iii.7-9, 19), and it is not clear

whether he intends by "allies" to mean perioikic cities of Lakonia as well as members of the Peloponnesian League. For Thebes and the Boiotian Confederacy, "Boiotians" would be the parallel nomenclature, but the Athenians *and their allies* took the oath κατὰ πόλεις ἕκαστοι. Xenophon's opinion is also, perhaps, expressed indirectly, in the Athenians' words: οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι οὕτως εἶχον τὴν γνώμην ὥς νῦν Θηβαίους τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ δεκατευθῆναι ἐλπίς εἴη (*Hell.* VI.iii.20). The hope for massive Theban casualties is repeated later (*Hell.* VI.v.35), where it is attributed to one of the Lakedaimonian envoys in Athens.

2 ἀντερωτήσαντος δὲ τοῦ Ἐπαμεινώνδου ταχὺ καὶ τεθαρρηκότως εἰ κἀκεῖνος οἴεται δίκαιον αὐτονομεῖσθαι τὴν Λακωνικὴν.

As Agesilaos had countered Epameinondas' demand by turning on Thebes, so Epameinondas replies by attacking Sparta with the same question to Agesilaos. It was, no doubt, the concern so strongly activated here that still motivated Epameinondas to secure the autonomy of Messenia after Leuktra. Plutarch perhaps compliments Epameinondas as Xenophon complimented Autokles: μάλα δοκῶν ἐπιστροφῆς εἶναι ῥήτωρ (*Hell.* VI.iii.7).

ἀναπηδήσας ὁ Ἀγησίλαος μετ' ὀργῆς ἐκέλευσε λέγειν σαφῶς αὐτὸν εἰ τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἀφίησιν αὐτόνομον. 3 τὸ δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο πάλιν τοῦ Ἐπαμεινώνδου φήσαντος, εἰ τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἀφίησιν αὐτόνομον.

Plutarch uses ἐναργεῖα to illustrate a characteristic action, repeating the participle ἀναπηδήσας from c.22. There is no anger in Xenophon's account, where Agesilaos' words indicate irritation, but Plutarch perhaps interprets the hatred in *Hell.* V.i.33. He represents Agesilaos as exercising autocratic authority, contrasting Epameinondas' reasoned argument.

οὕτω τραχέως ἔσχεν ὁ Ἀγησίλαος καὶ τὴν πρόφασιν ἠγάπησεν, ὥς εὐθὺς ἐξαλείψαι τὸ τῶν Θηβαίων ὄνομα τῆς εἰρήνης καὶ προειπεῖν πόλεμον αὐτοῖς. 4 τοὺς δ' ἄλλους Ἑλληνας διαλλαγέοντας ἐκέλευσεν ἀπιέναι, τὰ μὲν ἀκεστὰ τῆς εἰρήνης, τὰ δ' ἀνήκεστα τοῦ πολέμου ποιοῦντας.

The rage is so violent that action takes the place of words.

Agesilaos' delight recalls c.9, ἄσμενος ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ἐδέξατο, when Tissaphernes broke the truce. Plutarch continues the characterization of Agesilaos by Antalkidas and Epameinondas as φιλοπόλεμος in cc.23, 27. Cf. Diodoros XV.19.4. Xenophon does not record a declaration of war, but has the Spartan ἐκκλησία alert Kleombrotos in Phokis, and comments: ἤδη γάρ, ὥς ἔοικε, τὸ δαιμόνιον ἤγεν (*Hell.* VI.iv.3).

5 ἔτυχε δὲ κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐν Φωκεῦσιν ὧν ὁ Κλεόμβροτος μετὰ δυνάμεως.

Xenophon recorded Kleombrotos' mission to Phokis, with four *morai* and corresponding contingents of allies, at *Hell.* VI.i.1. It was said there to be under attack from Thebes, but then Polydamas of Pharsalos reported in Sparta that Jason was expanding his influence in this area. Thebes was thereafter defending the passes into Boiotia, as reported at *Xen. Hell.* VI.ii.1. It appears that the Lakedaimonians were separating Jason and the Thebans, declared to be allies (VI.iv.20). Xenophon makes no further reference to Kleombrotos until VI.iv.2, when the Lakedaimonians decide not to withdraw him along with their garrisons in other cities. It seems unlikely that the Spartans kept such a large part of their army in this area for so long, and at *Pelopidas* 16-17 Plutarch speaks of two *morai* at Orchomenos replaced from Sparta in rotation (διαδοχήν), though it is difficult to see why the arrival of this replacement should have deterred Pelopidas, unless it was additional to the two *morai* in the garrison. These two were then on an expedition into Lokris, leaving Orchomenos without defenders, and it was on their return from there that they met Pelopidas at Tegyra. Xenophon (*Hell.* VI.iv.10) refers to the war at Orchomenos, in which the cavalry of the Thebans had had good practice.

εὐθὺς οὖν ἔπεμπον οἱ ἔφοροι κελεύοντες αὐτὸν ἐπὶ Θηβαίους ἄγειν τὸ στράτευμα.

Because he has given the full account of Leuktra at *Pelopidas* 20-23, and because Agesilaos was not engaged, Plutarch here records

only the result of the battle. Xenophon tends to obscure the Theban achievement, highlighting rather Kleombrotos' early successes and Spartan bravery in the battle. He reveals, however, that when Kleombrotos approached Boiotia he used a mountainous and unexpected route through Thisbai, and then proceeded to Kreusis, where he captured twelve Theban triremes. This indicates that the route was along the series of valleys that runs along the Helikon range, below the main ridge, on the side towards the sea, from Distomon, to Steiron, Kyriakion and Hagia Anna, which has been described as the "High-road" (A.R.Burn (1949) pp.313-23 and Pl.42; followed by J.Buckler (1980) pp.57-9). A country track now leads through a series of narrow passes which open on to high plateaux, enclosed on either side by the upper slopes of the mountain. The end of this route indicates the final approach of the Spartans, after their detour to Kreusis, up the valley of the River Libadostras, and over the low ridge, the eastern spur of Mount Korombili, into the plain of Leuktra. The routes have recently been discussed in detail, and it is likely that Kleombrotos reached the plain at a point just to the west of the modern town (C.Tuplin (1987) pp.72-7). Xenophon has also revealed that the Thebans had been waiting for Kleombrotos at a narrow pass, perhaps at Koroneia (Diodoros XV.52.7; cf. c.16), so that when he turned to the mountain route, they would return to Thebes by the direct route past Lake Kopais and across the plain. There is a road which they could then have taken to Leuktra past Thespiiai, but the danger that Kleombrotos might be able to slip through in front of them, and to reach a position between themselves and Thebes, would suggest that they might prefer the longer march in order to protect the western approaches to the city.

καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους περιπέμποντες ἡθροίζον, ἀπροθύμους μὲν ὄντας καὶ βαρυνομένους τὸν πόλεμον.

Plutarch seems to be making his own interpretation of the allies'

morale in the period leading up to the battle, after Xenophon, who, however, records their discontent only after the battle:

τοὺς συμμάχους πάντας μὲν ἀθύμως ἔχοντας πρὸς τὸ μάχεσθαι, ἔστι δ' οὐς αὐτῶν οὐδ' ἀχθομένους τῷ γεγενημένῳ (*Hell.* VI.iv.15).

6 πολλῶν δὲ σημείων μοχθηρῶν γενομένων, ὥς ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἐπομεινώνδου γέγραπται, καὶ Προθόου τοῦ Λάκωνος ἐναντιουμένου πρὸς τὴν στρατείαν, οὐκ ἀνῆκεν ὁ Ἀγησίλαος, ἀλλ' ἐξέπραξε τὸν πόλεμον.

The gods' signs reflect the human unease and do not favour the Spartan enterprise. Xenophon also mentions that opposition was expressed by Prothoös, both on legal grounds and to avoid offending the gods, and that the advice was rejected by the assembly, but he does not name Agesilaos (*Hell.* VI.iv.2). Prothoös is given no introduction by Xenophon, though the preceding phrase τὰ οἶκοι τέλη may include him. If Plutarch's description precludes his being a *geron* or an ephor, Prothoös will be an example of an ordinary Spartiate addressing the ἐκκλησία, which had the right to decide but not to debate (Aristotle *Pol.* 1273a11), a point raised in a discussion with J.F.Lazenby. Xenophon introduces the influence of the gods, too, albeit with some hesitation, in the form of an oracle warning of a Lakedaimonian defeat, and encouraging signs for the Thebans (*Hell.* VI.iv.7).

ἐλπίζων αὐτοῖς μὲν ὁμοῦ τι τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὅλης ὑπαρχούσης, ἐκσπόνδων δὲ τῶν Θηβαίων γεγονότων, καιρὸν εἶναι δίκην λαβεῖν παρ' αὐτῶν. 7 δημοῖ δὲ τὸ σὺν ὀργῇ μᾶλλον ἢ λογισμῷ γενέσθαι τὴν στρατείαν ἐκείνην ὁ καιρός.

Plutarch attributes to Agesilaos the recognition that he had succeeded in isolating Thebes in the peace conference (Xen. *Hell.* VI.iii.19), and that Sparta was therefore in a position to win the coming battle. It has been suggested that Agesilaos was right, and that victory should have vindicated his policy for Sparta (G.L.Cawkwell (1976) pp.62-84; id. (1983) pp.385-400). For Plutarch, however, the human assessment of the opportunity was not all, as the repetition of ὁ καιρός indicates (see cc.8, 39), for Agesilaos was motivated by anger.

Plutarch again uses anger to motivate one of the successive stages in the decline of Agesilaos' character, and introduces the same combination of words at *Pelopidas* c.32:

ὥς δ' εἶδεν ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ παραθαρρύνοντα καὶ συντάττοντα τοὺς μισθοφόρους, οὐ κατέσχε τῷ λογισμῷ τὴν ὀργήν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν βλέψιν ἀναφλεχθεὶς καὶ τῷ θυμῷ παραδοὺς τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς πράξεως, πολὺ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐξαλόμενος ἐφέρετο βοῶν καὶ προκαλούμενος τὸν τύραννον.

This phrase denotes tragic ὁμορτία, for which Pelopidas himself pays, but wins glory. Here, however, Agesilaos' ὁμορτία causes the deaths only of others. Plutarch implies that reason should have overruled the emotions. This is, perhaps, his interpretation of the way Xenophon records the rejection of the advice of Prothoös, that Sparta should abide by the terms of the Peace just agreed: ἡ δ' ἐκκλησία ἀκούσασα τοῦτα ἐκεῖνον μὲν φλυαρεῖν ἡγήσατο (*Hell.* VI.iv.3). This striking phrase indicates strongly the irrational nature of the Spartan reaction to what seems to be an orthodox proposal, and if Xenophon composed it to describe the atmosphere of the meeting, or to represent the views expressed and voted upon, Plutarch may have pin-pointed a veiled criticism of the leadership for provoking this response, so that responsibility for the defeat at Leuktra does not appear to rest only with the generalship on the battlefield. Agesilaos' misinterpretation of ὁ καιρός, a rare occurrence in a military situation, compounds his responsibility, for the word clearly denotes everything which it is the duty of the general to take into account before committing himself to action: here anger has rendered his judgement defective.

ἡττήθησαν ἐν Λεύκτροις ἡμερῶν εἴκοσι διαγενομένων.

The precise Julian date of the battle seems to be incalculable, though mid-August may be acceptable, but the twenty days between it and the Peace must be suspected (C.Tuplin (1987) pp.77-8, 83). There seems to be no obvious significance in the interval of twenty days. The gods' anger would have to wait while the order reached Phokis

and while the Spartans then reached the battlefield, delayed by the diversion to Kreusis, but other victims of divine retribution have waited longer. Plutarch may simply wish to provide a temporal link in order to dispel doubt that there was a retributive element.

The two armies were drawn up in positions resulting from their respective lines of approach. The plain of Leuktra is not wide at this point, and is bounded on the north and south by roughly parallel low ridges facing each other. Behind the Theban line, the road to Thebes would have offered little chance of further resistance once the Spartans had broken through. The Theban strength was concentrated on the left, to face the Spartans. The reason for this was surely the lesson learnt at Koroneia, where the Thebans did not themselves face the Spartans, and, despite their own victory, had therefore found the Spartans behind them. If this had been allowed to happen at Leuktra, Thebes could have been taken, whether the Thebans won or lost. Their only hope of saving Thebes was to defeat the Spartans, and, after victory, remain in position between the Spartans and the city. The Thebans were not only the main strength of their fighting force, massed in unprecedented depth of phalanx, but were also fighting with the desperation of defending their homes and families from certain destruction. Their strategy, tactical formation and motivation will have contributed most to their victory, in addition to sound training, confidence and past battle experience. On the Spartan side, failure to learn the value of the development of the deep phalanx rendered their courage and reputation ineffectual, in addition to the confusion of the initial cavalry clash and of possible last minute corrective manoeuvring.

8 ἀπέθανον δὲ χίλιοι Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Κλεόμβροτος ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν οἱ κρᾶτιστοι τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν.

Xenophon also gives nearly 1,000 Lakedaimonian dead, but adds that of 700 Spartiates present, more than 400 fell. The identity of the

Lakedaimonian casualties is not stated. They cannot have been allies and mercenaries, for they were evidently on the Spartan left (*Hell.* VI.iv.14) and, if Diodoros is correct (XV.55), not to be engaged by Epameinondas' right wing. References in Xenophon to *perioikoi* and the difficulties resulting from exclusive training of Spartans in the army suggest that these were not integrated into the Spartiate units (J.F.Lazenby (1985) pp.14-16; though G.L.Cawkwell (1983) p.385 disagrees), unless there were arrangements for recruiting and training unknown to us. The decline in the number of Spartiates available for military service may well have been made good by recruiting those who had been disqualified, but had been fully trained (J.F.Lazenby (1985) p.17). The *perioikoi* will have been with the allies and the mercenaries, on the left wing, and may have had few casualties. The Spartan cavalry were the first to be engaged by the Thebans and were quickly routed (*Hell.* VI.iv.13), so that they suffered casualties. However, the cavalry were not all full citizens. At *Hell.* V.iv.39 there is a reference by name to a cavalryman, Eudikos, one of the *perioikoi*. At *Hell.* VI.iv.11 the richest men rear the horses, and the description of the riders, who are assigned only at the call-up and have to be given horse and arms, seems to confirm that at Sparta these recruits did not have hoplite status. They will have contributed to the 600 casualties who were not Spartiates. Of the hoplites, the *ὑπομέλοντες* will have contributed largely to this casualty list, too, those, that is, who, having been through the *ἀγωγή*, trained and served alongside the Spartiates in the phalanx, although they were now without Spartiate status (J.F.Lazenby (1985) pp.16-20).

"Leuktra was decisive, not so much because the Spartan army had been destroyed . . . but because it put an end to the myth of Spartan invincibility" (J.F.Lazenby (1985) p.162),

and this would make the position of the Spartiates insecure.

ἐν οἷς καὶ Κλεώνυμόν φασι τὸν Σφοδρίου τὸν καλὸν τρεῖς πεσόντα πρὸ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τοσαυτάκις ἐξαναστάντα καὶ μαχόμενον τοῖς Θηβαίοις ἀποθανεῖν.

Like Xenophon, who describes the Spartans' heroism in defeat by recording the wish of some to fight again (*Hell.* VI.iv.14-15), Plutarch ends his account of the battle with praise, but he does it by enlarging Xenophon's brief notice of Kleonymos' death. After the deaths of those in the higher ranks have given the measure of the defeat, the loyalty of Kleonymos to his king restores the image of the courageous Spartan soldier. Kleonymos was fulfilling his promise not to shame his friend, but Plutarch had not mentioned that at c.25. Xenophon, too, does not refer to this directly, but makes the link clearly by adding Sphodrias to the list of dead, now one of the king's council.

See Endnote 8 for further discussion of casualty figures at Leuktra.

PART TEN

SPARTA

(Chapters 29-30)

CHAPTER 29

Spartans great in adversity

In cc.29, 30 Plutarch reveals critical assessments of Agesilaos and Sparta just before he reaches the eclipse of the city as leader even in the limited area of the Peloponnese, the subject of the next five chapters.

1 Συμβάντος δὲ τοῖς τε Λακεδαιμονίοις πταίσματος ἀπροσδοκῆτου καὶ τοῖς Θηβαίοις παρὰ δόξαν εὐτυχήματος, οἷον οὐ γέγονεν ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι πρὸς Ἕλληνας ἀγωνισσάμενοις.

The disaster for the Lakedaimonians is of course correspondingly a success for the Thebans. Xenophon had praised the Spartans' desire to fight again, but the mood changed to depression, and the dead had to be recovered under truce, while the Thebans marked their success with a trophy. Plutarch presents his comments on each in a single rhetorical expression, exploiting the element of surprise, which is common to both. It is expressed as if the Spartans were not expecting disaster and the Thebans were: both were unable to foresee that the reverse of their expectations would be the result. Plutarch also uses a rhetorical expression to describe the event as surpassing others of its kind, with which may be compared: ἀγῶνα λαμπρότατον ὃν Ἕλληνες πρὸς Ἕλληνας ἠγωνίσαντο (*Nikias* 27.9). This is an adaptation of Thucydides VII.87:

Ξυνέβη τε ἔργον τοῦτο [Ἑλληνικὸν] τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε μέγιστον γενέσθαι, δοκεῖν δ' ἔμοιγε καὶ ὢν ἀκοῇ Ἑλληνικῶν ἴσμεν, καὶ τοῖς τε κρατήσασι λαμπρότατον καὶ τοῖς διαφθορεῖσι δυστυχέστατον.

Here it is possible to see that recognizable rhetoric does not necessarily preclude the correct assessment of political significance. Leuktra was of unsurpassed significance for Greece, and the unique nature of the circumstance was that the supposed invincibility of the Spartan army had come unexpectedly and, with hindsight, unambiguously to an end. It was left for Xenophon's successors to

make this explicit. In Aristotle's view, one single blow was too much for Sparta (*Pol.* 1270a33).

οὐδὲν ἄν τις ἥττον ἐζήλωσε τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ ἠγάσθη τὴν ἡττημένην πόλιν ἢ τὴν νικῶσαν.

Plutarch now comments at greater length on the behaviour of the Spartans, with a paradoxical comparison that involves both cities. Here the events show that the character of a people, like that of an individual, is constant, and that the Spartans have behaved as courageously in their extremely difficult situation, true to their traditions, as the victorious Thebans behaved. The judgement, however, is presented, not as Plutarch's, but as a generalized one, that the reader is not expected to challenge. The commendation of the personal courage of the Spartans is, of course, in strong contrast to the increasingly widespread criticism of Agesilaos on other grounds which began in c.22. Clearly Plutarch is drawing a distinction between the Spartans and the behaviour of their king, and is establishing at this stage his approval of a manifestation of what he saw as the normal character, developed in Lykourgan Spartan society. Not only, then, does Plutarch at this point combat any tendency to associate the rest of Sparta with the blemishes he has displayed in Agesilaos' character: he is also establishing a standard of community behaviour in the Sparta that he admired, against which he will set the later, very different, reactions of Spartans to another national crisis, to be described almost immediately, in c.31 and again in c.33.

2 ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ξενοφῶν φησι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔχειν τι καὶ τὰς ἐν οἴνῳ καὶ παιδιᾷ φωνὰς καὶ διατριβάς ἀξιομνημόνευτον, ὁρθῶς λέγων.

For support in this judgement, Plutarch has turned to Xenophon, whom he regarded as important for his philosophical works, and to whose authority accordingly he had appealed at c.20 as Ξενοφῶντος δὲ τὸν σοφόν. The quotation, from Xenophon *Symposium* I.1, is slightly modified by Plutarch. Xenophon refers to the behaviour of good men,

observing it in two different forms, the one a reversal of the other:

τῶν καλῶν καγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔργα οὐ μόνον τὰ μετὰ σπουδῆς
πραττόμενα ὀξιομνημόνευτα εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς.

Plutarch has done the same in the previous sentence, referring to the courage of two cities in different situations, observing it both for τὴν ἡττημένην πόλιν and for τὴν νικῶσαν. In the quotation, however, he has narrowed Xenophon's reference, for he has omitted the first, serious, situation: τὰ μετὰ σπουδῆς πραττόμενα, and has retained only the second, lighter, one, having inserted a new but similar situation: τὰς ἐν οἴνῳ. On the other hand, he has broadened the reference, for where Xenophon referred only to two contrasted aspects of the man's actions, ἔργα πραττόμενα, Plutarch now mentions talk as well as behaviour: τὰς . . . φωνὰς καὶ διατριβάς. The adjustments will be seen to be necessary for Plutarch's purpose in presenting his own argument in the next section.

ἔστι δ' οὐχ ἥττον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ὄξιον κατανοεῖν καὶ θεᾶσθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἃ παρὰ τὰς τύχας πράττουσι καὶ λέγουσι διευσχημονοῦντες.

Having established the paradox, that valuable observations are possible even in unexpected, unintended, places, Plutarch uses a rhetorical technique seen in some of Homer's similes, too, that what he compares does not match, but surpasses, the given standard. He claims that the display of qualities in circumstances which militate against them is an even stronger proof of character. The quotation enables Plutarch to create the contrast with what Xenophon had said, but with the changed form he can limit his discussion to the serious situation, the Spartans' behaviour "in the face of what has happened", and he can also include speech, and its absence, as well as action.

3 ἔτυχε μὲν γὰρ ἡ πόλις ἐορτὴν ἄγουσα καὶ ξένων οὔσα μεστή.

After digressing to establish his principle, Plutarch now re-introduces the event he had already begun to record, the conduct of the city. Apparently in planning Kleombrotos' expedition to Boiotia,

the ephors had disregarded the approaching festival. Plutarch has realised that the presence of foreign spectators will have added to the embarrassment caused by the disaster, for it was important for Spartans not to allow their internal problems to encourage enemies and potential enemies. Obviously better news would have been a different matter.

4 οἱ δ' ἔφοροι, καίπερ εὐθύς ὄντος καταφανοῦς ὅτι διέφθορται τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπολωλέκασιν, οὔτε χορὸν ἐξελθεῖν εἴσσαν οὔτε τὸ σχῆμα τῆς ἑορτῆς μεταβαλεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλὰ κατ' οἰκίαν τῶν τεθνεώτων τοῖς προσήκουσι τὰ ὀνόματα πέμψαντες, αὐτοὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν θέαν καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τῶν χορῶν ἔπραττον.

At *Hell.* VI.iv.16 in the response at Sparta to the arrival of the news of Leuktra during the festival, Xenophon gives a brief statement, ἐλυποῦντο, of the ephors' distress, but goes on to refer to their continuation of the chorus, their communication of the names of the dead, and their imposition of silence, σιγῇ τὸ πάθος φέρειν, on the women. He concentrates on the self-control of the ephors, and the subsequent behaviour of the relatives is presented as obedience to their command. Here, due recognition of the ephors' self-control is also given by Plutarch, but their sense of shock, instead of grief, gives notice of the significance of Leuktra for the whole of Greece, and for Sparta, too, in this wider context. This is not advertised in Xenophon's account, which is more sympathetic to Sparta. The ephors made no public announcement, in their desire for secrecy, but only circulated the news to the relatives, and continued with the festival. The city's reaction is given separately. Plutarch will present the behaviour of the Spartans also as a spontaneous response, as they themselves reacted with Spartan courage and composure, without the ephors' order for silence. The one version implies commendation for the relatives' obedience to the ephors' command, the other for the relatives' own self-control. Plutarch's extra phrase, τὸ σχῆμα τῆς ἑορτῆς, denotes the programme of the festival, and the spectacle seen

by visitors. He thus describes the outer "form" or manifestation of their inner sense of decorum, which made possible the controlled Spartan reaction. The reference to form is continued in τὸ σχῆμα and σχήματι below.

5 ἅμα δ' ἡμέρᾳ φανερῶν ἤδη γεγονότων πᾶσι τῶν τὲ σωζομένων καὶ τῶν τεθνεώτων, οἱ μὲν τῶν τεθνεώτων πατέρες καὶ κηδεσταὶ καὶ οἰκεῖοι καταβαίνοντες εἰς ἀγορὰν ἀλλήλους ἐδεξιοῦντο λιπαροὶ τὰ πρόσωπα, φρονήματος μεστοὶ καὶ γήθους, οἱ δὲ τῶν σωζομένων, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ πένθει, μετὰ τῶν γυναικῶν οἴκοι διέτριβον, εἰ δέ τις ὑπ' ἀνάγκης προέλθοι, καὶ σχήματι καὶ φωνῇ καὶ βλέμματι ταπεινὸς ἐφαίνετο καὶ συνεσταλμένος.

Xenophon says that it was on the last day of the festival that the messengers arrived; visitors would soon be departing from Sparta, and the news of the disaster was not made fully public, perhaps, until the following day (τῇ δ' ὕστεραίᾳ ἦν ὀρᾶν), when foreigners were going home. In the remainder of the chapter Plutarch, following Xenophon, records the Spartans' reversal of other, more usual, reactions to such news. He has, however, restructured the passage, making four parts instead of Xenophon's two, for where Xenophon has separated the relatives only as those of the dead and those of the survivors, Plutarch has further divided each of these into two categories, the male and the female, again showing his interest in all the members of the family. He has also introduced several expressions which are more concrete and specific. In the first place, the male relatives of the dead, οἱ προσήκοντες, are expanded into πατέρες καὶ κηδεσταὶ καὶ οἰκεῖοι, and ἐν τῷ φανερῷ becomes εἰς ἀγορὰν. Xenophon's wholly physical description, λιπαροὺς καὶ παιδρούς, is represented by λιπαροὶ τὰ πρόσωπα, a more explicitly external description than Xenophon's, to which Plutarch then adds the explanatory phrase φρονήματος μεστοὶ καὶ γήθους, reverting to the inner response established above as Plutarch's main interest. Then, in the second place, the male relatives of the survivors are either out of sight at home, μετὰ τῶν γυναικῶν οἴκοι διέτριβον, or, if anyone is constrained to go out of the house and is open to observation again, he is then described in more concrete

detail, σχήματι καὶ φωνῇ καὶ βλέμματι ταπεινός. For the condition of these relatives Xenophon has used two adjectives only, in the simple phrase σκυθρωπούς καὶ ταπεινούς, but his main point is that few were seen, ὀλίγους ἄν εἶδες. Plutarch has taken this to refer, not to their total number, but rather to their reluctance to be seen, stressing their mood. Of course, if they were expecting that their men would receive the treatment described in c.30, their mood would not be unaffected.

7 ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τῶν γυναικῶν ἰδεῖν ἦν καὶ πυθέσθαι τὴν μὲν ζῶντα προσδεχομένην υἷδον ἀπὸ τῆς μάχης κατηφῇ καὶ σιωπηλήν, τὰς δὲ τῶν πεπτωκέναι λεγομένων ἐν τε τοῖς ἱεροῖς εὐθύς ἀνοστρεφομένους, καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἰλαρῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως βαδιζούσας.

Further expansion and heightening has been achieved by Plutarch with the treatment of the women separately from the male relatives already described. He has been careful to explain that verbal reports were available, so that he can describe the women who were said not to be seen abroad. The patterns of situation and response are similar for men and women, but the vocabulary for women is changed, becoming sometimes rather more striking, but also more appropriate for them. For the female relatives of the survivors, σκυθρωπούς καὶ ταπεινούς becomes κατηφῇ καὶ σιωπηλήν, introducing explicitly the silence, spontaneous here, but in Xenophon imposed by the ephors and not mentioned again. For the female relatives of the dead, ἐν τῷ φανερῷ is interpreted in two specific and highly relevant contexts, one religious: ἐν τε τοῖς ἱεροῖς εὐθύς ἀνοστρεφομένους, and one domestic: πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἰλαρῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως βαδιζούσας, where the adverbs denote inner feelings, replacing Xenophon's external appearances, λιπαρούς καὶ παιδρούς. Plutarch has also carefully arranged the order of survivors and slain in a chiasmic pattern, beginning and ending with the examples which correspond most closely to his starting point, behaviour in adversity, for it is the way the bereaved carried their grief that displays the unique Spartan character.

The effect of these changes is to introduce a strong element of

ἐνόργεια into the narrative, which, with the expanded length of the passage, gives due prominence to Plutarch's main concern, the subject of character. This attention to presentation is the function of rhetoric, which has been criticized as destroying the historical value of an author's work (A.J.Woodman (1988) p.199). The comparison with the probable source passage in Xenophon indicates no distortion of his less rhetorical account, which itself appears to be that of an eye-witness, though not necessarily of the author himself. The problem for the historian in this case is to represent the significant impact of the event on the human level as well as the political, and it is only this impact which benefits from the use of evocative language to paint his picture. Plutarch has brought extra life to an already vivid description by visualizing the details. He has also extended the perspective from Xenophon's inward looking view of the Spartans alone, with a comparison with normal behaviour elsewhere.

CHAPTER 30

A failure of nerve

Plutarch has developed three themes on the problems facing Sparta after the defeat at Leuktra, introducing the consequences of the disregard of the oracle at Agesilaos' accession, Agesilaos' saving of the τρέσαντες, and the Spartan expedition to Arkadia. He has used these to illuminate the political mood in Sparta at this time.

1 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ὥς ἀφίσταντο μὲν οἱ σύμμαχοι, προσεδοκᾶτο δὲ νενικηκῶς Ἐπαμεινώνδας καὶ μεγαλοφρονῶν ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς Πελοπόννησον, ἔννοια τῶν χρησμῶν ἐνέπεσε τότε πρὸς τὴν χολότητα τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου.

Plutarch seems to have drawn his primary information from several references in Xenophon, but, unless he had another source, he has added what may be judged to be reasonable inferences from a wider knowledge of Spartan thinking. Diodoros' source had indicated the mood at Sparta at this time: εἰς πολλὴν ὀμηχανίαν ἔπιπτον (XV.63.1). Plutarch perhaps represents as a tendency to defect, what the polemarchs perceived of the feelings of the allies at Leuktra, as they were recorded at Xen. *Hell.* VI.iv.15:

αἰσθανόμενοι δὲ τοὺς συμμάχους πάντας μὲν ἀθύμως ἔχοντας πρὸς τὸ μάχεσθαι, ἔστι δ' οὖς αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ἀχθομένους τῷ γεγενημένῳ,

although at *Hell.* VI.iv.18 Xenophon describes the high spirits, μᾶλα προθύμως, of those Peloponnesians who joined Archidamos' rescue operation. This, however, was before the peace conference at Athens, at which the autonomy of the cities of Greece, including the Peloponnese, was reaffirmed (*Hell.* VI.v.1, 2-3), and Sparta was isolated. Xenophon also records the threat of invasion, which was removed only when Jason of Pherae advised against it (*Hell.* VI.iv.22), although the name of Epameinondas is not mentioned. The importance for Spartans of keeping divine favour was mentioned before the campaign, by Prothoös (*Hell.* VI.iv.22), and Plutarch may well have assumed subsequent recrimination, and that the Spartans would at this time

recall the oracle. No doubt his concern for the reputation of the god required that any disregard of the advice offered should later be seen to have been punished, and it may be supposed that he would explain the disaster in this way. Cf. *Comparatio* 1.2: τὸν δὲ χρησμὸν κατειρωνευσόμενος τὸν περὶ τῆς χολότητος. Agesilaos' disability will always have been available for exploitation by anyone opposing him, but the terms of the oracle, δηρὸν γὰρ νοῦσοί σε κατασχίσουσιν ἄελπτοι (c.3), limit the relevant harm to something serious enough to have effects of lasting duration.

καὶ δυσθυμία πολλή καὶ πτοία πρὸς τὸ θεῖον, ὥς διὰ τοῦτο πραττούσης κακῶς τῆς πόλεως, ὅτι τὸν ἀρτίποδα τῆς βασιλείας ἐκβαλόντες εἶλοντο χολὸν καὶ πεπηρωμένον· ὁ παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς ἐδίδασκε φράζεσθαι καὶ φυλάττεσθαι τὸ δαιμόνιον.

That the interpretation of the oracle accepted at the time of the accession was wrong means that Diopeithes was right in thinking that the lameness was in the king, not in the kingdom, but the "man-destroying war" was rightly foreseen as the consequence which would affect the kingdom, as the battle at Leuktra did (c.3). In his defence, Agesilaos could claim that not he, but Lysander, was responsible for the erroneous advice, but this would not relieve the city from its responsibility for having made the choice. The Spartans' tendency to see a disaster as the consequence of their guilt is exemplified at Thucydides VII.18.2:

ἐν γὰρ τῷ προτέρῳ πολέμῳ σφέτερον τὸ παρανόμημα μᾶλλον γενέσθαι,

where, contrary to agreement, they had refused arbitration in their dispute with Athens. The indirect and often ambiguous expressions used in oracles, as here, always necessitated human intervention in the form of an interpretation of meaning, and the quality of the interpretation was, again as here, something to be ascertained. Diotima explains to Socrates in Plato's *Symposium* (203a) that there are two intermediaries in communications between gods and mortals, τὸ

δαιμόνιον, an inferior deity, and ὁ σοφὸς δαιμόνιος ἄνθρωπος, a superior human who must have ἡ μαντικὴ τέχνη. In this case, the authority of Lysander had been accepted by the Spartans, in defiance of the authority of a recognized prophet. The orthodox view of Plutarch would make them collectively responsible for their misfortunes.

2 διὰ δὲ τὴν ἄλλην δύναμιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὀρετὴν καὶ δόξαν οὐ μόνον ἐχρῶντο βασιλεῖ καὶ στρατηγῷ τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀποριῶν ἰατρῷ καὶ διαιτητῇ.

Throughout the *Life*, Plutarch has commended Agesilaos' qualities as king and as general, but although his next employment makes other demands, his authority would convince the citizens that his judgement was to be accepted, just as the same qualities also explain their earlier acceptance of Lysander's interpretation of the oracle. However, judgement is one quality that is not only missing from the list, but is manifestly being questioned by the critics, including Plutarch, in Agesilaos' handling of Sparta's relations with Thebes and the choice of Agesilaos as king. Plutarch uses two metaphors from medicine, the first for the search for a remedy, the second for the prescription of a regimen for the maintenance of health, διαιτήματα.

τοῖς ἐν τῇ μάχῃ καταδειλιάσασιν, οἷς αὐτοὶ τρέσαντας ὀνομάζουσιν, ὀκνοῦντες τὰς ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἀτιμίας προσάγειν, πολλοῖς οὔσι καὶ δυνατοῖς, φοβούμενοι νεωτερισμὸν ἀπ' αὐτῶν. 3 οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀρχῆς ἀπείργονται πάσης.

The first phrase explains what the men had done to deserve the status defined by the technical term in the second phrase. The title was given to a Spartan whose companion died without him at Thermopylai:

ὄνειδός τε εἶχε ὁ τρέσας Ἀριστόδημος καλεόμενος (Herodotos VII.231).

The information about this crisis comes only from Plutarch, and *Apoth. Lak.* (*Mor.* 191, 214), though there the ephors first expressed their concern. Plutarch may have had in mind the similar situation which arose when the Spartans removed the rights of citizenship from the

prisoners from Pylos, recently returned by the Athenians, δείσαντες μή τι . . . νεωτερίσωσιν. Thucydides reports that this involved debarring some important men from holding any command, although they were restored later (Thuc. V.34). The other marks of degradation are recorded by Herodotos (VII.231) and *Lak. Pol.* 9. The men suffering the punishments listed could no doubt be kept out of sight for a day while foreigners were still in Sparta, so that only the "evidence" given by the Spartans themselves would reach the rest of Greece, to contribute to the myth that has come down to the present day.

Plutarch records a remedy which would avoid discontent, rather than add to it. The large numbers of men involved seem to make the charge of cowardice less appropriate than in individual cases, but this was not to be made the issue, nor was the opportunity taken to propose reform. Plutarch, however, would probably not have seen change as desirable. Sparta, for him, was admired for the laws which were considered to be derived from Lykourgos, and in departing even once from strict observance the Spartans were now abandoning the very system that had made them what they were, and so, like Agesilaos, they were in decline - a new theme for Plutarch. Their respective positions have gone through several changes. In c.20 Agesilaos had been shown to be holding the Spartans to the traditional way of life, but was thereafter at fault over Phoibidas, Sphodrias and Thebes. The citizens had maintained the high moral standard in the crisis of c.29, and at the beginning of c.30 they had realized Agesilaos' vulnerable moral position in the kingship. The citizens' present decline may, perhaps, start for Plutarch in their continued reliance on him, especially as νομοθέτης, despite their awareness of the significance of the interpretation of the oracle, with which he has juxtaposed it.

5 δεινὸν οὖν ἦν τοιοῦτους ἐν τῇ πόλει περιορᾶν πολλούς, οὐκ ὀλίγων δεομένην στρατιωτῶν. καὶ νομοθέτην αἰροῦνται τὸν Ἀγησίλαον.

The link with the numbers available to serve in the army seems to

be false. Service as hoplites would not be excluded by Plutarch's or Thucydides' phrase, for soldiers were recruited not only from the Spartiate class (J.F.Lazenby (1985) pp.10-20), so that the loss of these men as Spartiates was not significant for the total military numerical strength of the Spartans. The problem created by decreasing numbers of Spartiates was rather, perhaps, the threat posed to the survival of the social system, which ensured their privileged position as the ruling oligarchy, if they were seen to be too few to enforce it, or if they could not fill most of the posts of responsibility from their own ranks. A *perioikos* held command at sea (Thuc. VIII.22.1), and occasionally harmosts may have been non-Spartiate (Xen. *Hell.* I.1.32, II.2.2, III.5.12). Plutarch had recorded that Agesilaos exploited Sparta's need for soldiers in defending Sphodrias, c.25, preferring, no doubt, not to reveal the real reason, but he was perhaps right to refer above to social unrest. The fear of a revolt of helots had arisen after the disaster at Pylos (Thuc.IV.80), and Kinadon had plotted soon after Agesilaos' accession. The large numbers of discontented men that would now be created, if the survivors of Leuktra were deprived of Spartiate status, would present an even greater threat to the state.

6 εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων· καὶ φήσας ὅτι τοὺς νόμους δεῖ σήμερον ἔαν καθεύδειν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς αὔριον ἡμέρας κυρίου εἶναι πρὸς τὸ λοιπόν, ὅμα τοὺς τε νόμους τῇ πόλει καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπιτίμους ἐφύλαξε.

It is not easy to see why the question of Spartiate status involved such a meeting. It would suggest that the rest of the population thought highly enough of their superiors to sympathize with their plight (G.L.Cawkwell (1983) pp.391-3), and recognized the city's need to avoid imposing the regular penalties. If, however, Agesilaos made his proposal in a meeting of the ἐκκλησία consisting only of the Spartiates, they would be sympathetic to the plight of the survivors of Leuktra. Plutarch makes no favourable comment on the proposal here, but at *Comparatio* 2.3 he says that it was an exceptional political

device: οὐ γέγονε ἄλλο σόφισμα πολιτικόν. Without the epithet, σόφισμα is in the military vocabulary of stratagems, meaning "a trick", and may be pejorative, like σοφιστής, or commendatory, like σοφία (E.L.Wheeler (1988) pp.18, 27). That the opportunity was not taken for more sweeping change is said to be symptomatic of the failure of Sparta to engage in radical reform, in keeping with the needs of the times, here in the social sphere, as earlier in the military, and after the Peace of Antalkidas (P.A.Cartledge (1987) p.179). Plutarch seems rather to approve the retention of the standards of Lykourgos, and, while he has avoided the issue of their implementation in the present case, he leaves the impression that he regretted the means.

7 βουλομένος δὲ τὴν παροῦσαν ἀθυμίαν καὶ κατήφειαν ἀφελεῖν τῶν νέων, ἐνέβαλεν εἰς Ἀρκαδίαν καὶ μάχην μὲν ἰσχυρῶς ἐφυλάξατο συνόψαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐλὼν δὲ πολίχνην τινὰ τῶν Μαντινέων καὶ τὴν χώραν ἐπιδρομῶν, ἐλαφροτέρον ἐποίησε ταῖς ἐλπίσι καὶ ἡδίστην τὴν πόλιν, ὥς οὐ παντόποσιν ἀπεγνωσμένην.

Just as, if the announcement was made to the Lakedaimonians, it was, perhaps, an astute exercise in communication, so the expedition to Arkadia would be a valuable psychological rehabilitation of the Spartan military machine, especially for the survivors of Leuktra. Their escape from the indignity of the customary punishments for cowardice would not wholly remove either the public stigma or the personal sense of shame. However, some military achievement to offset the shock of a Spartan defeat could also do something to restore the Spartan reputation among the allies, who did not expect the Lakedaimonians to undertake any expedition for a long time (Xen. *Agesilaos* II.23). That any risk of further depletion of numbers was removed by avoiding pitched battle seems to be indicated by Xenophon's other account of this campaign (*Hell.* VI.v.11-21), which confirms that there was no major confrontation: Eutaia was captured, but purchases replaced plunder; he plundered farms near Mantinea, but refused to be persuaded to attack the Arkadians and Argives, and, after the panic of a false alarm at the

approach of his allies, the Orchomenians, a brilliant manoeuvre was needed to extricate his army from a valley near Mantinea, which, as Xenophon says, he had entered by mistake at dusk. When Agesilaos withdrew rapidly to Eutaia, very late, Xenophon indiscretely reports that he wanted to avoid contact, so that he would not be seen to be in flight, and would show that no one had been willing to engage in battle with him. Plutarch's attitude seems to have been rightly influenced by Xenophon's comment: ἐκ γὰρ τῆς πρόσθεν ἀθυμίας ἐδόκει τι ἀνειληφέναι τὴν πόλιν (*Hell.* VI.v.21). For Plutarch, too, however, Agesilaos' honour is restored in the military field. He has often shown admiration for his generalship, but the last phrase in this chapter leaves the position of Sparta still in some doubt, despite the recovery of some of the citizens' self-respect.

PART ELEVEN

LAKONIA AND EPAMEINONDAS

(Chapters 31-35)

CHAPTER 31

Crisis in Sparta

1 Ἐκ δὲ τούτου παρῆν εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν ὁ Ἐπομεινώνδας μετὰ τῶν συμμάχων, οὐκ ἐλάττονας ἔχων τετρακισμυρίων ὁπλιτῶν.

The abrupt introduction of the new situation heightens the contrast with the brief elation of the last chapter. Plutarch, like Xenophon, does not explain the arrival in the Peloponnese of Epameinondas, the Theban national hero, since it was, no doubt, more fully treated in the *Life* which is not extant. The Boiotian Plutarch would be disappointed that Xenophon should make little mention of him by name, and he seems to have turned to another source, perhaps Ephoros, followed also by Diodoros at XV.62-66. Xenophon mentions that, during Agesilaos' earlier campaign in Arkadia (c.30), the Eleians were expecting the Thebans to come, having sent ten talents for their expenses (*Hell.* VI.v.19). He omits the report given by Diodoros of the formation of the Arkadian League at this time (XV.59), but its formation perhaps explains the events he does mention, that Agesilaos' campaign was a response to the threatened Theban intervention. The existence of the Arkadian League is recognized at *Hell.* VI.v.22.

The other main extant accounts of Epameinondas' invasion are in *Pelopidas*, the brief *Epaminondas* of Nepos, and Pausanias IX.13-15. Diodoros records that the Arkadians, with the Argives and Eleians, obtained help from the Thebans, Lokrians and Phokians, after their request had been refused by Athens. The decision to invade Lakonia was then taken jointly. As usual, since Agesilaos takes no part at this stage, Plutarch omits the preliminary details of the expedition here, but he clearly had access to other sources. He alone distinguishes the 40,000 hoplites here from the total, including auxiliaries, μυριάδος ἑπτό, given here. He gives this figure also at *Pelopidas* 24: ἡγούμενος ἑπτά μυριάδων, and says that the Thebans formed a twelfth part. The same total figure is given by Diodoros at XV.81, in the obituary notice of

Pelopidas: ἐπὶ μὲν ἡγήσατο μυριάδων, but in the account of the invasion this figure is given as πλειόνων ἢ πεντακισμυρίων (XV.62). Plutarch's consistency indicates that he used the one source in both places; Diodoros either followed two sources, or there is a simple error in his text.

3 ἦν μὲν δὴ χρόνος οὐκ ἐλάττων ἐτῶν ἑξακοσίων, ὅφ' οὐ κατέκουν τὴν Λακεδαιμόνα Δωριεῖς· ἐν δὲ τούτῳ παντὶ τότε πρῶτον ὤφθησαν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ πολέμιοι, πρότερον δ' οὐδεὶς ἐτόλμησεν· ἀλλὰ ἀδύωτον καὶ ἄθικτον οὖσαν ἐμβαλόντες ἐπυρπόλουν καὶ διήρπαζον ἄχρι τοῦ ποταμοῦ [καὶ] τῆς πόλεως μηδενὸς ἐπεξιόντος.

Plutarch is concerned to show the low level to which the condition of the Spartans had declined, by comparison with the immunity from invasion enjoyed in the past. Diodoros, too, explicitly refers to Sparta's decline: εἰς πολλὴν ἀμνηχανίαν ἔπιπτον (XV.63), and the previous centuries of immunity: πεντακόσια ἔτη τὴν Λακωνικὴν τετηρηκότες ἀπόρθητον (XV.65). Xenophon briefly mentions that the women had never seen an enemy: οὐδέποτε ἰδοῦσαι πολεμίους (*Hell.* VI.v.28), but reveals the Spartans' isolation in the messages from Karyai: λέγοντες τὴν ἐρημίαν (*Hell.* VI.v.25). He attaches great importance here to the defections of the *perioikoi*, perhaps explaining Agesilaos' anxiety when Epameinondas challenged him over the recognition of autonomy (c.27). Plutarch's three expressions combine these references to invasion, devastation, and Spartan helplessness.

4 ὁ γὰρ Ἀγησίλαος οὐκ εἶα πρὸς τοσοῦτον, ὥς φησι θεόπομπος, ρεῦμα καὶ κλύδωνα πολέμου μάχεσθαι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ἀλλὰ τῆς πόλεως τὰ μέσα καὶ κυριώτατα τοῖς ὀπλίταις περιεσπειραμένος, ἐκαρτέρει τὰς ἀπειλὰς καὶ τὰς μεγαλαυχίας τῶν Θηβαίων, προκαλουμένων ἐκεῖνον ὀνομαστικῶς καὶ διαμάχεσθαι περὶ τῆς χώρας κελευόντων, ὃς τῶν κακῶν αἰτιὸς ἐστὶν ἐκκαύσας τὸν πόλεμον.

By his juxtaposition of the name of Agesilaos with μηδενὸς ἐπεξιόντος, Plutarch seems to indicate that his decline is in some way responsible for Sparta's weakness, and the metaphor of the waves is reminiscent of Diopeithes' oracle (c.3). The important point, perhaps, is that against such overwhelming enemy forces the Spartans, now deprived of allies, had not been able successfully to take the more

aggressive action beyond their frontiers that had protected their territory before Leuktra. Agesilaos' generalship is not criticised by Plutarch, who approves of his restraint, mentioned by Xenophon (*Agesilaos* II.24), in not fighting in the open. Diodoros further mentions that the Lakedaimonians had to be restrained, but the order came from the elders (XV.64). Plutarch's description of the points occupied by Agesilaos as, "central and most important", corresponds more closely to the topography of Sparta than Diodoros' ἔχοντες τὴν τῶν τόπων ὀχυρότητα. Plutarch clearly follows the same tradition as Diodoros who records the Theban taunts:

αὐτοὶ δὲ προσελθόντες τῇ πόλει προεκαλοῦντο τοὺς Σπορτιάτας εἰς παράταξαν, ἥ ξυνομολογεῖσθαι προσέταπτον ἥττους εἶναι τῶν πολεμίων (XV.65.4).

but he presents them indirectly (Ὀμηρικῶς) by reporting Agesilaos' response to them, and in the same way uses them to establish Agesilaos' responsibility for the war. Xenophon's accounts of Agesilaos' diplomacy concerning Thebes and Arkadia (*Hell.* VI.iii.19, VI.v.4) identify his responsibility.

5 οὐχ ἥττον δὲ τούτων ἐλύπουν τὸν Ἀγησίλαον οἱ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν θόρυβοι καὶ κραυγαὶ καὶ διαδρομαὶ τῶν τε πρεσβυτέρων δυσανασχετούντων τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν οὐ δυναμένων ἡσυχάζειν, ἀλλὰ παντάπασιν ἐκφρόνων οὐσῶν πρὸς τε τὴν κραυγὴν καὶ τὸ πῦρ τῶν πολεμίων.

The reactions of the men and women are expressed in the same three nouns, but the participles show, among the elders, a sense of outrage, no doubt over the military situation, which Plutarch makes explicit later in the chapter, and, by contrast, among the women, their loss of rational control on perceiving the enemy's shouts and fires, greatly contrasting their earlier disciplined response to tragedy (c.29), and the quite different picture of Spartan women often presented in *Sayings of Spartan Women* (*Mor.* 241-2). Again, the one word, κραυγαί, is used, not only of the Spartans, both men and women, but also of the enemy's cries, κραυγὴν; the total sound was the same, but what it meant was different in each case. Xenophon provides indirect confirmation of

Plutarch's description of the scene, in recording the anxiety of the women seeing the smoke of the burning houses. The anxiety of the men is shown by the action of the authorities, who, in recognition of the isolation of the Spartiates, called for the immediate aid of 6,000 Helot volunteers (*Hell.* VI.v.28). Both authors seem to exploit the imposed transfer of the women from their usual, predominantly domestic environment, to the unfamiliar world of war, as a device to portray the crisis of confidence.

6 ἡνία δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς δόξης αὐτόν, ὅτι τὴν πόλιν μεγίστην παραλαβὼν καὶ δυνατωτάτην, ἑώρα συνεσταλμένον αὐτῆς τὸ ὄξύωμα, καὶ τὸ αὔχημα κεκολουμένον, ᾧ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐχρήσατο πολλάκις εἰπὼν ὅτι γυνὴ Λόκαινα καπνὸν οὐχ ἑώρακε πολέμιον.

Plutarch again uses the indirect method, Ὀμηρικῶς, to indicate a judgement about Agesilaos' responsibility for Sparta's decline, this time quoting the supposed effect on Agesilaos himself of his realization that the situation has this special significance for his reputation. The validity of this judgement is not increased by attributing it to Agesilaos himself, since the attribution is not capable of authentication. Plutarch has also suggested that Agesilaos had often boasted about Lakonia's immunity from invasion. It is perhaps not easy to find suitable historical contexts for the boast, but it is likely that the form of the anecdote is developed from Xenophon's account. Plutarch has modified Xenophon's point slightly: αἱ μὲν γυναῖκες οὐδὲ τὸν καπνὸν ὁρᾶσαι ἠνεύχοντο, ἅτε οὐδέποτε ἰδοῦσαι πολεμίους (*Hell.* VI.v.28). Aristotle's remark, that two-fifths of the property was owned by women (*Pol.* 1270a23), perhaps suggests that their concern was only for the property, and that would account for perhaps a minority of them, but since Xenophon goes on to explain that this was their first sight of an enemy, it is clear that if the information was available to the Spartans, its relevance did not give it a place in his version.

7 ἡμεῖς μέντοι πολλάκις ὑμῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ Κηφισοῦ ἐδιώξαμεν, . . . Ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς γε οὐδέποτε ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ Εὐρώτα. . . . 8 Πολλοὶ ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀργολίδι κεῖνται, . . . Ὑμῶν δέ γε οὐδεὶς ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ.

Each of the three anecdotes proves that Spartan territory had never been violated before, but the last two, which are included in *Apophth. Lak.* (Mor. 217, 233), carry more conviction as part of the tradition, than Agesilaos' boast, and show how the defence of Sparta had previously been effected by establishing military superiority beyond its borders. This chapter marks the lowest point in Plutarch's account of Agesilaos' reign.

Epameinondas threatens Sparta

1 Τότε μέντοι τὸν Ἀνταλκίδαν φασὶν ἔφορον ὄντα τοὺς παῖδας εἰς Κύθηρα ὑπεκθέσθαι περίφοβον γενόμενον.

The contrast with the earlier confidence of Antalkidas is perhaps intended to indicate the depth of despair to which even such a prominent Spartan had sunk. Kythera had been de-populated by Konon and Pharnabazos and occupied by a garrison under an Athenian commander, but Sparta will have recovered it under the terms of the Peace. It has been suggested that perhaps Antalkidas' relatives had been concerned with the re-occupation. That Plutarch explicitly does not name his authorities here, and two or three times later in the chapter, may indicate that he draws from irregular sources.

2 ὁ δ' Ἀγησίλαος, ἐπιχειρούντων διαβαίνειν τὸν ποταμὸν τῶν πολεμίων καὶ βιάζεσθαι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ἐκλιπὼν τὰ λοιπὰ παρετάξατο πρὸ τῶν μέσων καὶ ὕψηλων.

The natural defences of the city of Sparta are extremely limited, apart from the river Eurotas. Xenophon refers to the occupation of passes and high ground (*Agesilaos* II.24), which seems to indicate outlying defences, but he also mentions inner defence positions, west of the Eurotas, such as the sanctuary of Athena Alea, where the hoplites had been drawn up facing the enemy near the bridge, the cavalry on the race-course at the sanctuary of Poseidon, and an ambush in the sanctuary of the Tyndaridai (*Hell* VI.v.28-31). Plutarch does not name the sanctuaries, but gives general locations.

3 ἑρρῦη δὲ πλεῖστος ἑαυτοῦ καὶ μέγιστος τόθ' ὁ Εὐρώτας, χιόνων γενομένων, καὶ τὸ ῥεῦμα μᾶλλον ὑπὸ ψυχρότητος ἢ τραχύτητος ἐγένετο σκληρὸν καὶ χαλεπὸν τοῖς Θηβαίοις.

Immediately to the east and north of Sparta, in summer, the Eurotas now has not enough water to fill the stony bed. In a wet winter, however, to the north it can be fast-flowing and formidable, and a considerable obstacle even where it widens a little, below the

present road bridge, and a pier of an ancient bridge (Sparta: General Plan, *BSA* XIII (1906-7) Pl.1; P.A.Cartledge and A.J.S.Spawforth, (1989) p.215). Plutarch has inserted this description, perhaps having noticed Xenophon's reference to the winter as a reason for the departure of the invaders (*Hell.* VI.v.50).

4 πορευόμενον δὲ πρῶτον τῆς φάλαγγος τὸν Ἐπαμεινώνδαν ἐδείκνυσάν τινες τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ· κἀκεῖνος, ὥς λέγεται, πολὺν χρόνον ἐμβλέψας αὐτῷ καὶ συμπαράεμψας τὴν ὄψιν, οὐδὲν ἢ τοσοῦτον μόνον εἶπεν· ὦ τοῦ μεγαλοπράγμονος ἀνθρώπου.

A piece of rhetorical ἐνόργεια, in a Homeric miniature, as in the confrontation of Achilles and Priam at *Iliad* XXIV.482-4:

θάμβος δ' ἔχει εἰσορόωντας,
ὥς Ἀχιλλεὺς θάμβησεν ἰδὼν Πρίαμον θεοειδέα.
θάμβησαν δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι, ἐς ἀλλήλους δὲ ἰδόντο.

The reputation of a foe is thus enhanced, as Caractacus' is in Tacitus' *Agricola*, 29ff. Agesilaos makes a guarded statement, which may be interpreted as an expression of disbelief in the audacity displayed in the attack on Sparta, or of admiration for a worthy foe.

5 ἐπεὶ δὲ φιλοτιμούμενος ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας ἐν τῇ πόλει μάχην συνόψαι καὶ στήσαι τρόπαιον, οὐκ ἴσχυσεν ἐξαγαγεῖν οὐδὲ προκαλέσασθαι τὸν Ἀγησίλαον, ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀναζεύξας πάλιν ἐπόρθει τὴν χώραν.

Plutarch reverses Xenophon's judgement that an attack on the city was abandoned for lack of courage: ἤδη τι ἐδόκει θορραλεώτερον εἶναι (*Hell.* VI.v.50), suggesting that Agesilaos refused the challenge. It is very likely that Epameinondas may not have had any serious intention of occupying, or have wished to destroy, Sparta (P.A.Cartledge (1987) p.235). Certainly, later events showed that Thebes had not the resources with which to garrison it permanently, or to maintain permanent control of the Peloponnese, and Epameinondas' restraint is clearly represented elsewhere in the tradition (Pausanias IX.15). He perhaps saw the need to retain Sparta as a counter-balance to Athens and to rivals in the Peloponnese. The destruction of Sparta's reputation for territorial inviolability and military invincibility

was perhaps a sufficient achievement, and a demonstration to the Spartans themselves of the change in the balance of power. Xenophon records that the devastation of the countryside extended to the south coast at Gytheion. Agesilaos had on occasions demonstrated the reality of his military superiority in the same way, in Asia Minor and in parts of Greece. Epameinondas' demonstration was no less effective, and will have impressed not only the Spartans but also the rest of Greece, without the risk of casualties in another battle. The effects would also be felt at the next harvest time and beyond, in the case of olive trees.

6 ἐν δὲ Λακεδαίμονι τῶν πάλαι τινὲς ὑπούλων καὶ πονηρῶν ὡς διακόσιοι συστραφέντες κατέλαβον τὸ Ἰσώριον, οὗ τὸ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος ἱερόν ἐστιν, εὐερκῇ καὶ δυσεκβίαστον τόπον.

The medical and political metaphors for "disloyal" suggest citizens who have lost their full status, to be distinguished from *perioikoi* and helots on the one hand, and the Spartiates specified later by Plutarch. cf. P.A.Cartledge (1987) p.164. This unrest demonstrates, as did Kinadon thirty years earlier, the fragile harmony of the Spartan community. The depth of the present crisis led to the recruitment of 6,000 helots recorded by Xenophon, but this further increased the Spartans' anxiety when they were assembled together (*Hell.* VI.v.29), and presumably some realized their opportunity. Perhaps the timing of the defection was determined by the expectation of immediately linking up with the enemy, and the ready surrender perhaps followed the arrival of allied contingents, and the Theban withdrawal, when Agesilaos could make his unarmed approach without danger to himself from the enemy. The temple of Artemis is in the territory of the Pitanatai (Pausanias III.14.2) which extends to the west from the Spartan acropolis. Fimmen (*RE* (1950) Kol 2247), on Issorion, puts it to the north of the acropolis, on one of the hills marked Mondouna (*BSA* XIII (1906-7) General Plan L-N 11), hence not far from the enemy on the other side of the Eurotas.

7. αὐτὸς δ' ἐν ἱματίῳ καὶ μεθ' ἑνὸς οἰκέτου προσήει, βοῶν ἄλλως ὀκηκοέναι τοῦ προστάγματος αὐτοῦς.

Agesilaos typically avoids precipitate action and prefers to operate by deception, thus displaying, for Plutarch, two admirable traits of generalship.

9 τῶν δὲ συστάντων ἐκείνων περὶ πεντεκαίδεκά τινας συλλαβῶν νυκτὸς ἀπέκτεινεν.

Summary execution indicates the gravity of the Spartan citizens' regard for their position. Herodotos says that Spartan executions always took place at night (IV.146.2).

10 ἄλλη δὲ μείζων ἐμηνύθη συνωμοσία καὶ σύνοδος ἀνδρῶν Σπαρτιατῶν ἐπὶ πράγμασι νεωτέροις εἰς οἰκίαν κρύφα συνερχομένων, οἷς καὶ κρίνειν ἄπορον ἦν ἐν ταραχῇ τοσαύτῃ καὶ περιορᾶν ἐπιβουλεύοντας. 11 ἀπέκτεινεν οὖν καὶ τούτους μετὰ τῶν ἐφόρων βουλευσάμενος ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ἀκρίτους, οὐδενὸς δίκῃ δίκης τεθνατωμένου πρότερον Σπαρτιατῶν. 12 ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν συντεταγμένων εἰς τὰ ὄπλα περιοίκων καὶ εἰλώτων ἀπεδίδρασκον ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους.

There is no other report of this conspiracy, and the execution without trial of "a greater number of Spartiates", more than the 200 mentioned above, in the circumstances following the heavy losses at Leuktra, is extremely doubtful (J.F.Lazenby (1985) pp.166-7). Desertions of the *perioikoi*, however, are confirmed by Xenophon at *Hell.* VI.v.25 and 32. These may have come into the tradition along with details not found in Xenophon's account, such as the two revolts mentioned by Plutarch, but allowance must be made for the hostile nature of such a source, and the conveniently secret nature of the proceedings which exposes the tradition to such enlargement. The survivors of the first revolt could, of course, provide their evidence with more reliability than is to be attributed to reporters of the second, which was unlikely to be widely acknowledged and may be compared with the disappearance of helots at Thuc. IV.80.4.

13 ἀναχωρῆσαι δὲ τοὺς Θηβαίους ἐκ τῆς Λακωνικῆς οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι λέγουσι χειμῶνων γενομένων καὶ τῶν Ἀρχάδων ὀρξαμένων ἀπιέναι καὶ διορρεῖν ὀτόκτως, [οἱ δὲ] τρεῖς μῆνας ἐμμεμενηκότας ὅλους καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῆς χώρας διαπεπορθηκότας.

Xenophon gives the reduction of the army when the Arkadians went home, the lack of provisions now available, and winter, as all contributing to the desire of the Thebans to withdraw (*Hell.* VI.v.50). Plutarch indicates that different reasons for the decision are given by the various sources he is using, rather than assigning them all to those in command. This method allows him to introduce Theopompos' further suggestion of bribery. Diodoros says that Theopompos ended his *Hellenika* with Knidos (XIV.84) and started his history of Philip after the Thasians settled Krenides (XVI.3), so that this suggestion may not be part of his main narratives. Bribery is a frequent accusation (cf. Sphodrias in Xen. *Hell.* V.iv.20) which understandably enters a hostile tradition, but is not likely to be authenticated easily. The additional suggestion that the decision had already been made before the bribe was accepted enlivens the narrative. At this point Diodoros records the foundation by Epameinondas of the town of Messene and the gathering of its new citizens (XV.66), which Plutarch delays until c.34 and Xenophon overlooks.

CHAPTER 33

The eclipse of Lykourgan standards

1 Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἡγνόησαν οἱ ἄλλοι, μόνος δὲ Θεόπομπος ᾔσθετο.

Plutarch casts doubt on Theopompos' report of Agesilaos' arrangement by bribery for the Thebans' departure from Lakonia (c.32.14), claiming that it was uncorroborated, as he did at *Perikles* 28 with Douris' accusation of brutality against Perikles and the Athenians, although at c.3 he did not question Douris' testimony about Timaias. He thus hesitates here over a hostile account, but he quotes without qualification Theopompos' favourable attitude in another reference, recording his judgement that Agesilaos was μέγιστος . . . καὶ τῶν τότε ζώντων ἐπιφανέστατος (c.10). Corroboration was not to be expected from Xenophon, of course, who would have been reluctant to attribute bribery to Agesilaos, both on moral grounds and as indicating military failure. The rejected quotation was perhaps intended to show indirectly that the plight of Sparta was considered serious enough to warrant such drastic measures.

2 τοῦ δὲ σωθῆναι τὴν Σπάρτην τότε πάντες αἷτιον ὁμολογοῦσι γενέσθαι τὸν Ἀγησίλαον, ὅτι τῶν ἐμφύτων αὐτῷ παθῶν, φιλονεικίας καὶ φιλοτιμίας, ἀποστὰς ἐχρήσατο τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀσφαλῶς.

Plutarch commends Agesilaos, as usual, for service in the military interests of Sparta (cf. *Comp.* 3.5). Although at *Agesilaos* II.24 Xenophon agrees with the judgement of Plutarch: διεφύλαξε τὴν πόλιν, in *Hellenika* there is no mention of Agesilaos in an active role in the defence of Sparta from VI.v.22 to VII.v.9. He appears there only once, at VII.i.32, to welcome his son back from war. Xenophon records Agesilaos' caution in the continuation of his comment at *Agesilaos* II.24: ὅπου μὲν ἐν παντὶ πλέον ἂν εἶχον οἱ πολέμιοι, οὐκ ἐξάγων ἐνταῦθα, and confines himself to analysis of the military requirements. Plutarch relates this caution to a change in Agesilaos' way of thinking, which

determined the new policy. The word ἐμφύτων is important as revealing Plutarch's understanding of character, consisting of both inherited traits and acquired. He shows that the caution which Agesilaos has here exercised is uncharacteristic, for he has abandoned the two important inherited traits, the competitive virtues of φιλονεικία and φιλοτιμία, displayed repeatedly in earlier chapters. They regularly met with his approval, except when they were taken to excess, and Plutarch had shown before that they were further fostered by the Lykourgan system. He now implies that Agesilaos had at last been forced into a change, for the strong word, ἀποστάς, indicates that, in the uncharacteristic circumstances that had been brought about, Sparta could not be saved by his own proper, characteristic qualities. Paradoxically, Agesilaos' personal interest, his reputation for adherence to Lykourgan principles as he would see them, must be sacrificed, if he is to act in the interest of Sparta.

3 οὐ μέντοι τὴν γε δύναμιν καὶ τὴν δόξαν ἐδυνήθη τῆς πόλεως ἀναλαβεῖν ἐκ τοῦ πταίσματος, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ σώματος ὑγιεινοῦ, λίαν δ' ἀκριβεῖ καὶ κατασκημένῃ κεχρημένου διαίτη παρὰ πάντα τὸν χρόνον, ἁμαρτία μία καὶ ῥοπή τὴν πᾶσαν ἐκλινεν εὐτυχίαν τῆς πόλεως.

Agesilaos ensured the survival of the city, but "the power and the glory" of Sparta were lost. They had been founded on the practice of the characteristics which were now abandoned. Plutarch introduces a medical simile to contrast the two states. The body at the start is healthy, so, too, Lykourgan Sparta is considered to have been healthy in the beginning. Plutarch regularly praises the Sparta which he attributes to the period when the Lykourgan way of life prevailed. The difficulties now being experienced are attributed to the failures of individuals to understand and maintain the early principles. By following "strict asceticism of regimen" the Spartans had made their education too narrow. Excess, even of praiseworthy qualities, is now demonstrated to be destructive (cf. Aristotle *NE* i. 1098a16, ix. 1166a12, *Pol.* 1295a38, c.5, and the Delphic μηδὲν ἄγαν). The quarrel between

Agesilaos and Lysander at c.8 had illustrated the danger to the state from unrestrained desires for achievement, τὸ ἄγαν μὴ φυλαζόμεναι. Here it is the narrowness of the Spartan way of life that is excessive. Only by having had a broader, more philosophical element in his education, could a Spartan - or anyone else - recognize the point at which excess begins. The parallel with medicine points to the ability of a doctor to regulate the excesses in bodily functions by the use of τέχνη, the value of which is recognized by Plato at *Symposium* (186-8). Like Plutarch, Aristotle (*Pol.* 1271b1) also criticizes the narrowness of Spartans' education, for through having had regard for one virtue only, they did not know how to live a peaceful life, and concentrated only on the art of war (cf. c.26). Spartans were, for Aristotle, also wrong in their practice even of this single virtue (*Pol.* 1334b), for while training in war rightly provides against enslavement, they used their military power to create an empire, and to rule despotically over their neighbours, instead of ruling for the good of the governed (*Pol.* 1333b41-1334a). Plutarch's phrase, "a single failure and the (consequent) critical turning point", suggests that he had in mind the statement of Aristotle: "The city sank under a single blow", but he does not continue with Aristotle's train of thought about the cause, that it was inequality under its property laws that had led to a reduction in the number of citizens (*Pol.* 1270a33-b).

οὐκ ἀλόγως. 4 πρὸς γὰρ εἰρήνην καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ἀριστα συντεταγμένῳ πολιτεύματι προσαγαγόντες ἀρχὰς καὶ δυναστείας βιαίους, ὧν οὐδενὸς ἠφεῖτο δεῖσθαι πόλιν εὐδαιμόνως βιωσομένην ὁ Λυκοῦργος, ἐσφάλησαν.

Plutarch implies, by his own interjected comment (cf. ὁρθῶς λέγων at c.29), that with training in sound reasoning the Spartans would have recognized the mistaken course they were steering, and would have corrected their over-concentration on a limited objective. Narrowness of education prevented the true understanding of the lawgiver's aims. Plutarch here presents two views of the constitution.

The first is his own favourable judgement of the earlier condition of Sparta, in which prosperity is defined in the Lykourgan terms of *Lykourgos*, especially 30-31: obedience of the citizens, and enjoyment by all of the city's self-sufficiency, without hegemony. He contrasts this with prosperity in a more material sense, depending on empire and power, as the Spartans had come to understand it, and as the author of *Lak. Pol.* presents it in his first sentence: οὔσα δυνατωτάτη τε καὶ ὀνομαστοτάτη ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι.

Plutarch and Aristotle agree in giving narrowness as the cause of Sparta's decline, but there is a difference in their interpretations of the intentions of the lawgiver, and hence of his responsibility. Aristotle interpreted the Spartan constitution as designed by the lawgiver only for military excellence: for Plutarch, empire and the special power denoted by *δυναστεία* have been added by the Spartans themselves, later. The admired objectives are here summarized in the following phrase *πόλιν εὐδαιμόνως βιωσομένην*, dissociating *Lykourgos* from the criticism implied in the adjective *βιάους*, and presenting him, consistently with *Lyk.* 23, as a man of peace. In so far as Plutarch's praise for Agesilaos centres on his military activity, it may be thought that Plutarch holds him largely responsible for continuing the misinterpretation of *Lykourgos*' intentions. However, his approval is given mainly for the defence of the city and for Panhellenist enterprises, not for aggression against Thebes (*Comp.* III.2). A cluster of ornamentation indicates the importance Plutarch attaches to this passage.

At this point he has completed the development of Xenophon's injunction to consider the behaviour of those in adversity (c.29), the first courageous response to disaster contrasting with the later loss of nerve and the decline (cc.30ff.). In the rest of this chapter he considers further decline in Spartan behaviour in other circumstances. It is clear from modern discussions of the "decline" of Sparta that

several factors were involved: social, concerning the fall in numbers of the Spartiates, though not of the Lakedaimonian population as a whole; military, as regards the Spartans' limited innovation in organization and tactical developments; political, as in Plutarch's review of Spartan hegemony. The aggressive policy has been defended (G.L.Cawkwell (1976) pp.62-84), but the position of Sparta in the years following Leuktra (J.F.Lazenby (1985) pp.165-70) shows that this policy failed (P.A.Cartledge (1987) p.407). There is, however, another factor underlying these, which is suggested by a remark of Xenophon:

ὥς γὰρ . . . χρημάτων δ' ἑώρα τὴν πόλιν δεομένην, εἰ μέλλοι σύμμαχόν τινα ἔξειν, ἐπὶ τὸ πορίζειν ταῦτα ἑαυτὸν ἔταξε (Agesilaos II.25).

Xenophon refers to Agesilaos' service abroad at the end of his career. Sparta, like Thebes and Athens, never had the resources, either of manpower or of money, needed to maintain hegemony of Greece for long (cf. G.L.Cawkwell (1972) p.275), and it seems that Xenophon might just as well have put his remark at the start, for Sparta's frequent resort to war throughout Agesilaos' reign was perhaps required, and designed, to make good the lack of money by extensive predatoriness.

5 αὐτὸς μὲν οὖν ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ἤδη πρὸς τὰς στρατείας ἀπειρήκει διὰ τὸ γῆρας, Ἀρχίδαμος δ' ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐκ Σικελίας ἤκουσαν παρὰ τοῦ τυράννου βοήθειαν ἔχων ἐνίκησεν Ἀρκάδας τὴν λεγομένην ἄδακρυν μάχην· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔπεσε τῶν μετ' αὐτοῦ, συχνοὺς δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀνεῖλεν.

Agesilaos' retirement at the age of about 74, not announced by Xenophon, but to be assumed from his long absence from the narrative, allows Archidamos, the heir to the kingship, to be given the opportunity for experience of military command before becoming king, unlike Agesilaos, so far as is known. Plutarch usually passes over events in which Agesilaos played no part, and this campaign appears to transfer the focus from Agesilaos to his son, which would be inappropriate in his biography. However, the absence of the name of Dionysios, and the lack of details about the assistance sent by him, and about the action itself (Xen. *Hell.* VII.i.28), perhaps indicate that

Plutarch is not recounting the episode for its own sake. The very need for Sicilian help clearly continues the theme of Sparta's decline, highlighting Sparta's lack of access to sources of manpower in the Peloponnese, which would require money and allies. Agesilaos' influence, and his responsibility for it, will be further revealed in the sequel of the Arkadian expedition under the command of Archidamos. Xenophon, too, has indicated, by reporting the Arkadians' successes, the reality of the military decline of Sparta and, if the MSS reading is correct, of the shortage of Spartiates:

(οἱ Ἀρκάδες) . . . στρατευσάμενοι δὲ καὶ εἰς Ἀσίνην τῆς Λακαίνης ἐνίκησάν τε τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων φρουρὰν καὶ τὸν Γεράνορα τὸν πολέμαρχον Σπαρτιάτην γεγεννημένον ἀπέκτειναν καὶ τὸ προάστιον τῶν Ἀσιναίων ἐπόρθησαν (*Hell.* VII.i.25),

though, with the emendation Σπαρτιάτην πολέμαρχον, Geranor was merely promoted, perhaps in unusual circumstances (J.F.Lazenby (1985) p.203 n.7). The ability to mount a Spartan attack on Arkadia shows a distinct and separate use of manpower from the defence of distant parts of Lakonia itself against sudden attack. The expedition perhaps marks an attempt to return to the Spartans' economical policy of securing their defence against potential enemies by mounting attacks beyond the Lakonian borders. In the past, by establishing a reputation for invincibility in battles fought in favourable circumstances of their own choosing, they had been able to deter invasion. Even Leuktra would have been in this category, for, by his attitude to Thebes over the taking of the oaths at the peace conference, Agesilaos had engineered the opportunity for a victory which would have removed the last threat to Spartan hegemony. The designation "tearless" gives all the information about the battle that makes it significant for Plutarch's subsequent comment, which explains in what way it was tearless, though the true Spartan reaction to casualties did not normally involve tears either.

6 αὕτη μάλιστα τὴν ἀσθένειαν ἤλεγξεν ἡ νίκη τῆς πόλεως.

Xenophon's injunction might also have required examination of behaviour in favourable circumstances. The paradox, that victory should show up weakness, reveals that in Plutarch's view Sparta's problem is a matter of its own unique character, the weakness of the city, in his account, being moral, not military.

πρότερον μὲν γὰρ οὕτω σύνηθες ἡγοῦντο καὶ προσῆκον ἔργον αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ νικᾶν τοὺς πολεμίους ὥστε μήτε θύειν τοῖς θεοῖς πλὴν ἀλεκτρυόνα νικητήριον ἐν τῇ πόλει μήτε μεγαληγορεῖν τοὺς ἀγωνισαμένους μήθ' ὑπερχαίρειν τοὺς πυνθανομένους.

Plutarch sets out the earlier characteristics which provide a standard by which to judge the Spartans' current behaviour. The Spartan way of life had brought the continued success that gave rise to the belief that victory was "customary and natural" - the belief that was shattered at Leuktra, but was now, they hoped, to be revived. This belief, unlike the ἀμαρτία μία καὶ ῥοπή above, might have been said by Plutarch to be ἀλόγως, and so, perhaps, predictably unfulfilled. The resentment of the neglected gods does not appear to be the point here, and setting up the normal trophy of victory would not come into the category of excessive exultation. Only its excess, shown by ὑπερ-, was untypical. On this occasion the Spartans were guilty of all three forms of excess. The anaphora of μήτε with an infinitive adjacent enhances the emphasis on the three phrases.

7 ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἐν Μαντινείᾳ μάχης γενομένης, ἣν Θουκυδίδης γέγραφε, τῷ πρώτῳ φράσαντι τὴν νίκην οἱ ἄρχοντες ἐκ φιδιτίου κρέας ἔπεμψαν εὐαγγέλιον, ἄλλο δ' οὐδέν.

Thucydides gives the report at V.64-75, but without reference to any reward for the messenger. The restraint shown after the much more important victory at Mantinea (418BC) illustrates the Spartans' earlier practice, but Plutarch also introduces it as the subject of the response to news, which is to be made the occasion for his comparison of the Spartans' present behaviour. Plutarch seems to suggest that

the magistrates messed together.

8 τότε δὲ τῆς μάχης ἀγγελθείσης καὶ τοῦ Ἀρχιδάμου προσιόντος, οὐδεὶς ἐκαρτέρησεν, ἀλλὰ πρῶτός θ' ὁ πατὴρ ἀπῆντα δακρύων ὑπὸ χαρᾶς καὶ μετ' ἐκεῖνον τὰ ὄρχεια, τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν τὸ πλῆθος ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν κατῆει, τὰς τε χεῖρας ὀρεγόντων καὶ θεοκλυτούντων.

Plutarch has given an all-inclusive list, mentioning the gods invoked by the mortals, and dividing the latter into the representative of the warriors in battle and the adults at home. He, like Xenophon (*Hell.* VII.i.32), gives a comprehensive list of all the levels of adult Spartan society left in the city. The lack of restraint is shown at first to be general in the city, but the party that went out to meet Archidamos is detailed, being led by his father, Agesilaos. He is not named here, perhaps to introduce the alliteration of *P*, and to stress the irregularity of the personal nature of the greeting in a public event by the one who, of all people, had been to the fore, previously, in upholding the traditions of Spartan life. Plutarch completes the list of Spartans in the city with the officials, consisting of the king and the magistrates, and the ordinary civilians, consisting of the elders and the women. Another paradox is perhaps intended, in that the so-called Tearless Battle now causes tears; and whereas in other cities both kinds of tears, expressions of joy and sorrow, would not be exceptional, tears in Sparta now reveal, not Spartan strength, as they did by their absence in the sorrow after Leuktra, but, by their appearance in joy, Spartan weakness. The particular abnormality of Spartans thanking the gods for victory, which they had earlier regarded as theirs naturally, betokens both their great sense of relief and their present lack of their former composure.

The topography of the Spartan residential area is imperfectly known. Four of the five villages were enclosed within walls in Hellenistic times, but there is no significant descent to the river, unless the procession started from the low hill to the north which served as Sparta's acropolis.

ὥσπερ ἀπεωσμένης τὰ παρ' ἀξίαν ὄνειδη τῆς Σπάρτης καὶ λαμπρὸν αὖθις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὸ φῶς ὁρώσης· ἐπεὶ πρότερόν γε φασιν οὐδὲ ταῖς γυναῖξιν ἀντιβλέπειν τοὺς ἄνδρας, αἰσχυνομένους ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαισαν.

Xenophon records Archidamos' address to the troops before the battle:

ἀναβλέψωμεν ὀρθοῖς ὄμμασιν . . . παυσώμεθα αἰσχυνόμενοι καὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ ξένους (*Hell* VII.1.30).

These words clearly have been adapted by Plutarch and set in a different context. He is not illustrating Archidamos' generalship, but instead describes the position achieved after the battle, in terms of what the troops had been urged beforehand to achieve. This use of φασιν, with its subject not expressed, is a fiction, no doubt, though Plutarch could assume that someone would notice the fulfilment of the general's exhortation. The Spartans display self-deception in supposing that after Archidamos' victory the city will avoid the consequences of Leuktra. Plutarch has them refer to the disaster as an unmerited disgrace, perhaps revealing their arrogance in ignoring the more usual political and military consequences of defeat. Mention of τοὺς ἄνδρας, the warriors who had been in Arkadia with Archidamos, and who were not part of the procession referred to, completes the list with the only remaining members of the adult citizen population. Each of these constituents, those in the city and the arriving warriors, has a verb denoting vision as predicate, in the case of those in the city, an imagined ability to see something which did not exist, and in the case of the men, their newly-recovered ability to look their wives in the face after the period of shame. The start of the next chapter shows the true position, and reveals that the relief was an illusion.

The chapter ends with a reference to the disaster of defeat at Leuktra, using the verb ἔπαισαν, which is cognate with the noun πταίσματος used in the earlier part of the chapter. Another reference to disaster, ἐσφάλησαν, occurring in a significant position at the end of that section, had marked the end of Plutarch's analysis of the citizens'

collective responsibility for Sparta's decline, resulting from their departure from strict Lykourgan principles. Plutarch's analysis is reminiscent of Diodoros' censure of the successors of the earlier Spartans who, for the five hundred years before Leuktra, had preserved the city's hegemony (XV.1.1-5). In this tradition, the downfall is attributed to the Spartans' own folly in treating their allies harshly. Diodoros comes closest to Plutarch when he says that they had deserved the contempt they experienced: ὅσην εἰκός ἐστι γενέσθαι κατὰ τῶν ἀναιρούντων τὰς τῶν προγόνων ἀρετάς, an unmistakable reference to the Lykourgan values which Plutarch, too, claims were abandoned. That Agesilaos was held responsible is made clear at XV.19.4: ὁ δ' Ἀγησίλαος, ὦν φύσει δραστήκιος, φιλοπόλεμος ἦν καὶ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων δυναστείας ἀντείχετο. Plutarch's attitude seems to be consistent with the hostile tradition.

The second half of the chapter deals with the city's moral weakness, following on its military weakness. By beginning this section with his name, Plutarch seems to have assigned individual responsibility to the leadership of Agesilaos in this respect, illustrated by his heading the uncharacteristic emotional procession. His individual responsibility, however, is finally extended to the military decline, with the reference to Leuktra. The chapter began with Plutarch's commendation of Agesilaos for saving Sparta, though he did it only by renouncing the qualities which had led to the success of the militarily aggressive policies, but which had finally brought about the disaster denoted in the phrase with which it now ends. Thus in the first part of the analysis Plutarch had dealt with the military disaster, foreshadowing Agesilaos' responsibility for the resulting moral weakness, and at the end he returns to the military disaster, linking it, too, into the chain of Agesilaos' responsibility.

CHAPTER 34

Epameinondas again threatens Sparta

1 Οἰκισομένης δὲ Μεσσηνίας ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἐπαμεινώνδαν καὶ τῶν ὀρχαίων πολιτῶν πανταχόθεν εἰς αὐτὴν συμπορευομένων.

Plutarch has made his reference to the foundation of Messene after his account of the Tearless Battle. Diodoros (XV.66) indicates that Messene was founded after Epameinondas' campaign in Lakonia. Xenophon does not mention the foundation of the city at that point (*Hell.* VI.v.32), but indirectly confirms its existence, and Diodoros' chronology, by his references to the Theban and Persian demands for its autonomy, and Sparta's refusal to accept it (*Hell.* VII.i.27, 36; iv.9). Plutarch indicates no firm relative dating, and its mention has been delayed, perhaps, to form the bridge over a period of several years, leading to the reference below to Agesilaos' failure to recover Messenia during Epameinondas' last invasion of Lakonia, when the attack on Sparta serves to mark the Spartans' deepest resentment of Agesilaos. During this period, Xenophon at *Agesilaos* II.25 records Agesilaos' active concern only over Sparta's finances, and assigns no active role to him in *Hellenika*.

διαμάχεσθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐτόλμων οὐδὲ κωλύειν ἐδύναντο.

Plutarch follows the analysis of the Spartans' moral decline in the preceding chapter with a demonstration of the effect on their military situation - loss of courage for battle and loss of power to control events. Plutarch shows that the revival under Archidamos was only imagined in the Spartan minds. The campaigns mentioned by Xenophon at this time were undertaken, without Agesilaos, for the recovery of Karyai (*Hell.* VII.i.28) and Sellasia (*Hell.* VII.iv.12), and for the placing of a garrison in Kromnos and its later relief from siege (*Hell.* VII.iv.20-27). He does not put these into perspective as regards Sparta's real strength, though he mentions outside help sent at these

times, for example, from Sicily and from some Arkadians. A balanced view of the military strength of the Spartans has suggested that their courage remained intact, and, although they were contained within their boundaries and could no longer be a great power, they were still a formidable force (J.F.Lazenby (1985) pp.165-9). The isolation of Sparta by the foundation of Messene and Megalopolis will have restricted its imperial recovery.

χαλεπῶς δὲ καὶ βαρέως πρὸς τὸν Ἀγησίλαον εἶχον, ὅτι χώραν οὔτε πλήθει τῆς Λακωνικῆς ἐλάττονα καὶ πρωτεύουσαν ἀρετῇ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἔχοντες καὶ καρπούμενοι χρόνον τοσοῦτον, ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκείνου βασιλείας ἀπολωλέκασιν.

In the last chapter, Plutarch recounted directly the personal and individual emotional responses of the Spartans to the events. Here he makes explicit the criticism of Agesilaos that was merely implied before, when he now describes, though indirectly, 'Ομηρικῶς, Agesilaos' responsibility for the Spartan weakness and decline, as recognized by the Spartans themselves. Plutarch's judgement of Agesilaos is not an unreasonable one here, stated in terms reminiscent of Diodoros (XV.1). His description of the land of Messenia adequately suggests the significance of the loss to Sparta of much rich agricultural production, but to what extent this contributed to the financial difficulties, which Agesilaos later tried to relieve by offering himself for mercenary service overseas (cc.36ff.), cannot be assessed. The loss is described as "a serious blow that condemned Sparta to take a second place" (P.Oliva (1971) p.196), though no direct connection can be made since the state as such did not own land anywhere and the working of Sparta's treasury is unknown. Plutarch's highly intricate, elaborate structure reveals careful composition, and careful composition indicates the importance that the author attaches to the passage. This is clearly, therefore, his considered judgement of Agesilaos at this point in his narrative.

2 διὸ καὶ προτεινομένην ὑπὸ τῶν Θηβαίων τὴν εἰρήνην ὁ Ἀγησίλαος οὐκ ἐδέξατο.

Xenophon refers to three peace initiatives, by Ariobarzanes, Pelopidas, and Corinth (*Hell.* VII.i.27, 33-40, iv.8-12). The Thebans naturally always demanded acceptance by Sparta of the independence of the newly founded city of Messene, perhaps recollecting Agesilaos' repeated insistence on the autonomy of Boiotia in similar circumstances, and Ariobazarnes' support for Sparta did not deter them. Pelopidas had negotiated peace terms with Artaxerxes, but failed to obtain ratification by any of the other cities of Greece. Plutarch's remark most clearly fits the third initiative, which marked the end of the Peloponnesian League, with only Sparta abstaining in the hope of regaining Messenia.

μὴ βουλόμενος δὲ τῷ λόγῳ προέσθαι τοῖς ἔργῳ κρατοῦσι τὴν χώραν, ἀλλὰ φιλονεικῶν, ἐκείνην μὲν οὐκ ἀπέλαβε, μικροῦ δὲ τὴν Σπάρτην προσσέβαλε καταστρατηγηθείς.

Though the contrasted datives are not parallel grammatically, the usual opposition between word and deed still stands, and is here very strong. The Spartans, traditionally regarded as men of action rather than of words, are required to give their verbal acceptance of the actions of others, the Thebans, and the verbs προέσθαι, of the Spartans, and κρατοῦσι, of the Thebans, clearly reverse the traditional norms of the previous era. The loss of Messenia will have cut off the income of the Spartans, whether Spartiates or inferiors, who still had land there, and reduced the number of lots available for distribution, but compared to the time when the population was most numerous, the land required to supply the domestic needs of individual Spartiates, now numbering perhaps only one tenth as many, will not have been as extensive as before, and the nature of the financial benefit of private possessions in Messenia would presumably have changed before now. Perhaps most essential needs could be met in Lakonia, and the large accumulations of estates (Aristotle *Pol.* 1270a33-b) may have been

hardest hit.

Of more immediate importance was the proximity of enemy territory on the boundaries of Lakonia, prohibiting assistance from any friendly states. Agesilaos' attitude towards Thebes is, as usual, attributed to personal hatred and hostility. Plutarch perhaps implies a retributive connection between the excessive pursuit of Thebes and the penalty for Sparta: it was no doubt too late at this time, for even a change of heart there to modify Epameinondas' determination to preserve Messenian autonomy. Agesilaos is said not only almost to have lost Sparta besides, but to have done so through being outdone in his main field of competence, generalship. Plutarch goes on to refer this to the defenceless state of the city, when Epameinondas unexpectedly marched south overnight from Tegea, while Agesilaos was marching north to help the Mantineians in response to their request. The verb καταστρατηγέω has developed a technical sense in Diodoros: πανουργία κατεστρατήγησαν (XV.16.1; cf. XVI.11.4; E.L.Wheeler (1988) p.10 n.) Xenophon described Sparta as ὥσπερ νεοττιῶν παντάπασιν ἔρημον τῶν ἄμυνομένων (*Hell* VII.v.10), which provides some support for Plutarch's judgement.

3 ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ Μαντινεῖς αὖθις ἀπέστησαν τῶν Θηβαίων καὶ μετεπέμποντο τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, αἰσθόμενος δ' Ἐπαμεινώνδας τὸν Ἀγησίλαον ἐξεστρατευμένον μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ προσιόντα, λαθὼν τοὺς Μαντινεῖς ἀνέκρουσε νυκτὸς ἐκ Τεγέας ἄγων ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν Λακεδαίμονα τὸ στράτευμα, καὶ μικρὸν ἐδέησε παραλλάξας τὸν Ἀγησίλαον ἔρημον ἐξαίφνης καταλαβεῖν τὴν πόλιν.

Plutarch moves on to the fourth Theban invasion of the Peloponnese, and the second attack on Sparta. Xenophon, who recognized that the Arkadians and others had instigated the first incursion into Lakonia (*Hell* VI.v.23), now gives prominence to the Arkadians' charge that the Thebans' aim was to dominate them, indicating his own approval by referring to them as οἱ κηδόμενοι τῆς Πελοποννήσου (*Hell* VII.v.1). The Thebans sadly were disappointed in their reliance on the voluntary unanimity of their Arkadian allies.

They had not the resources to do anything else but trust their loyalty to the alliance. The Mantineian Lykomedes, Xenophon suggests (*Hell.* VII.i.23), had encouraged some Arkadians to become hostile to Thebes, though there was also long-standing conflict between those with oligarchic, often pro-Spartan, sympathies and the commonly democratic opposition to Sparta, in addition to old antagonisms, Mantinea against Tegea, Arkadia against Elis. The Athenians, after Theban occupation of Oropos, had accepted the Arkadian offer of alliance, and Theban inexperience had led their representatives into diplomatic errors, in Achaia and at Tegea (*Hell.* VII.i.43, iv.36-40). Perhaps these tensions inevitably condemned the incipient federation to failure from the start, but more general resistance to the idea of federation has also been observed (D.J.Mosley (1971) pp.319-30). The dominant tradition attributed only the worst of motives to the Boiotians, who should, perhaps, be judged no more harshly than others, if they seem to have acted at times in their own perceived best interests.

Plutarch has set the scene briefly, and has Epameinondas leave Tegea before any Lakedaimonians have reached the area, but are only on their way in response to the Mantineian request for help, as also mentioned by Xenophon (*Hell.* VII.v.9). In Diodoros' account, on the other hand, Epameinondas sets out to Sparta on learning that they are already plundering in the vicinity (XV.5-6). There are thus clearly two differing versions of these events. Diodoros gives the name of the commander as King Agis, which has been emended to Agesilaos (C.Tuplin (1979) pp.347-57), with the later reference to Agesilaos changed to Archidamos, putting Agesilaos' whereabouts in question.

4 εὐθύνου δὲ Θεσπιέως, ὡς Καλλισθένης φησὶν, ὡς δὲ Ξενοφῶν, Κρητὸς τινος, ἐξαγγείλαντος τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ.

Xenophon reports that Agesilaos was marching to Mantinea by way of Pellene in the Eurotas valley (*Hell.* VII.v.9), and received warning there from the Cretan only just in time to avoid the capture

of Sparta. Plutarch indicates that he knew of another version here, and since Kallisthenes was from Olynthos, he may have had access to independent sources from northern Greece. Thespiai had a pro-Spartan party, and Spartan garrisons, including one under Sphodrias, had been there before Leuktra, which may explain the desertion of a Thespian from Epameinondas to Agesilaos, perhaps even by arrangement beforehand as a Spartan sympathizer. The passing of this intelligence by the deserter was crucial for Sparta's defence, and Xenophon even suggests possible divine responsibility for the Cretan's message to Agesilaos (*Hell.* VII.v.10). Diodoros mentions Cretan messengers, in the plural, and their function is very different. His "Agesilaos" is not informed about Epameinondas' march, but guesses what he will do. The Cretans are then sent to Sparta to alert those left behind. This is an unconvincing piece of generalship, and it is hardly acceptable to replace the "guess" by introducing the "suppressed" Euthynos from Kallisthenes, as C.Tuplin (1979) suggests (p.350). Diodoros' later reference to Agesilaos, as ὁ δ' ἐπὶ τῆς φυλακῆς ἀπολελειμένος, contradicts the earlier suggestion of his whereabouts, and may simply distinguish him from the cavalry, the mercenaries, and the three *lochoi*, all of whom seem to have continued on their way to Arkadia after the arrival of the Cretan message, while Agesilaos returned to Sparta (*Xen. Hell.* VII.v.10).

There are two other factors which help to clarify the situation.

(1) Confusion over the Cretan participation may be removed. Plutarch records the dispatch of Agesilaos' instructions by mounted messenger sent on ahead to Sparta by Agesilaos, which Xenophon omits, and perhaps Diodoros transferred the function of the Cretan(s) to the conveyance of this communication, which for him contained the commander's inspired "guess".

(2) Topography presents problems for the movements of the two armies in Diodoros, who does not explain whether they used the same

route or not. In Xenophon's version, however, while Agesilaos was travelling via Pellene, Epameinondas would have marched from his camp at Tegea by a more direct route along the valley of the river Sarandapotamos, to reach Sellasia, on the northern side of Sparta, to the east of the Eurotas. His intention may have been, partly at least, to force the Spartans to limit their aid to Mantinea by retaining troops to defend their own territory, but he may also have exploited the use by Agesilaos of the western route, necessitated by the Theban presence at Tegea.

καὶ αὐτὸς παρήλθεν εἰς τὴν Σπάρτην. 5 ὀλίγω δ' ὕστερον οἱ
Θηβαῖοι διέβαινον τὸν Εὐρώταν καὶ προσέβαλλον τῇ πόλει, μάλ' ἐρρωμένως
τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου καὶ παρ' ἡλικίαν ἐπαμύνοντος.

Plutarch maintains high praise for Agesilaos' military judgement and activities. He consistently distinguishes his generalship from other aspects of character. Agesilaos is judged by Diodoros, on several occasions and in several situations, and his judgements are perhaps similar to Plutarch's. He condemns the abandonment of the early Spartan virtues (XV.1-5), and Agesilaos' fondness for war (XV.19.4), but praises his generalship in the defence of Sparta against Epameinondas (XV.83). The judgement at XV.31.3-4, however, also in praise of his generalship, is not necessarily an inconsistency, to be explained by a change in source: "The villain of a few pages earlier (19.4) has now [at XV.31.3-4] been transformed into a hero" (H.D.Westlake (1986) p.269). There is a key word, δραστικός, in both passages, which indicates the same consistent character assessment, and commendation of the achievement should not be mistaken for approval of the man.

6 οὐ γάρ, ὡς πρότερον, ἀσφαλείας ἔωρα τὸν καιρὸν ὄντα καὶ φυλακῆς,
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπονοίας καὶ τόλμης, οἷς τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον οὐδέποτε
πιστεύσας οὐδὲ χρησάμενος, τότε μόνοις ἀπεώσατο τὸν κίνδυνον.

Plutarch had used the word ἀσφαλῶς in describing Agesilaos' previous defence of Sparta (c.33), and now he has taken over Xenophon's word for the Spartans' desperate efforts, τοῖς

ἀπονενοημένοις (*Hell.* VII.v.12). Thus, in each of his successful defences of Sparta, Agesilaos is said to have departed from his established practice, indicating the two extremes, the over-cautious and the over-daring, between which there could have been an Aristotelian mean. Perhaps the exercise of their natural characteristics could not sustain the policies which led to the decline of the Spartans, although his ability to recognize ὁ καιρός seems to be, for Plutarch, one of Agesilaos' strengths as a general, except at Leuktra (c.28; cf. c.39). The successful defence of Sparta, in the reduced circumstances of the time, restores the position which Plutarch supposes the Lykourgan constitution to have been designed to maintain. The rest of the chapter reveals that, in the new circumstances, the traditional Spartan characteristics of fitness, courage, selflessness and maintenance of discipline, still flourished. "Rumours of the death of Sparta . . . are in fact seriously exaggerated" (P.A.Cartledge and A.J.S.Spawforth (1989) p.ix, after M.Twain).

ἐκ τῶν χειρῶν τοῦ Ἐπαμεινώνδου τὴν πόλιν ἔξαρπάσας, καὶ στήσας τρόπαιον, 7 καὶ τοῖς παισὶ καὶ ταῖς γυναῖξιν ἐπιδείξας τὰ κάλλιστα τροφεῖα τῇ πατρίδι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀποδιδόντας, ἐν δὲ πρώτοις τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον . . . 8 Ἰσίδαν δὲ δοκῶ, τὸν φοιβίδου υἱόν . . .

Xenophon does not mention Agesilaos as taking part in the defence of Sparta, after the Spartiates had posted themselves on guard following his return from Pellene. He describes Archidamos' vigorous leadership of a small band of one hundred men, and gives him the honour of the trophy (*Hell.* VII.v.12-13). In a "euphuistic" passage reminiscent of the style of the orator Gorgias, Archidamos and Isidas carry on the fight as substitutes for Agesilaos, who could not really be imagined as taking so active a part at his age. Homer substituted Diomedes' ἀριστεῖα for the absent Achilles (*Iliad* V). The episodes do not involve Agesilaos directly, but allow Plutarch to portray some of the traditional Spartan characteristics that he continued to admire, in particular by carrying the attention back to the upbringing of citizens,

in the service of the city.

10 ἐτρώθη δ' ὑπ' οὐδενός, εἴτε θεοῦ δι' ἄρετήν φυλάττοντος αὐτόν, εἴτε
μεῖζόν τι καὶ κρεῖττον ἀνθρώπου φανείς τοῖς ἐναντίοις.

Plutarch here introduces the possibility of divine intervention, to which Xenophon refers at four different stages in his account (*Hell.* VII.v.10-13, 26). The first and last of these, the saving of Sparta and the balanced outcome of Mantinea, correspond to the position described by Plutarch. The paradox of both reward and punishment for Isidas' action reflects the paradox that Agesilaos' leadership gave the inspiration for an action which he, as one who made it a principle not to risk soldiers' lives, should not approve, but might welcome, just as he had disapproved but accepted that of Phoibidas, father of Isidas. Plutarch has ended the series of three incidents with the one in which the ephors re-instate that same, traditional, Spartan virtue of strict discipline.

The successful defence of the unwalled Sparta is impressive. Perhaps Epameinondas, who knew the topography from his earlier attack, and had visited Sparta again for a Peace Conference, had undertaken the attack only in the expectation of finding few vigorous defenders. His task-force was not his full strength, and had had a long overnight march, with the disappointment of having failed to achieve the full surprise they needed. Attackers had a difficult task in the narrow streets of the four villages, against a desperate defence (*Xen. Hell.* VII.v.11), in the knowledge that the main enemy army remained intact at Mantinea. There was, perhaps, little to gain in winning an indefensible base at great cost, when the psychological effect of the penetration of Lakonia, in addition to the victory hoped for in the north, would leave Sparta powerless for the future. The main requirement for Epameinondas, however, would be to return to Mantinea without further waste of time, in order to take advantage of the absence of the force sent for its relief.

CHAPTER 35

Mantineia: Sparta isolated

1 Ὀλίγαις δ' ὕστερον ἡμέραις περὶ τὴν Μαντίνειαν ἐμαχέσαντο, καὶ τὸν Ἐπαμεινώνδαν ἤδη κρατοῦντα τῶν πρώτων, ἔτι δ' ἐγκείμενον καὶ κατασπεύδοντα τὴν δίωξιν, Ἀντικράτης Λάκων ὑποστὰς ἔπαισε.

Since Agesilaos was not involved in the fighting, Plutarch does not give an extended account of the battle. He has selected from Xenophon's account of the complete action, only the few facts of the final engagement essential for his purpose, yet omitting nothing but the preliminary details and the subsequent movements of the two sides. The three brief participial phrases correspond almost exactly to the three stages in Xenophon leading to Epameinondas' death:

κρατήσας γὰρ ἧ προσέβαλεν ὅλον ἐποίησε φεύγειν τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἐπεὶ γε μὴν ἐκεῖνος ἔπεσεν (*Hell.* VII.v.24),

but gives prominence to the Boiotian hero by placing the direct object before the subject and verb.

δόρατι . . . μαχαίρα . . .

The variant accounts of the weapon used enable Plutarch to establish the importance for the Spartans of the removal of the much-feared Epameinondas, by introducing the evidence of the family name, Μαχαιρίωνες, which was apparently claimed to have been bestowed in honour of the man responsible for his death. This is a notable example of Plutarch's use of indirect description, Ὀμηρικῶς, to give independent authority to an evaluation or judgement. His generous treatment of the Spartan hero contrasts with Xenophon's disparagement of the Boiotians. At *Hell.* VII.v.12 he had discredited the victors of Leuktra, and here says of their cavalry: ὥσπερ δ' ἡττημένοι πεφοβημένως διὰ τῶν φευγόντων πολεμίων διέπεσον (*Hell.* VII.v.25). Xenophon's *Hellenika* ends with Mantineia.

Διοσκουρίδης

Plutarch mentions him at *Lyk.* 11, again in connection with an

injury, the possible blinding of Lykourgos with a stick. (*FHG* ii.192ff.)

2 οὕτω γὰρ ἐθαύμασαν καὶ ὑπερηγάπησαν αὐτὸν φόβῳ τοῦ Ἐπαμεινώνδου ζῶντος.

The strong wording further highlights the passage dealing with Epameinondas and the relief of the Spartans to be free from him after the troubles he had caused – over a period, in fact, of at least ten years, from the peace conference before Leuktra (c.28) until his death here at Mantinea.

γένοι δ' ἀτέλειαν, ἣν ἔτι καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔχει Καλλικράτης, εἰς τῶν Ἀντικράτους ἀπογόνων.

Clearly family traditions survived into Plutarch's time and may have been a source of information, as here, relevant to his work, though not therefore infallible. Plutarch has used this information to illustrate the excessive relief felt by the Spartans in their crisis (cf. their relief after the "Tearless Battle"). The family's pride in their ancestor's exploit may, perhaps, excuse the possible exaggeration.

3 ἀπήλαυνον οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀγησίλαον τοῦ ὄρκου τοὺς Μεσσηνίους, ὥς πόλιν οὐκ ἔχοντας.

Diodoros (XV.89) records this attempt to deprive Messene of its recently acquired independence, but he attributes it to the Lakedaimonian representatives at the peace conference, without naming Agesilaos, and perhaps Plutarch assigns to him only an indirect, though influential, role. Since Epameinondas had established the independence of Messenia in his first invasion of the Peloponnese, one year after Leuktra, the grounds for exclusion must be a piece of Spartan rhetoric. The Spartans no doubt wished to avoid universal recognition of Messene, as they had before (*Hell.* VII.i.27), in the hope that they would more legitimately be able to claim the right to recover the area by military reconquest, or even, perhaps, to call on the other signatories to help in the recovery of the territory, that is, without violating the terms of the Peace.

4 καὶ μόνοις αὐτοῖς πόλεμος ἦν ἐλπίζουσιν ἀναλήψεσθαι τὴν Μεσσηνίαν.

As a further consequence of Leuktra, the Spartan domination even of peace conferences was ended, but whereas the failure of the earliest attempts to agree peace terms resulted in continuation of wars, the present peace was not aborted by the withdrawal of Sparta (Diodoros XV.89.) Sparta alone remained in a state of war, but Messenia was never recovered.

5 βίαιος οὖν ἐδόκει καὶ ἀπηνὴς καὶ πολέμων ἄπληστος ὁ Ἀγησίλαος εἶναι, τὰς μὲν κοινὰς διαλύσεις πάντα τρόπον ὑπορύπτων καὶ διαβάλλον.

Agesilaos is once more being judged adversely by Plutarch as φιλοπόλεμος (Diodoros XV.19; cf. cc.23, 28). From here to the end of the chapter, Plutarch reviews the problems created by this aspect of Agesilaos' character. His policy of isolating Thebes had led to costly hostilities, for which the finance at first, no doubt, came from the tribute paid by the former subjects of Athens, and the plunder he had captured in Asia Minor. Since this was no longer available, Xenophon refers to Sparta's financial needs at this time: χρημάτων δ' ἑώρα τὴν πόλιν δεομένην, εἰ μέλλοι σύμμαχόν τινα ἔξειν (*Agesilaos* II.25), and records that Agesilaos did all he could at home to raise money. Plutarch perhaps describes the means necessary to do this, and the consequent resentment, for, as Aristotle comments, the Lakedaimonians were unwilling to pay taxes (*Pol.* 1271b10). He seems to have seen that the opportunity to end these difficulties had come with this latest peace conference. The empire had been lost and there was no possibility that the Spartans could easily recover Messenia: to contemplate this was, for Plutarch, fruitless militarism. Perhaps his admiration for the Lykourgan constitution led him to wish that the Spartans had embraced the universal peace and revived their early principles, to become the moral leaders of Greece once more.

His judgement here of Agesilaos as φιλοπόλεμος may be compared

in part with Aristotle's criticism of Sparta:

The charge which Plato brings, in the *Laws* [I.625E, 630] against the intentions of the legislator, is likewise justified; the whole constitution has regard to one part of virtue only - the virtue of the soldier, which gives victory in war (*Pol.* 1271b1).

Elsewhere he advises the military training of citizens for defence, not for conquest (*Pol.* 1333b38; see R.A.de Laix (1974) p.21; G.L.Huxley (1979) pp.51-2). On the other hand, Plutarch, at *Lykourgos* 31, denied that the main aim of the lawgiver was "to leave his city as the leader of so many other cities". The measures he attributed to Lykourgos (5ff.) concerned good order and happiness, in the city and in the individual. The reason for Sparta's decline was, for Plutarch, not embedded in the constitution. At *Lykourgos* 30 he complained of the undermining of the laws of Lykourgos by Lysander. So here, Plutarch defends the provisions of Lykourgos, and regards Agesilaos as responsible for the decline.

6 ὑπὸ χρημάτων ἀπορίας.

A selection of references to finances during this period indicates the scale of this problem. Agesilaos brought back from Asia Minor 1,000 talents in booty (c.19), as Lysander had brought 1,500 talents before him (Diodoros XIII. 106.8). Timokrates brought fifty talents from Tithraustes to encourage the Greek cities to make war on the Lakedaimonians (Xen. *Hell.* III.v.1). Sixty talents were raised for the wages of the Athenian fleet under Iphikrates by selling the captured crews of the triremes sent to Kerkyra by Dionysios (Diodoros XV.47). Agesilaos' reward for his services in Egypt was 230 talents (c.40).

ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐν Μεσσήνῃ κτημάτων καὶ προσόδων σφαδάζειν.

Plutarch again indicates the mercenary requirement of Sparta's policies, confirmed by Xenophon at *Hell.* VII.v.10. The chapter ends on a pessimistic note, and with a striking infinitive, strongly metaphorical and derogatory, which is used of the vain struggles of unbroken

horses by Aeschylus (*Persae* 192), and, by Plutarch, of Antony's agony in death (*Antony* 76). However, no further Spartan military activities are recorded for this time. In Xenophon's *Agesilaos*, after the defence of the city (II.24), Agesilaos undertook no more campaigns in Greece, because of his age. Diodoros gives no Spartan involvement until almost ten years later, when Archidamos promised money and mercenaries secretly to the Phokian, Philomelos, and gave him fifteen talents. Xenophon appropriately ended *Hellenika* at this point, but it was not yet the end of his *Agesilaos*.

PART TWELVE

EGYPT AND DEATH

(Chapters 36-40)

CHAPTER 36

The humiliations of mercenary service in Egypt

1 Ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἠδόξεσε Ταχῷ τῷ Αἰγυπτίῳ στρατηγὸν ἐπιδοῦς ἑαυτόν.

There are five references to the Egyptian campaign in *Apophth. Lak.* (*Mor.* 210, 214, 215), the first of which, however, contains a doubtful reading for the name. Other authorities treat this episode in different ways. Plutarch continues the criticism of Agesilaos, the comparative adverb making a connection which clearly indicates that Agesilaos is involved in further loss of reputation among the Spartans. Plutarch suggests that his surrender of independence and autonomy in undertaking service even as commander was thought unworthy. Xenophon ended his *Hellenika* before coming to this episode, but in *Agesilaos* II.26-7 he records that after saving Sparta Agesilaos was paid for non-military services in Asia Minor, having rescued Ariobazanes three times from siege, on the last occasion receiving payment even from the besieger, Mausolos, who contributed money to Sparta διὰ τὴν πρόσθεν Ἀγησιλάου ξενίαν, perhaps in return for some provision of mercenaries (S.Hornblower (1982) p.202; id. (1983) p.231). Xenophon continues (II.28-31) with Agesilaos' expedition in the service of the king of Egypt, without naming Tachos or any other Egyptians, though where the manuscripts give ταχέως, editors have changed this to Ταχῷς, creating historical problems of chronology, for the king at the time was Nektanebis I (S.Hornblower (1982) pp.174-5). Xenophon (*Agesilaos* II.25) commends Agesilaos for attending to the financial need of the state, and suggests that the offer of command was the opportunity for Agesilaos to liberate the Greeks of Asia Minor, and to punish the Persians, especially for their hostile attitude over Messenian autonomy. Later, at II.31, he again refers to money, in reporting Agesilaos' urgent need to obtain pay for the Greeks, which forced him

to choose to serve one or other of the two sides. Since Agesilaos did not survive the expedition, it is clear that from this point Xenophon could not have had the privileged, direct communications he seems to have drawn on earlier. Nepos (*Agesilaus* 8) treats only the arrival and departure of Agesilaos, omitting all details of the campaigns, but Diodoros, recording the Satraps' Revolt against Artaxerxes (XV.90), provides the context for Tachos' decision, at the same time, to rise up against the King, using Greek mercenaries. He mentions only the Spartans' resentment of Artaxerxes' wish for Messenian autonomy as the reason for their willingness to participate. His account of the campaign (XV.92-3) is complimentary to Agesilaos, and also ends very differently from all the others, with the restoration of Tachos to his kingdom.

2 οὐ γὰρ ἡξίουں ἄνδρα τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἄριστον κεκριμένον καὶ δόξης ἐμπεπληκότα τὴν οἰκουμένην, ἀποστάτη βασιλέως, ἀνθρώπῳ βαρβάρῳ, χρῆσθαι τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοῦνομα καὶ τὴν δόξαν ἀποδόσθαι χρημάτων, ἔργα μισθοφόρου καὶ ξεναγοῦ διαπραττόμενον.

This description of Agesilaos' reputation recalls the report attributed to Theopompos: μέγιστος μὲν ἦν ὁμολογουμένως . . . καὶ ἐπιφανέστατος (c.10). The unexpressed subject here is the Lakedaimonians, understood from the above, so that Plutarch again gives the adverse judgement indirectly, Ὀμηρικῶς, and the indirect speech following this verb reports the current thoughts of the Lakedaimonians. The Greeks' contempt for non-Greeks stems in part from the belief that long subjection to the despotic rule of eastern monarchs had made them naturally servile, while luxury in living style weakened the spirits of their rulers, too (Herodotus VIII.102, Lysias *Olympic Oration*, Isokrates *Panegyricus*, Aristotle *Pol.* 1255a28). Tachos, before his revolt, had been a subject of the Persian king. The contempt for him is compounded by his treachery, though Agesilaos had previously encouraged desertions from the King (c.12).

3 κεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ ὀγδοήκοντα γεγονῶς ἔτη καὶ πᾶν ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τὸ σῶμα κατακεκομμένος, ἐκείνην αὔθις ἀνεδέξατο τὴν καλὴν καὶ περίβλεπτον ἡγεμονίαν ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας, οὐ πάμπαν ἄμεμπτον εἶναι τὴν φιλοτιμίαν.

Plutarch has reversed the word order found in Xenophon, and has strengthened the rhetorical value of the expression by his choice of preposition: ἔτη ἐγγόνει ὁμφὶ τὰ ὀγδοήκοντα (*Agesilaos* II.28). He has also added the reference to Agesilaos' wounds: πᾶν ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τὸ σῶμα κατακεκομμένος, so that what was a commendation in Xenophon now becomes the grounds for a twofold criticism. The only motives attributed to Agesilaos by Plutarch are the references to money (χρημάτων) above and to mercenary service here. The Panhellenist motive, the achievement of the freedom of the Greeks, is presented only as a supposition, incompatible with his age. The reader might have expected that objective to meet with approval from Greeks in all circumstances, and the paradoxical criticism gains in intensity. By including it, Plutarch indicates that he has noticed, and rejected, Xenophon's favourable interpretation of Agesilaos' motives.

4 τοῦ γὰρ καλοῦ καιρὸν οἰκεῖον εἶναι καὶ ὦραν, μᾶλλον δ' ὅλως τὰ καλὰ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν τῷ μετρίῳ διαφέρειν.

"The good and honourable has its own appropriate circumstances and proper time", perhaps requiring a sounder body and a younger age, but more broadly in terms of the activity a man of such high standing should undertake. In practical achievement the mission was not without some success, despite these handicaps. The criticism is on the theoretical grounds of the need to observe the bounds of moderation by rational considerations, rather than, perhaps, to follow personal desire and political expediency. (cf. Aristotle *NE* i.1098a16, ix.1166a12, *Pol.* 1295a38, quoted above, c.33.) Plutarch has faulted Agesilaos for his failure truly to appreciate ὁ καιρός before, in choosing to go to war with Thebes (c.28). There he gave anger as overpowering reason, and he now goes on to explain in what respect

Agesilaos failed to meet this requirement here. Lysander, too, and by association Agesilaos, in the quarrel (c.8), had failed to understand ὁ καιρός. Although Plutarch has not enlarged on the subject, here or at cc.28, 37, 39, it seems to have been a fundamental part of his thinking. Only when we see Agesilaos come into his own in the military field, in Egypt, does he begin to understand its requirements again.

5 οὐ μὴν ἐφρόντιζε τούτων ὁ Ἀγησίλαος, οὐδ' ᾔετο παρ' ἀξίαν εἶναι λειτούργημα δημόσιον οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀνάξιον ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ζῆν ἄπρακτον ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ καθῆσθαι περιμένοντα τὸν θάνατον.

Plutarch implies that Agesilaos was consciously neglectful, and should have accepted the criticism, but was incapable of making a rational assessment. That he ignored these considerations indicates that he had been aware of what people thought of him, perhaps as early as the criticism made at c.35.5, βίαιος οὖν ἐδόκει κτλ. This is a direct refutation by Plutarch of Xenophon's claim of universal praise of Agesilaos, specifically for his judicious selection of the services he should perform after Sparta had been saved: πῶς οὐκ ἂν φαίη τις αὐτὸν εὐγνωμόνως χρήσθαι ἑαυτῷ; (*Agesilaos* II.25). Xenophon himself goes on immediately to suggest that Agesilaos was beyond the age for active military campaigning: ἀπεῖργεν ἤδη τὸ γῆρος. Plutarch has evidently seen the logical inconsistency of Xenophon, when he then records Agesilaos' delight in accepting the Egyptian offer at *Agesilaos* II.28. He presents this as Agesilaos' disregard of what came to be known as the Aristotelian mean, in judging that there was no service which he should not have undertaken in this demeaning way. Plutarch expresses it in terms of Agesilaos' own thoughts on lifelong public service, which he saw manifested in Xenophon's rhetorical question (*Agesilaos* II.25), and in the similar comment on Agesilaos' character in old age with which he ended the encomium (*Agesilaos* XI.14-16).

6 καὶ πλοῖα πληρώσας ἀνήχθη, τριάκοντα συμβούλους ἔχων μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ Σπαρτιάτας, ὡς πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δὲ κατέπλευσεν εἰς τὴν Αἴγυπτον, εὐθὺς οἱ πρῶτοι τῶν βασιλικῶν ἡγεμόνων καὶ διοικητῶν ἐβάδιζον ἐπὶ ναῦν θεραπεύοντες αὐτόν. 8 ἦν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Αἰγυπτίων σπουδὴ τε μεγάλη καὶ προσδοκία διὰ τοῦνομα καὶ τὴν δόξαν τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου.

Xenophon gives no details, except the offer of the chief command. The Egyptian campaign resembles in some ways the campaign in Asia Minor, and Plutarch may have assumed that advisers accompanied Agesilaos as in c.6.4. Here he represents the honorific reception that Agesilaos was entitled to, in preparation for the contrast with the eventual, very different, Egyptian reaction.

καὶ συνετρόχαζον ἅπαντες ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν. 9 ὥς δ' ἑώρων λαμπρότητα μὲν καὶ κατασκευὴν οὐδεμίαν, ἄνθρωπον δὲ πρεσβύτην κατακείμενον ἔν τινι πόρᾳ παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν, εὐτελεῖ καὶ μικρὸν τὸ σῶμα, τραχὺ καὶ φαῦλον ἱμάτιον ἀμπεχόμενον, σκώπτειν αὐτοῖς καὶ γελωτοποιεῖν ἐπὶ εἰ.

Nepos describes Agesilaos' appearance, furnishings, and dress, in very similar terms:

nam et statura fuit humili et corpore exiguo et claudus altero pede; terra tecta stramentis; vestitu humili atque obsoleto (Agesilaus 8).

He, like *Apophth. Lak. (Mor. 214)*, reports the Egyptians' contempt. What they saw, contrasting their expectations of regal grandeur, was the deliberate Spartan simplicity of life-style, for which Plutarch so firmly commended Agesilaos at c.12 in describing the reaction of Pharnabazos when they met, and again at cc.14 and 19 in Sparta. However, Agesilaos has now been shown to have lost the approval or admiration of friends, enemies, Spartans and allies - a comprehensive list. That the Egyptians regarded his simplicity as contemptible does not necessitate Plutarch's concurrence in their judgement, and, while Nepos includes Agesilaos' lameness as a cause of contempt, Plutarch, having recorded this at c.2, concentrates on inoffensive features, using the word πρεσβύτην - perhaps a substitute for "king" in the other authorities - to point to a recognition on his part of the incongruity. On the other hand, Plutarch does not wholly approve of the flexibility

of Alkibiades who could adapt to the company he was in, for it could be good or bad company (*Alk.* c.23). Disapproval of these two extremes would suggest that, for Plutarch, there was again an acceptable mean, in Aristotelian terms. In the following chapters, Agesilaos ultimately wins recognition even from the suspicious Egyptians for his military ability, as in *Apophth. Lak.* (*Mor.* 214). Plutarch's purpose is clearly not simply that, but the complex one of showing that success in the military field is not inconsistent with the simplicity of the Lykourgan system which he admired. The misguided interpretation of it has already been shown to have destroyed the prosperity that the Spartans had enjoyed while they adhered to it.

καὶ λέγειν ὅτι τοῦτ' ἦν τὸ μυθολογούμενον· ὠδίνειν ὄρος, εἴτα μῦν ἀποτεκεῖν.

The proverb is recorded in *Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum*:

ὠδινεν ὄρος, εἴτα μῦν ἀπέτεκεν
(I.378.4, II.733.4);

and is used by Horace at *Ars Poetica* 139:

parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus.

Athenaios XIV. 616d attributes it to Tachos:

ὠδινεν ὄρος, Ζεὺς δ' ἐφοβεῖτο, τὸ δ' ἔτεκεν μῦν.

In these Greek forms, like Plutarch's, it has a chiastic pattern, missing in Horace's translation. (See also Phaedrus IV.23; Lucian. *Hist. Conscr.* 23 and Quintilian 8.3.20.) A Hellenistic source has been suggested (C.O.Brink, *Horace on Poetry* (1971) p.215, but he does not cite Plutarch). This anecdote strictly presupposes an Egyptian proverb, and perhaps it was brought for the first time into Greek literature in connection with Agesilaos, but, alternatively, a Greek proverb may have been introduced into this Egyptian context. Since Plutarch goes on to present a highly ornamented and expanded account, it may be that he introduced it. Horace's version is the earliest of those listed above.

10 ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἐθαύμασαν, ὅτε ξενίων προσκομισθέντων καὶ προσαχθέντων ἄλευρα μὲν καὶ μόσχους καὶ χῆνας ἔλαβε, τραγήματα δὲ καὶ πέμματα καὶ μύρα διωθεῖτο, καὶ βιαζομένων λαβεῖν καὶ λιπαρούντων, ἐκέλευσε τοῖς εἴλωσι δοῦναι κομίζοντας. τῷ μέντοι στεφανωτρίδι βύβλω φησὶν αὐτὸν ἡσθέντα θεόφραστος.

An almost identical list of gifts is given at *Apophth. Lak.* (*Mor.* 210). There Agesilaos accepts only the cereal, the rest being suitable only for the helots. The gifts are arranged by Plutarch in two lists of three, using the two verbs, ἔλαβε and διωθεῖτο, to portray the regular simplicity of the Spartans, by the acceptance of the wholesome natural foodstuffs and the rejection of the elaborate luxuries. Nepos tells of the gifts offered:

ille praeter vitulinam et eius modi genera obsonii, quae praesens tempus desiderabat, nihil accepit: unguenta, coronas secundamque mensam servis dispertit,

and explains the renewed contempt for boorishness at this point:

quod eum ignorantia bonarum rerum illa potissimum sumpsisse arbitrantur (*Agesilaus* 8.4).

Plutarch, of course, omits the criticism of Agesilaos' simple taste here, and does not use τὸ ὀψώνιον (ὄψον, ὠνέομαι), a word which is found commonly in papyri, meaning the salary paid in money to an employee, and he also avoids τὸ ὄψον, which perhaps gave rise to Nepos' transliteration, obsonium, commonly used also in Roman comedy. The crowns are more correctly, perhaps, the flowering head of the papyrus plant (LSJ s.v. βύβλος; cf. Theopompos, *Hist.* 22), which Plutarch also describes as acceptable by Agesilaos for their simplicity and neatness, though later, as a parting present. Theophrastos, also cited at c.2, is not named by Nepos, but may be their common source, unless Plutarch found only this part of the reference there. The correct authority may have been Theopompos, however (K.Ziegler ad loc.). This fuller version of the anecdote, containing the attribution to the source and the reference to papyrus crowns, perhaps indicates that it belongs here in Egypt (cf. c.16; M.A.Flower (1988) pp.124-5).

CHAPTER 37

Agesilaos is accused of betrayal

1 οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἤλπιζεν, ἀπάσης στρατηγὸς ἀπεδείχθη τῆς δυνάμεως, ἀλλὰ τῶν μισθοφόρων μόνων, τοῦ δὲ ναυτικοῦ χαβρίας ὁ Ἀθηναῖος.

Plutarch continues to record the indignities suffered by Agesilaos in being given less responsibility than he had expected, and makes this appear to be the reason why he did not accept Chabrias' proposition. The mercenary force from Greece was of 10,000, including 1,000 Lakedaimonians dispatched with Agesilaos, and Tachos' army was of 80,000 Egyptian troops (Diodoros XV.92). That such factors of prestige were important is shown in the speech of Kephisodotos (Xen. *Hell.* VII.i.12), who pointed out to the Athenians that their command of the helots and mercenaries, in the combined fleet of the allies, would not match the Spartan command of the citizens in their combined land forces, but at *Agesilaos* II.28-30 he does not record that Agesilaos took Spartans or mercenaries with him, or that he retained any part of the command that he had been deceived into thinking had been offered to him. Athenian participation is not relevant in Xenophon's *Agesilaos*, but for Plutarch the loss of the navy is part of the indignity, in contrast, for example, with the supreme command he had held earlier in Asia Minor. Diodoros speaks only of the appointment to the command of the mercenaries, and does not mention any deception.

2 ἔπειτα τὴν ἄλλην ἀλαζονείαν καὶ κενοφροσύνην τοῦ Αἰγυπτίου βαρυνόμενος ἠναγκάζετο φέρειν· καὶ συνεξέπλευσεν ἐπὶ τοὺς φοίνικας αὐτῷ, παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὑπεύκων καὶ καρτερῶν, ἄχρι οὗ καιρὸν ἔλαβε. 3 Νεκτάνεβις γὰρ ἀνεψιὸς ὢν τοῦ Ταχῶ καὶ μέρος ἔχων ὑφ' ἑαυτῷ τῆς δυνάμεως, ἀπέστη καὶ βασιλεὺς ὑπὸ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ἀναγορευθεὶς διεπέμπετο πρὸς τὸν Ἀγησίλαον, ἀξιῶν αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν.

To follow another leader was clearly a new experience for Agesilaos, having previously enjoyed sole military responsibility, full recognition of the successes of his leadership, and respect for the value of his ascetic way of life, as shown by Pharnabazos. Plutarch illustrates here, however, the decline of Spartan influence, and of the

myth of Spartan invincibility. The Spartans would have to earn afresh their place in the changed world, and Plutarch seems to have seen that the situation made for himself by Agesilaos on this occasion was unsatisfactory. Like Xenophon (*Agesilaos* 31), he shows that Agesilaos and his mercenaries must accompany their paymaster, regardless of their own wishes, unless they have, or can obtain, the resources needed for survival, and that their standards of loyalty have to be less secure, if more attractive terms of employment are available. Diodoros (XV.92), like Plutarch, has Tachos lead an expedition to Phoenicia, against Agesilaos' advice, and records that in his absence Nektanebos (*sic*), the son of the general who was left in Egypt, is persuaded by him to return from his campaign in Syria and take the kingship, Tachos' ensuing flight being to beg forgiveness from the King. In this account, after winning Artaxerxes' support, Tachos returns to Agesilaos: Agesilaos does not change sides, and eventually helps to recover the kingdom for Tachos (XV.93). Xenophon records that it was the occurrence of a revolt of the Egyptian troops which caused the flight of the king to Phoenicia, without indicating that it was to the King that he fled or that Agesilaos also left Egypt. In Xenophon's account Agesilaos is not presented with an invitation to change sides. When his employer, the reigning king, has fled to Sidon, the Egyptians are divided by internal strife, and there are then two kings, who are not named, and Agesilaos is committed to neither, unless Xenophon has deliberately withheld that one was Tachos. Plutarch alone records Agesilaos' dilemma.

αἰσθομένου δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ Ταχῶ καὶ τραπομένου πρὸς δέησιν αὐτῶν, ὁ μὲν Χαβρίας ἐπειρᾶτο καὶ τὸν Ἀγησίλαον ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ τοῦ Ταχῶ πείθων καὶ παραμυθούμενος κατέχειν, 5 ὁ δ' Ἀγησίλαος εἶπεν ὅτι σοὶ μὲν, ὦ Χαβρία, κατὰ σεαυτὸν ἀφιγμένῳ χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ λογισμοῖς ἔξεστιν, ἐγὼ δ' ὑπὸ τῆς πατρίδος ἐδόθην Αἰγυπτίοις στρατηγός. 6 οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ ἔχοι μοι καλῶς οἷς ἐπέμψθην σύμμαχος πολεμεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ πάλιν ἡ πατρίς κελεύσῃ.

There is no identifiable place for the mercenary Chabrias in the

action recorded. Unlike Agesilaos, he went to Egypt in a private capacity, because Athens, with the other Greeks, obstructed the satraps' request for mercenaries. "They are not aware of the existence of any state of war between the King and themselves" (P.A.Cartledge (1987) p.328, citing Hicks/Hill (1901) no.121; and p.201, citing Tod 145). Chabrias retains what is, for a mercenary, obsolete terminology in urging that ties of friendship should determine choice of service. Agesilaos is also made to use loose moral expressions in order to justify his attitude, and to avoid revealing his true intentions. Morality has not in the past been an argument weighing heavily with Agesilaos, and it is not the ground reported later in the chapter, either for his action, or for the ephors' explicit instructions. His phrases imply a Spartan state initiative involving the Egyptian people directly, although at c.36 the arrangement was made with Tachos, and apparently at his own suggestion, ἐπιδοὺς ἑαυτόν. However, it was perhaps endorsed by the state with the appointment of the thirty counsellors. Agesilaos' previous deceptions have been approved by Plutarch, and have succeeded, but his manoeuvres are now presented in a bad light, and in an unconvincing form: in the past, of course, Agesilaos has deceived enemies, but since, in Chabrias' phrase, Tachos was a friend, this case was different.

7 ταῦτα δ' εἰπὼν ἔπεμψεν εἰς Σπάρτην ἄνδρας, οἱ τοῦ μὲν Ταχῶ κατηγορήσειν, ἐπαινέσσεσθαι δὲ τὸν Νεκτάνεβιν ἔμελλον. 8 ἔπεμψαν δὲ κάκεῖνοι δεόμενοι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ὁ μὲν ὡς πάλαι σύμμαχος γεγὼς καὶ φίλος, ὁ δ' ὡς εὐνούστερος καὶ προθυμότερος περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐσόμενος.

With this hostile message, Agesilaos prepares the Spartan authorities for his eventual decision to abandon Tachos. Neither Xenophon nor Diodoros reports any consultation with Sparta. In Xenophon, Agesilaos must choose to serve one or other of the kings in order to obtain pay for the Greek troops, and he is said to have considered which of the two seemed more truly to be φιλέλλην. Since Xenophon links the willingness to undertake the expedition with

Spartan hostility towards the King (*Agesilaos* II.29), the Egyptian φιλέλλην should also be required to be no friend of the Persians. In that case, Diodoros' account is flawed, since he has recorded the reconciliation of Tachos with the King. In Plutarch, Tachos was at the start a friend of Sparta, and since his flight comes later as the consequence of the desertion of his mercenaries at c.38, he retains a formal claim on Agesilaos' loyalty, but the Egyptians have themselves forced a choice on Agesilaos, by transferring their allegiance to Nektanebis. Both contenders for Agesilaos' services are still available. Plutarch presents an analysis of the choice facing the Spartans in the form of the contrasting appeals of the envoys of Tachos and Nektanebis, expanding Xenophon's simple criterion of friendship by setting the known record of past alliance against a promise of good-will in the future. The insult caused to Agesilaos by the failure to appoint him as supreme commander apparently tells against the sincerity of Tachos, and is the only recorded issue relevant to the matter of principle here mentioned. Repeated statements of the Spartan interpretation of justice as the interest of Sparta predispose the reader to expect the eventual decision, for the conflict is between loyalty to the "discredited" original agreement and the dictates of practical diplomacy.

9 ἀκούσαντες οὖν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς μὲν Αἰγυπτίοις ἀπεκρίναντο φανερώς Ἀγησιλάῳ περὶ τούτων μελήσειν, ἐκείνῳ δ' ἐπέστειλαν ὁρᾶν κελεύοντες ὅπως πράξει τὸ τῇ Σπάρτῃ συμφέρον.

A similar response from the home government to a suggestion made by Agesilaos, not mentioned at the time by Plutarch, was described by Xenophon:

ἦκον ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαιμόνος ἀπαγγέλλοντες ὅτι ἡ πόλις ἐπιτρέποι Ἀγησιλάῳ διαγνῶναι τὰ ἐν φλειοῦντι ὅπως αὐτῷ δοκοίη (*Hell.* V.iii.25).

This example may have been the model used by Plutarch here. The Spartans have involved themselves in the authorization of a possible

change of loyalty, specifying self-interest as the criterion for the determination of policy, and leaving the definition of this to the commander on the spot. The expression τὸ τῇ ἑνόρτῃ συμφέρον is repeated below, first in the form τῷ συμφέροντι τῆς πατρίδος, and then as τῷ τῆς πατρίδος συμφέροντι. This accumulation of references to the concept shows Plutarch's desire to stress his criticism of the Spartan principle of self-interest, which operated earlier in the Phoibidas and Sphodrias affairs. The Spartans' hope of punishing the King of Persia is now apparently ignored.

10 οὕτω δὲ λαβὼν τοὺς μισθοφόρους ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ἀπὸ τοῦ Ταχῶ μετέστη πρὸς τὸν Νεκτάνεβιν, ἀτόπου καὶ ἀλλοκότου πράγματος παρακαλύμματι τῷ συμφέροντι τῆς πατρίδος χρησάμενος· ἐπεὶ ταύτης γε τῆς προφάσεως ἀφαιρεθείσης, τὸ δικαιοτάτον ὄνομα τῆς πράξεως ἦν προδοσία.

Tachos is thus robbed of the mercenaries that at c.36 Plutarch had said were obtained by Agesilaos, using money sent him by Tachos. If Diodoros was correct in saying that Nektanebis now came to Egypt, Agesilaos was choosing the easier option, to join the man in possession, rather than to have to recover for Tachos the territory lost to him. Xenophon (*Agesilaos* II.30-1) obscures Agesilaos' moral difficulty: his original paymaster has fled, and the main consideration he has in mind is the need to impose an obligation on a new employer in order to ensure financial rewards. The need to choose the one more likely to be a friend of Greece seems to be an afterthought, and Xenophon further suggests that by choosing this one Agesilaos had ensured his friendship with Sparta. By expressing the choice in this way, Xenophon has concentrated on the apparent interest of Sparta in having friends, but has not presented it as fulfilling one of the objectives of Agesilaos' mission, punishment for Persia. Plutarch, who has expressed his unfavourable moral judgement of Agesilaos' conduct in strong terms, seems to have some justification for seeing, in Xenophon's presentation, the evidence for his accusation of treachery. There is, however, more justification for thinking that Xenophon may

not have penetrated to Agesilaos' real grounds for his choice. Although Diodoros has recorded the restoration of Egypt to Tachos, he later shows Nektanebis as king, and more importantly shows him as hostile to Persia, and in alliance with the King's enemies: πολέμιον ὄντα Περσῶν καὶ πείσαντες παραλαβεῖν αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν συμμαχίαν (XVI.41.3). The revolt of the Egyptian army, the flight of Tachos, and Agesilaos' choice of service with Nektanebis, may all have to do with their respective attitudes to the King.

11 Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὴν πρώτην τοῦ καλοῦ μερίδα τῷ τῆς πατρίδος συμφέροντι διδόντες, οὔτε μανθάνουσιν οὔτ' ἐπίστανται δίκαιον ἄλλο πλὴν ὃ τὴν Σπάρτην αὔξειν νομίζουσιν.

Plutarch's verbs draw attention to a deficiency, both in the Spartans' education and character development, and in their natural intellectual ability. Previously he has defined the Spartan view of justice in abstract terms as τὸ συμφέρον, but he now expresses it in terms of expansion of self-interest. Indeed, the claim is here given even more extreme expression than before: "nothing else is just", rather than one thing is more just than others. This, therefore, is Plutarch's powerful condemnation of Spartan imperial policies. Their power in war was, as Aristotle said, used for wrong purposes (*Pol.* 1324b2, 1333a35-b15).

CHAPTER 38

Agesilaos' generalship is not recognized

1 Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ταχῶς ἐρημωθείς τῶν μισθοφόρων ἔφυγεν, ἐκ δὲ Μένδητος ἕτερος ἐπανίσταται τῷ Νεκτανέβιδι βασιλεὺς ἀναγορευθεὶς· καὶ συναγαγὼν δέκα μυριάδας ἀνθρώπων ἐπῆει.

Xenophon also records the desertions from the king, first of the Egyptians who were campaigning separately, then of all the rest (*Agesilaos* 30). The king fled, and division among the Egyptians led to the appointment of two kings: διττοὺς βασιλέας αἰροῦνται, neither of them named. These events follow immediately after Agesilaos began to consider what his response should be to his having been deceived over his appointment. Plutarch's sequence is identical at this point, if Agesilaos is to be included in Xenophon's "all the rest", but in Plutarch's account the rivals for the kingship are specified as Nektanebis and the Mendesian. Both Xenophon and Plutarch have neglected the reconciliation of Tachos with Artaxerxes reported by Diodoros (XV.92.5), which would no doubt have offended Agesilaos, and would motivate his desertion. Diodoros has recorded neither the third contender nor the desertion of Agesilaos to Nektanebis, but Agesilaos' continued service with Tachos is even more unlikely to be true, in view of the report of his appointment as Artaxerxes' commander in Egypt (XV.92.5).

2 θαρρύνοντος δὲ τοῦ Νεκτανέβιδος τὸν Ἀγησίλαον, καὶ λέγοντος ὅτι πολλοὶ μὲν εἰσιν οἱ πολέμιοι, μιγάδες δὲ καὶ βάνηυσοι καὶ δι' ἀπειρίαν εὐκαταφρόνητοι, 3 Καὶ μὴν οὐ τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν, ὃ Ἀγησίλαος εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν φοβοῦμαι καὶ τὴν ἀμαθίαν ὥς δυσεξαπάτητον.

Plutarch continues to present Agesilaos as deprived of the chance to take the initiative, but attention is directed away from questions of morality as military strategy comes into the centre of focus again. Nektanebis' observation is reminiscent of Agesilaos' own comment on the non-Spartan troops at c.26. In his reply, Agesilaos begins to re-assert his superiority in military wisdom, with the emphasis on deception,

selecting as a reason for fear, the very quality which Nektanebis thinks encouraging. Diodoros, too, shows Agesilaos instructing his employer, who is still Tachos, not to fear numerical superiority, but in his anecdote he advises fear only of outstanding bravery.

4 αἱ γὰρ ἀπάται τὸ παράδοξον ἐπάγουσι τοῖς πρὸς ἄμυναν <ὄν> ὑπονοοῦσι καὶ προσδοκῶσι τρεπομένοις, ὁ δὲ μὴ προσδοκῶν μηδ' ὑπονοῶν μηδὲν οὐ δίδωσι τῷ παραλογιζομένῳ λαβήν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῷ παλαίοντι ῥοπήν ὁ μὴ κινούμενος.

Deception of the enemy in war is outside the moral standards of peacetime, according to Agesilaos' view reported at c.9, and by Xenophon at *Hell.* III.iv.11, and so is acceptable here. ἀπάτη is one of the main terms for stratagem, denoting "the creative activity of changing an object or situation into something else" (E.L.Wheeler (1988) p.31). It was an important feature of many victories on the battlefield, at a time when the gathering of military intelligence and communications over long distances, between commander and troops, were difficult, and mobility of armies was so much restricted. Deception played an important part also in many successful assaults on fortified cities. Agesilaos gives Nektanebis, who has commented only on numerical advantage and lack of experience, a superior account of the complexity of strategic considerations, using several technical terms and the metaphors from wrestling. Plutarch may be developing the ideas on strategy listed by Xenophon at *Agesilaos* VI.5-6, and following the advice at *Hipparchikos* V.9: ὄντως γὰρ οὐδὲν κερδαλέωτερον ἐν πολέμῳ ἀπάτης.

5 ἐκ τούτου καὶ ὁ Μενδήσιος ἔπεμπε πειρῶν τὸν Ἀγησίλαον. ἔδεισεν οὖν ὁ Νεκτάνεβις.

That there is now a third contender for Agesilaos' services corresponds with Xenophon's report of the appointment of the two kings, but Diodoros retains Tachos as the only reigning king. Nektanebis' anxiety is understandable, perhaps, since Agesilaos had already deserted one employer.

ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐν ὑποψίᾳ καὶ φόβῳ γενόμενος πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπεχώρησεν εἰς πόλιν εὐερκῇ καὶ μέγαν ἔχουσαν περίβολον. 6 ὁ δ' Ἀγησίλαος ἡγανάκτει μὲν ἀπιστούμενος καὶ βαρέως ἔφερεν, αἰσχυνόμενος δὲ καὶ πάλιν μεταστῆναι πρὸς τὸν ἕτερον καὶ τελέως ἀπελθεῖν ἄπρακτος, ἠκολούθησε καὶ συνεισῆλθεν εἰς τὸ τεῖχος.

Agesilaos is still powerless to influence his employer, since his allegiance is now in doubt. He seems to be tempting him to a course of action which conflicts with his own earlier cautious analysis, though at Sardis early engagement had been to his advantage (c.10). All three authorities have recorded disagreement at this stage between Agesilaos and his employer. In the accounts of both Plutarch and Xenophon, Agesilaos has to consider which of the two contenders for the throne he should serve, while in both Diodoros and Plutarch Agesilaos has to decide whether to change sides again, or to accompany his nervous employer into a large city. Plutarch continues to portray the difficulties that Agesilaos has created for himself, and the hostile attitudes of others to his leadership. He again uses the Homeric technique of revealing judgements through the characters themselves, continuing his account of Agesilaos' uncomfortable situation because of his employer's distrust, which was another new experience for him (cf. c.37). Since Agesilaos was too ashamed to change sides again, evidently he, too, was aware of the shame of having done it just once. Fear of failure to complete the Asia Minor campaign was suggested by Plutarch, after the interruption of the sacrifice at Aulis (c.6.11: ὥς ἀτελῶν αὐτῷ τῶν πράξεων γενησομένων), and, in the event, completion was forestalled by his recall. Here Agesilaos is made to realize for himself the danger that there may be nothing gained for Sparta from this expedition. Agesilaos has to suffer humiliation, and accept an unwelcome move. The unfavourable account continues to the end of the chapter, giving the impression that, once the first unworthy decision had been taken, the downward spiral was relentless.

CHAPTER 39

Agesilaos reasserts his military superiority

1 Ἐπελθόντων δὲ τῶν πολεμίων καὶ περιταφρευόντων τὴν πόλιν, αὖθις αὖ δείσας τὴν πολιορκίαν ὁ Αἰγύπτιος ἐβούλετο μάχεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας μάλα συμπροθυμouμένους εἶχεν· οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἐν τῷ χωρίῳ σῖτος.

In the first part of the chapter Plutarch refers to Nektanebis only as the Egyptian, perhaps bringing Agesilaos into greater prominence, now that the clash with the enemy is imminent. Nektanebis' loss of nerve, brought on by his fear of siege, leads him to wish to break out, although it was his earlier fear of fighting it out that had decided him to enter the city (c. 38). This reversal of policy discredits Nektanebis' military wisdom, and the anxiety infects the Greeks, who are worried by the shortage of provisions, and now support Nektanebis.

2 ὁ δ' Ἀγησίλαος οὐκ ἔδωκ, ἀλλὰ κωλύων, ἤκουε μὲν ἔτι μᾶλλον κακῶς ἢ πρότερον ὑπὸ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων καὶ προδότης ἀπεκαλεῖτο τοῦ βασιλέως, ἔφερε δὲ πρότερον ἤδη τὰς διαβολὰς καὶ προσεῖχε τῷ καιρῷ τοῦ στρατηγήματος.

Agesilaos is now isolated, and in opposition to the Greeks, to Nektanebis, and to the Egyptians. Plutarch had himself judged Agesilaos' action to be a betrayal (c.37), and he now attributes this judgement also to the Egyptians. The trough has now reached its nadir in preparation for a dramatic *περιπέτεια*. However, the reason for the bitterness is misunderstanding of Agesilaos' military skill and the value of his advice, but generalship is his main strength and the two participles reveal firmness and confidence in the correctness of his judgement. Nevertheless, even at the point where he will prove his supremacy, Plutarch intensifies the theme of Agesilaos' declining popularity, and, while he judges the strategy differently, and recognizes that Agesilaos' plan is that of a wise general, he does not retract his judgement of this betrayal. The reversal of the downward momentum in Agesilaos' reputation and fortunes is signalled by a difference in his responses to the opposition. Whereas previously his

reaction was described in βαρυνόμενος (c.37), and βαρέως ἔφερεν (c.38), it appears that his confidence in the stratagem now enables him to endure the criticism more patiently, ἔφερε δὲ προότερον, and his skill in deception serves him well in his handling of his employer, as he bides his time. Plutarch has made ὁ καιρός the criterion again, but, in contrast to the other occasions, Agesilaos, the general, is now beginning to be intellectually alert to the requirement. The phrase τῷ καιρῷ τοῦ στρατηγήματος denotes the two qualities most required, the creative activity and knowledge of exact timing (E.L.Wheeler (1988) p.26).

3 τάφρον ἔξωθεν ἦγον οἱ πολέμιοι περὶ τὸ τεῖχος βαθεῖαν, ὥς παντάπασιν ἀποκλείσαντες αὐτούς.

Diodoros reports (XV.93.3) that the enemy's attempt to take the fortified city by storm was costly: πολλοὺς ἐν ταῖς τειχομαχίαις ἀπέβαλον, but that the large resources of manpower available made circumvallation feasible. His phrase, διὰ τὴν πολυχειρίαν, is similar to that of Agesilaos, as reported by Plutarch, πολυχειρία δὲ περιελθεῖν καὶ περιταφρεῦσαι (c.38). The stratagem will prove the very point that Agesilaos has made regarding the enemy's numerical superiority.

4 ὥς οὖν ἐγγυὲς ἦσαν αἱ τελευταῖ τοῦ ὀρύγματος, ἀπαντῶντος αὐτῷ καὶ περιϋδόντος ἐν κύκλῳ τὴν πόλιν, ἐσπέραν ἀναμείνας γενέσθαι καὶ κελεύσας ἐξοπλίζεσθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

All circumvallations must reach this point, and offer the same opportunity to the besieged. Like Plutarch, Diodoros records a night enterprise as the work was being completed, but the timing seems to have been determined by desperation (ὁ μὲν ταχὺς ἀπέγνω τὴν σωτηρίαν) because provisions were exhausted (XV.93).

ἔλεγεν ἔλθων πρὸς τὸν Αἰγύπτιον. Ὁ μὲν τῆς σωτηρίας, ὃ νεανία, καιρὸς οὗτός ἐστιν, ὃν ἐγὼ διαφθεῖραι φοβούμενος οὐκ ἔφραζον πρὶν ἔλθεῖν.

Agesilaos' speech displays the quality of his generalship, analysing the military situation, concealing plans even from his

colleague, and encouraging the faint-hearted. His admission of having deceived the young man, still not named, and the reason given for doing so, establish his superiority, and he teaches the lesson that a general must look out for ὁ καιρός.

7 ἐθαύμασεν ὁ Νεκτάνεβις τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου τὴν δεινότητα.

The Egyptian is now named, juxtaposed with the Spartan for effective contrast, at the point where the difference of opinion between the two is resolved in Agesilaos' favour, and his skill is generously acknowledged. Plutarch again expresses the judgement indirectly, Ὀμηρικῶς, by recording the admiration of Nektanebis.

προσπεσὼν ἐτρέψατο ῥαδίως τοὺς ἀντιστάντας.

Agesilaos' part was to plan the enterprise, leaving the younger Nektanebis to carry it out. The description of the action is accordingly brief, as it is in Xenophon's version:

τὸν μὲν μισέλληνα μάχῃ νικήσας χειροῦται (*Agesilaos* II.31).

8 ὥς δ' ἄπαξ ἔλαβε πειθόμενον αὐτῷ τὸν Νεκτάνεβιν ὁ Ἀγησίλαος, αὐθις ἐπήγε τὸ αὐτὸ στρατήγημα καθάπερ πάλαισμα τοῖς πολεμίοις.

The Egyptian is again named, repeating the juxtaposition with the Spartan, but with the grammatical relation reversed, confirming the rehabilitation of Agesilaos' military reputation with the repetition of the successful stratagem, again using the technical vocabulary and metaphor.

9 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑποφεύγων καὶ ὑπάγων, τὰ δ' ἀντιπεριχωρῶν ἐμβάλλει τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν εἰς τόπον ἔχοντα διώρυχα βαθεῖαν ἐξ ἐκατέρας πλευρᾶς παραρρέουσιν.

If the canals were fed from a river, there was evidently water on three sides, making escape difficult for the enemy. This plan runs counter to advice attributed to Lykourgos (c.26), not to force an enemy to fight with desperation for survival (cf. *Lyk.* 13, 22). In Diodoros' account, the enemy's numbers are countered only in the second

engagement, and it may appear that the double use of the stratagem, in reverse situations of escape and capture, is a later embellishment. Plutarch's version, however, is the more acceptable, for Diodoros shows his own confusion in recording that, when, after escaping from the city, Agesilaos was being pursued closely, and was in danger of being surrounded, he himself took his men into the space between the two canals in order to restrict the enemy's numerical advantage (XV.93). Xenophon does not mention a second engagement. Plutarch marks the final military success of Agesilaos with the ornamentation which occurs in this chapter, particularly in Agesilaos' speech, and then again in the exciting account of the second stratagem, especially at the close.

CHAPTER 40

The final honours for Agesilaos

1 Ἐκ δὲ τούτου καλῶς μὲν εἶχε τὰ πράγματα καὶ βεβαίως τῷ Αἰγυπτίῳ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν· ἀγαπῶν δὲ καὶ φιλοφρονούμενος ἐδεῖτο μέναι καὶ συνδιαχειρᾶσαι μετ' αὐτοῦ τὸν Ἀγησίλαον.

Plutarch at last adjudges success to Agesilaos' mission, as he does at *Comp.* 4.7-8. He has not named Nektanebis, perhaps to avoid drawing attention at this point to the abandonment of the original employer, Tachos. Just as the Greeks of Asia Minor showed appreciation of Agesilaos' services at c.15 (cf. *Xen. Agesilaos* I.38), so here he has won affection and friendship (cf. c.13.2: τῇ φιλοφροσύνῃ τοῦ παιδός).

2 ὁ δ' ὄρμητο πρὸς τὸν οἴκοι πόλεμον, εἰδὼς χρημάτων δεομένην τὴν πόλιν καὶ ξενοτροφοῦσαν. προῖπεμψεν οὖν αὐτὸν ἐντίμως καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς, ἄλλας τε λαβόντα τιμὰς καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἀργυρίου διακόσια καὶ τριάκοντα τάλαντα.

Plutarch, like Xenophon (*Agesilaos* II.31), presumably refers to projected campaigns for the recovery of Messenia, but they appear to have come to nothing, and Sparta played no major role in Greek affairs for the next few decades. Diodoros (XV.94) recalls the foundation of Megalopolis, which hemmed the Spartans in, and attracted a further Theban invasion under Pammenes. He also records the attempted fining of the Lakedaimonians, in the Amphictyonic Council, for their seizure of the Kadmeia; the gift of fifteen talents, which Archidamos made to the Phokians to help them seize control of Delphi; more active co-operation with them, after the fine had been doubled, to have it annulled; and a campaign under Archidamos against Megalopolis (XVI.23, 24, 29, 39). Dionysios of Syracuse (*Xen. Hell.* VII.i.20, 28, and iv.12) had sent help, which may have had to be paid for, but pay for five months was also sent (Diodoros XV.70). Here, Agesilaos receives only a small sum, compared with what he had brought back from Asia Minor (c.19), and with the 1,500 talents brought by Lysander (Diodoros XIII. 106.8). (See

c.35 for other financial references.) Nepos records the sum of 250 talents, but Xenophon and Diodoros give no figures.

3 παρὰ τὴν Λιβύην εἰς χωρίον ἔρημον κομισθεῖς, ὃ καλοῦσι Μενελάου λιμένα, θνήσκει, βιώσας μὲν ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ τέσσαρα ἔτη, βασιλεύσας δὲ τῆς Σπώρτης ἐνὶ τῶν τεσσαράκοντα πλέον, καὶ τούτων ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα πάντων μέγιστος καὶ δυνατώτατος γενόμενος, καὶ σχεδὸν ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡγεμὼν καὶ βασιλεὺς νομισθεῖς, ἄχρι τῆς ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχης.

The ending of Agesilaos' last foreign campaigning, at Menelaos' Harbour, which Nepos also names, balances the Homeric reference to Agamemnon, at Aulis, on his departure for the first (c.6). The death of Agesilaos is described simply, without mention of his name here. The figures for his age, and for the length of his reign, do not allow certainty in the calculation of relevant dates. Perhaps the most secure event is the battle of Leuktra, yet "more than thirty" gives a very early date for his accession. The Olympic year in which Agis was insulted would then be 404, followed by the Eleian wars and his death, and Agesilaos' accession, before 402/1. If he died forty-one years later, which seems to be a more clearly documented number, there would be insufficient time after Mantinea for the Egyptian expedition. A better chronology follows from the report of Artaxerxes' death at Diodoros XV.93, at about the time of Tachos' flight and the accession of Nektanebis, which has been placed at about 361/0 (S.Hornblower (1982) p.174). The death of Agis would then be close to the 400BC Olympic games, allowing time for the Elis campaigns after Pausanias' settlement of Athens in 403BC. (For a full discussion see D.H.Kelly (1975), although he puts Artaxerxes' death at 359/8. He suggests that it was in the absence of the successor, Orchos, after his father's death, that Agesilaos was able to defeat the Mendesian.) Plutarch's assessment of Agesilaos' reign here is a generous one, and should be compared with that in the *Comparatio* 4.7ff.

4 ἔθους δ' ὄντος Λακωνικοῦ.

What happened to his body is biographically a part of the full

story of the life, giving a clue to the attitude of his contemporaries to him, in that they did not neglect their normal practice, even in circumstances of unusual difficulty. Although Diodoros says that the body was conveyed home in honey, Nepos mentions that wax was substituted.

5 τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ παρέλαβε, καὶ διέμεινε τῷ γένει μέχρις Ἀγιδος, ὃν ἐπιχειροῦντα τὴν πατριὸν ἀναλαβεῖν πολιτείαν ἀπέκτεινε Λεωνίδας, πέμπτου ἀπ' Ἀγησιλάου γεγονότα.

The glory of Agesilaos lived on in his descendants and for Plutarch this, too, is part of the full story of his character, reported indirectly, Ὀμηρικῶς. The final chapter has drawn the *Life* to a quiet close. Perhaps biography has the advantage over history in having clearly defined limits (J.Henderson (1989) pp.64, 66-85), but Plutarch's interest here was also in the character of Sparta. He has set the finite *Life* in an extended, if not infinite, context, by tracing Agesilaos' ancestry (c.1), and, at the end, his descendants, so that it is seen as an episode, incoming and ongoing, in a larger story. The *Lives* of Lykourgos, Lysander, Agis and Kleomenes have also contributed to the extended context.

EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION

Before presenting my conclusions I turn to Plutarch's *Comparatio* for clarification of what he regarded there as his ultimate judgement of Agesilaos' character. Its mainly hostile tone is harsher than that of the *Life*, and quite contrary to that of Xenophon's works.

Section One

1 From the start at *Comparatio* 1 he indicates an independent attitude in his treatment of the accession. Xenophon clearly wished to validate Agesilaos' claim to the kingship, but not only was reliable factual evidence not made available for the reader to judge - even his arrangement of the arguments was seen to be flawed. The nature of the case made it impossible that Plutarch should introduce new evidence, but he arranged the arguments with greater cumulative effect, presenting the Spartans with some logical justification for their decision, yet withholding authorial comment on what was still a flawed procedure. Plutarch suspended judgement at that point in order that his account of Agesilaos' reign might proceed, as the reign itself did, without exposure of the fact that it was defective. That exposure came about when the Spartans themselves were made aware that the oracular prophecy was being fulfilled.

The explicit judgement here in the *Comparatio* is that the accession was improper and that seems to be closer to the truth than Xenophon's view. Plutarch reinforces this judgement at *Comparatio* 2.2, where he makes the new and perhaps original observation that even if Leotychidas was ineligible, the oracle required that his place should not be taken by the lame Agesilaos. I have argued in favour of Plutarch's view.

2 The critical judgement at *Comparatio* 1.3-4 of Agesilaos' treatment of Lysander in Asia Minor seems to be less satisfactory. I have pointed out that since, for example, Lysander continued to serve

honourably there and at home, Xenophon's account of the quarrel does not necessarily penetrate to the truth, and that while Plutarch's revision of the presentation serves his literary purpose in revealing blemishes in Agesilaos' character, it does not bring improvements in historical accuracy. At *Comparatio* 1.3 the ingratitude manifested in Agesilaos' removal of Lysander's privileges is introduced to add to the criticisms made in the *Life*. However, Plutarch had juxtaposed the end of the quarrel in Asia with the account of Lysander's proposals in Sparta for the reform of the monarchy and the two topics would appear to be part of some hostile propaganda used by Agesilaos in his handling of his political opponents by associating them with a discredited leader. Criticism of Agesilaos' ingratitude would be equally relevant in the new context, although in practical politics it would be equally unrealistic.

3: The criticism at *Comparatio* 1.6 of Agesilaos' support for Phoibidas and Sphodrias in arranging their escapes from justice repeats the criticism made in the *Life* of Agesilaos' personal motives. Xenophon's versions reveal no privileged access to information about discussions and negotiations at the level where the policy decisions were made, and Plutarch did not have the means to make up for the deficiency. He did, however, implicate Agesilaos in the initiation of the seizure of the Kadmeia, perhaps interpreting the admission by Xenophon (*Hell.* V.ii.32) that he had personally devised the defence of Phoibidas on the ground that the action was in the interest of the state. He also criticized Agesilaos for his part in the affair of Sphodrias' raid, and whereas Xenophon repeatedly stressed Agesilaos' condemnation of the man's action, Plutarch relieved Sphodrias of some of the stigma by delaying the accusation until the grounds for the acquittal were published. He now explicitly asserts at *Comparatio* 1.7 Agesilaos' responsibility for the war which ensued, and his assertion seems to be justified: Xenophon, on the other hand, attempted unfairly to lay the blame for the

outbreak of hostilities on the military preparations of the Athenians (*Hell.* V.iv.34). If allowance is made for the initial tendency to resort to personal motivation here, Plutarch's judgement seems in the end to be more convincing than Xenophon's.

4 The treatment of the τρεσάντες is reconsidered at *Comparatio* 2.3. The designation of the device to allow the laws to sleep for a day as a σόφισμα is ambiguous, evoking both commendation because of the element of σοφία, and suspicion because of its connection with σοφιστής. That there is mild criticism here is indicated by the comparison with Pompey: οὐδ' οἷς αὐτὸς ἐτίθει νόμοις ᾤετο δεῖν ἐμμένειν (*Comparatio* 2.3). Although Xenophon does not include this episode in either *Hellenika* or *Agesilaos*, after Leuktra the question of a reaction consistent with *Lak. Pol.* 9 may well have been discussed in Sparta. It is unlikely that the Spartans would wish to create a major social problem for themselves at this time and the eventual disregard of Lykourgos' laws would have provoked the sort of comment that is found at *Lak. Pol.* 14. It is, however, possibly only a part of the creation of the Spartan image.

5 Plutarch agrees with Xenophon in his commendation of Agesilaos' obedience (*Comparatio* 2.5). He is equally strong in admiring his military achievements. Their views of Agesilaos' treatment of Thebes, however, are totally opposed, for while Xenophon clearly shared the hatred which he repeatedly attributed to him, Plutarch blames his determination to crush Thebes and dominate Messenia for the decline of Sparta. Plutarch's strongest commendation of his military leadership (*Comparatio* 4.1, 6) is accorded to his successful defence of Sparta in the years after Leuktra, in full agreement with Xenophon's judgement at *Agesilaos* II.24, but while Plutarch's claim that Agesilaos was undefeated (*Comparatio* 4.1) is consistent with his own narrative, apart from the uncertain result at Koroneia, Xenophon records reverses in Asia Minor and Akarnania. Plutarch has not mentioned these, seeming

largely to avoid all criticism of Agesilaos' Panhellenist military record, but it is more realistic when he admits at *Comparatio* 3.1 that his achievements do not match those of Pompey.

6: The *Comparatio* ends with perhaps its harshest criticism of Agesilaos. His last campaign, in Egypt, is condemned. In the first place, its intention was neither honourable nor necessary, for it was undertaken only to obtain money, and furthermore the money was to be used only to make war on the Greeks; and in the second place, its execution was marred by breach of trust in deserting his allies and going over to the enemy. Plutarch has again rejected Xenophon's presentation, for although *Hellenika* ends without the Egyptian campaign, in *Agesilaos* the quest for money for the city's needs is regarded as a most commendable enterprise and the change of employer is excused on the ground that it resulted from internal Egyptian problems, which forced Agesilaos to seek the more reliable Egyptian as ally for the future benefit of Sparta. However, the Egyptian episode is important for the *Life*, where Plutarch approves Agesilaos' demonstrations of his Spartan asceticism and his generalship.

Section Two

1: For the *Comparatio* Plutarch has clearly omitted many of the other qualities for which he had earlier expressed admiration, no doubt because overt reference to Lykourgos was not appropriate on the Roman side. He approves of Agesilaos' respect for people and the value of life, and his devotion to members of his family, as well as his obedience to the state, its officers and its Lykourgan laws. The omission of these commendations from the *Comparatio*, however, is balanced by Plutarch's failure to include other deficiencies in his character which are mentioned in the *Life*. The most important of these are the excesses of desire for achievement and conflict, φιλοτιμία, φιλονεικία, and the implied shortcomings of intellectual development, specifically in repeated failure to recognize the true

nature of justice and to comprehend the full import of ὁ καιρός. Although this last failing is more commonly mentioned in political affairs, its most devastating occurrence is in the assessment of the whole situation before Leuktra, which should have included even an awareness of the divine attitude. Self-knowledge, too, would have been relevant, for Agesilaos mistook ὁ καιρός because he was acting from emotion rather than reason, and as a result Sparta lost the battle.

Section Three

It remains to explain why these virtues and deficiencies are more especially relevant in the *Life*.

1. Although the character of Agesilaos is Plutarch's major interest, it also has importance for its bearing on the eclipse of Sparta as a power in the Greek world during his reign. The cause of the decline of Sparta is not directly addressed by Xenophon, but where he offers an explanation of a reverse, it is in terms of divine retribution. This is an explanation which Plutarch, too, has used, but his concern is rather with the disregard of the parts of the Lykourgan constitution to which he has attributed the admired qualities of the traditional Spartan way of life. Aristotle's diagnosis of the influence of wealth is noted as a cause of Sparta's decline by Plutarch in *Lysander*, but it is only Agesilaos' resistance to this influence that is significant in this *Life*. He is also aware of Aristotle's indictment of Sparta's shortage of citizens, but he does not stress it here.

2. Plutarch's main thrust is to identify failure of character. Aristotle drew attention to Sparta's intellectual shortcomings, which were revealed, for him, in the Spartans' concentration on military training. Plutarch has followed him in recognizing this, but differs from him in not assigning responsibility for it to the lawgiver. Lykourgos had prescribed the regimen for the good life, which included provision for security, but excluded imperialist expansion. For Plutarch the roots of the problem lay in a general failure of the

Spartans to develop in their education the correct intellectual appreciation of the lawgiver's intentions. Their view was closer to *Lak. Pol.* than to Plutarch's here and in *Lykourgos*.

3. . . . Whereas Chance, too, was elsewhere assigned a causal role at times, for example by Polybios, perhaps Plutarch introduces a more useful concept. The ability to recognize the nature of *ὁ καιρός* represents a fundamental requirement of a statesman which appears to be akin to the quality of *σύνεσις* (*συνετός*), attributed especially to Perikles by Thucydides. At the close Plutarch attributes the possession of this ability to Agesilaos as a general in Egypt, but it is one of his failings that he more than once mistook *ὁ καιρός* as a statesman, and once as a general, too.

4. . . . Plutarch has not *revealed* an explanation of the decline of Sparta which will satisfy modern historians, but he has, at least indirectly, *indicated* where one may be found. All the factors mentioned, by ancient and modern analysts, must carry due weight, but ultimately Sparta, on its own, had not the resources to sustain an empire. To attempt this was contrary to the law of Lykourgos (*Lykourgos* 31.1). Sparta had survived by coercing and attracting the support of others, but in doing so aroused the resentment which overthrew it. Agesilaos himself displayed traits which contributed to the decline and identified him as largely responsible for diverting Spartan efforts to war, for the most significant of his excesses was revealed in his hatred of Thebes, and Thebes won the battle of Leuktra which was brought on by his failure properly to understand *ὁ καιρός*. Plutarch thus assigned perhaps excessive importance to the role of the individual in historical causation, and this has not always been fashionable. In this, however, he was a man of his age; and in the case of Agesilaos, personality played a prominent part in the sources, especially in Xenophon's *Agesilaos*. But Agesilaos was not alone at fault: the whole city shared the responsibility because it also made the wrong choices, notably over

the accession and the continued occupation of the Kadmeia.

Section Four

1 Illustrations of Plutarch's responses to his sources on a minor scale have been given in the text in detail and need only be summarized here. Some reveal, for example, Plutarch's use of a source's vocabulary or an episode for a purpose or in a context different from the original. Some have revealed rhetorical skills of ornamentation and arrangement which serve well to guide readers through the work and retain their interest. Traits of character have been abstracted by Plutarch from recorded events and visual impressions have been interpreted to reveal the mental or emotional states that lie behind the exterior. With rather more significance, Plutarch has incorporated details culled from his wide reading extending from the poets to medical and military stratagemic writers. These responses are the fruits of rhetorical training that have even given occasional hints of the insights of a modern psychological study.

2 Plutarch's response to his sources has not been to copy them without careful consideration of their implications for his subject. The sources' judgements of Agesilaos are not taken at their face value, but are often subjected to shrewd analysis, and their significance is recognized in contexts remote from where they were found. Plutarch's own judgements are revealed directly when he comes to his final assessment, but he frequently records hints of them indirectly in the form of judgements made by people within the context of the *Life*. Although his main source throughout the *Life* has been the eulogist, Xenophon, he has taken an independent view of his interpretations of people and events, and has maintained his own attitude to Thebes. In this respect, rhetoric has not destroyed history, for Plutarch's own contribution has been interpretation and presentation, the function of rhetoric: history, in so far as it is the factual content of the sources, has been largely preserved intact and sometimes clarified.

3 The quality of the *Life* as literature is best judged, perhaps by the continued interest it has attracted through the centuries (E.Rawson (1969)), but Plutarch's *Agesilaos* is not only a biography, it is an exposition of an ideology. He seems to want his readers to realize that properly understood and practised the Lykourgan way of life was a good way of life for the Spartans and it was only their deviation from it that brought on their troubles. After Messenia became independent, they were still able to maintain themselves within their own boundaries, and did so in Hellenistic and Roman times. Free from imperialist overstretch and preserving their cultural cohesiveness they were to serve as an example of a way of life that would be good for others, too, in Plutarch's day, and for centuries beyond.

ENDNOTES

1: A survey of events leading to the choice of Agesilaos as king of Sparta (Chapters 1-3)

In 427 Agesilaos, at the age of eighteen, may have become the heir presumptive, as the younger brother of Agis, who was, the absence of evidence to the contrary suggests, childless, unless Leotychidas was already born, though this is nowhere stated. Thereafter Agesilaos' succession would be straightforward, unless and until Agis produced and recognized a legitimate heir, for there is nowhere mentioned any trace of any other rival contender. If Agis, at the birth, openly believed the information about the paternity of Leotychidas, it is hard to see how he could have avoided disowning the child, and if he disowned Leotychidas as his son, then there would surely be pressure on him to produce a legitimate heir. There might have to be some arrangement, as there was in other cases where the royal line was in danger. A childless Spartan was said to be able to invite the assistance of another Spartan (*Lak. Pol.* I; *Lykourgos* 15), though a surrogate father would, of course, have to be a Heraklid in this case, since it involved the king. Herodotos records steps taken in the case where the king's wife was thought barren:

οὕτω μὲν δὴ τὴν τρίτην ἐσηγάγετο γυναῖκα ὁ Ἀρίστων, τὴν δευτέραν ἀποπεμφόμενος (VI.63).

Anaxandrides was required by the ephors to take a second wife, who produced Kleomenes, the future king, preferred to Dorieus, the later son of the former wife. If Agis received the information later, or acted upon it later, proof of paternity would be difficult, and the consequences of acknowledging the child would cause difficulties for Agesilaos as heir presumptive. If, at the time of the death of Agis, Leotychidas was of an age to have his birth linked with an earthquake which happened during Alkibiades' visit to Sparta, he would be, perhaps, between twelve and sixteen years old, and the truth about his birth and parentage would be hard to find after such an interval. The birth at that time, if acknowledged immediately, would have surprised and perhaps disappointed Agesilaos, who would have been next in line for about twelve years before being displaced. This link with Alkibiades cannot be proved, and 425, marked by another earthquake, has been proposed as Leotychidas' date of birth. This would mean that Alkibiades was not Leotychidas' father, though leaving it open that he may have seduced Timaiia. (R.J.Littman (1969) pp.269-77; id. (1970) p.285). Lakonia is subject to frequent earthquakes (P.A.Cartledge (1976) pp.25-8) and the chosen earthquake and

consequently this date have been rejected (D.H.Kelly (1975) pp.46-9. The works of these two scholars, D.H.Kelly and R.J.Littman, came to my notice after I had written my arguments. Some of their aims are similar to mine, but the latter's main conclusions are not accepted here.) At this earlier date, only two years into Agis' reign, Agesilaos' immediate disappointment would be less, but the truth would be even more difficult to find, if the dispute arose only at Agis' death, about twenty-five years later, and at whatever time Agis rejected Leotychidas, he would have had no recognized direct successor from that time onward, for up to thirty years or more. As the king's younger brother, Agesilaos would then have continued to be the undisputed next in line.

This raises another problem, for if Agesilaos were the recognized heir, the challenge on the death of Agis would be made on behalf of Leotychidas. However, it is clear, from both Xenophon and Plutarch, that the challenge came not from Leotychidas but from Agesilaos. In *Agesilaos* I.5 Xenophon says not that he was to be king, but that there were signs that he was judged more worthy to be king even before his reign; and in *Hellenika* Xenophon's version of Agesilaos' first speech, Ἐμὲ δὲν δέοι βασιλεύειν, proves it only now to have become an open question, as does Plutarch's suggestion that Lysander had urged Agesilaos to claim the kingship - a suggestion supported by Xenophon's inclusion of the important part played by Lysander in the discussion of the succession, although he was not declared the instigator of the plan. Further support for this argument that it was Agesilaos, and not Leotychidas, who was the challenger, comes from Plutarch's statement, if, as seems likely, it is correct, that Agesilaos was unique in having undergone the Spartan ἀγωγή, which implies that Leotychidas did not have this distinction but had at the time been exempt as the recognized heir. Xenophon again provides confirmation in *Agesilaos* I.5 with his report of the grounds on which the city made Agesilaos king:

κρίνασα ἡ πόλις ἀνεπικλητότερον εἶναι Ἀγησίλαον καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ τοῦτον ἐστήσαντο βασιλέα.

Thus he became king, not as the undisputed heir presumptive of long standing, but because he was "pronounced worthy of the highest privilege" - τὸ . . . κριθέντα τοῦ καλλίστου γέρος ἀξιωθῆναι.

Finally, Plutarch seems to have been aware that Agesilaos was the challenger, for the Spartan public does not hear the brief statement about Leotychidas' birth from Lysander, ὄντι νόθῳ, which gives rise to the dispute, but later accepts the two aspects of the argument about

the law of succession mentioned together in refutation of Diopeithes' argument: εἰ μὴ γνήσιος ὢν μηδὲ Ἡρακλείδης. This suggests the sequence: assumed normal succession of Leotychidas, challenge from Agesilaos, defence by Diopeithes, refutation by challengers. Leotychidas is therefore shown to have been the legitimate heir of Agis and Agesilaos was a usurper.

The question arises of why the succession of Leotychidas was disputed. Whatever private discussions preceded the open debate, the Spartan kingship was not the prize of court intrigue, and if the normal, natural line of inheritance failed, there were, according to Herodotos, constitutional powers and procedures which legitimated the choice of the new king, apparently by open vote or acclaim in the assembly of Spartan citizens or in the gerousia, as that of Agesilaos was in the end (Xen. *Hell.* III.iii.4). The grounds of illegitimacy had been used before for removing a reigning king, and the same grounds could be used at the time of the succession for removing the unwanted legitimate heir. The means of effecting it may have been suggested by the earlier transfers of the Spartan kingship. Pausanias (III.8) compares Agis' refusal to acknowledge Leotychidas to Ariston's rejection of Demaratos, which Herodotos had mentioned (VI.65). It was one of Agesilaos' ancestors, another Leutychides, who had brought the charge of illegitimacy against king Demaratos, because of two disagreements with Kleomenes over policy, one (Herodotos V.75) at Eleusis, when he sided with the Corinthians, the other (VI.50 and 64-5) over support for Kleomenes' demand for hostages from Aigina. The story of the deposition told to Herodotos would still have been familiar in Sparta, and could have guided Agesilaos' procedure: a dubious claim that Demaratos' father had disowned him, made twenty years after his accession by his second-cousin, Leutychides, who was Agesilaos' great-grandfather, and who then became king himself.

The disputed succession, since it was not simply a question of deciding who was the legitimate heir, as in a clear case of bastardy, was thus not a constitutional crisis, but betrays a division of political opinion or policy. Personal ambition is a necessary condition, but not, perhaps, a sufficient cause for the success of the claim. To be successful the claimant needed powerful and ultimately majority support. There may well have been strong political reasons for replacing Leotychidas by Agesilaos, but since nothing is known of any participation by Agesilaos in public life before his accession, it is Lysander's career that provides evidence for the relevant political struggles of the time.

Attempts have been made to identify political factions in Sparta (C.D.Hamilton (1970) pp.294-314; id. (1979) pp.82-5). There had certainly been differences concerning Sparta's attitudes to mainland Greece and to Asia Minor after the Peloponnesian War: how Athens was to be treated, Spartan relations with the allies who had lately shared the victory, whether to help Greek cities threatened by the Persian king and the satraps, Pharnabazos and Tissaphernes, after the failure at Kunaxa of Kyros' expedition. Conflicting groups of supporters had associated themselves with one or other of the two kings, Agis and Pausanias, but, as a result of his major contribution to victory in the War, it was Lysander who had prestige and influence, for a time invincible. The alignments, however, need not have been permanent or fixed, but varying as the issues arose. The issues involved in the struggle for the succession are not specified, nor are the alignments of the candidates' supporters, except that Leotychidas was not alone (see above on πολλῶν ἐναντίον) and Lysander clearly was Agesilaos' main strength, although Xenophon does not give him the credit for urging Agesilaos to claim the kingship.

Lysander was first checked by the brief cooperation between Agis and Pausanias over the treatment of Athens after the Peloponnesian War, with the ephors divided three against two (Xen. *Hell.* II.iv.29), though Pausanias was then brought to trial and acquitted by a majority which did not include Agis, apparently (Pausanias III.5.2). Agis was again following a less aggressive policy in not pressing Elis in the campaign he was conducting just before he died, having previously withdrawn his army, perhaps prematurely, after an earthquake. Pausanias was later to be condemned in absence for failing to keep a rendezvous with Lysander at Haliartos where Lysander was killed (III.v.17ff.). These are indications of conflict between unadventurous limited imperialist policies and Lysander's clearly expansionist aims in setting up dekharchies and harmosts in cities and islands of Greece and Asia Minor after the war, aims which were opposed and stopped by ephors, perhaps preferring policies relevant nearer home. Lysander is reported to have taken steps to advance himself, intending to deliver the speech said to have been found after his death (below c.20) in which he proposed a reform of the kingship. Such a reform, within the constitution, appears to involve only a limited upheaval, but he could not hope to persuade the citizens without strong support, perhaps including that of the oracles, which he was said to have approached unsuccessfully to win approval for his position. The transfer of the kingship to Agesilaos would

perhaps serve the same purpose after the attempt to reform failed. If this was the motive for the transfer of the monarchy to Agesilaos, it is also true that it was the will of the Spartans that prevailed. Again, that it was the city that chose Agesilaos, as Xenophon reports (*Hell.* III.iii.4 and *Agesilaos* I.3), indicates that the principle, that justice was identical with the interests of Sparta, guided the Spartans' choice here, as elsewhere (e.g. c.23). Strong and active leadership, sanctioned by the vote of the majority, seems to have been achieved, and this, perhaps, is the most significant aspect of the succession.

2: The proposed Karian expedition (Chapter 9)

Karia was the natural objective if Agesilaos really wished to engage the enemy, for Tissaphernes had assembled his army to the south of the river Maiandros. Tissaphernes' purpose may have been, as mentioned by Xenophon (*Agesilaos* I.15, *Hell.* III.iv.12), to protect his own estates, but another would be to guard the approaches to the south, where the fleet base was, especially as he probably knew that the expedition had been sent as a response to the building of the Persian fleet, and that its purpose was to prevent a Persian encroachment into Greek waters of the Aegean, as stated at c.6.1. He also knew of the Spartans' interest in Karia from the earlier operations of Derkylidas on the instructions of the ephors (*Xen. Hell.* III.ii.12) which the truce had interrupted. If that truce was continued by Agesilaos (D.H.Kelly (1975) pp.25, 80; also G.Grote (1869) p.81), then his proposed Karian expedition will have been a resumption of those operations. The sequence of Agesilaos' decisions and movements regarding Karia need not be disturbed if deliberately planned deception is abandoned, but the change of plan should then, perhaps, be related more meaningfully to the arrival of Spithridates than the sources suggest. (See c.8.)

Plutarch makes Tissaphernes' gathering of troops in response to Agesilaos' threat to invade Karia the signal for him to set out to Phrygia, as he perhaps intended. In Xenophon's account, the verb διαβίβασεν denotes Tissaphernes' action at the earlier stage of setting up his base, and it did not trigger Agesilaos' movement southwards, but created the state of affairs to which Agesilaos eventually responded by turning to the north. Deliberate deception by Agesilaos need not be invoked, merely a change of plan: Tissaphernes' army was reinforced and Spithridates had arrived.

The satrapy of Phrygia, governed by Pharnabazos, whose residence was at Daskyleion, bordered on the Hellespont. Xenophon records suspicion between the two satraps (*Hell.* III.i.9). Pharnabazos had helped the Lakedaimonians in the Peloponnesian War (*Hell.* I.iii.5 and *passim*) and had also helped the Athenians (*Hell.* I.iii.8). Then Thibron's successor, Derkylidas, who had earlier been "insulted" by Pharnabazos, transferred his activities to fight him in the northern satrapy (*Hell.* III.i.9). Plutarch's reference to invasion is perhaps intended to suggest serious hostilities, but there was no major direct engagement. He has summarized events briefly, without naming Pharnabazos, and has devoted the rest of the chapter to moralizing on the results for Agesilaos.

The importance attached by Xenophon and Plutarch to Agesilaos' aims on his departure from Greece, and to the Aulis affair, is not matched by the military events following his arrival. Agesilaos does not appear to have taken advantage of Tissaphernes' lack of preparations, of his apparent weakness, or of the element of surprise for an immediate attack. The objective revealed in the treaty-making as autonomy for the Greeks is consistent with the initial requests made by the cities for Spartan intervention on their behalf, but Agesilaos' suspicion of Tissaphernes' promises, and Tissaphernes' declaration of war, would have shown him that autonomy was not going to be granted without a direct confrontation. Tissaphernes also seems to hold back. He had perhaps arranged every necessary counter-measure following the truce with Derkylidas, and could do nothing then but wait, but even when he had received reinforcements and declared war, far from mounting an attack on Agesilaos immediately, he seems only to have planned for the defence of Karia, although Agesilaos was keeping his side of the agreement and maintaining the peace. Agesilaos, despite his joyful reception of the declaration of war, still continued to avoid conflict with Tissaphernes, instead of making the most of the help of the gods which he was so confident they would give him against the oath-breaker. There was evident reluctance on both sides for direct confrontation. Xenophon reveals the anxiety of the Lakedaimonians when they realized the strength of their enemy (*Hell* III.iv.11), and once Agesilaos, too, had realized, whether on the march or at an earlier stage, that in Karia he would face Tissaphernes and his strengthened forces, the strategically sound attack on Karia had become too dangerous to contemplate. Spithridates' advice and topographical guidance instigated or activated the change of plan, and Agesilaos turned north to go just about as far away from that enemy as he could, to precisely the area where Lysander had spent some time when in Asia Minor before, and close to where he had picked up Spithridates. It seems a logical decision, and it led to the success of taking cities and booty, but it meant that Agesilaos made no further contact at all with Tissaphernes during this season. Plutarch perhaps saw the inconsistency here, and re-worked the episode to introduce the deception as a deliberate intention, and, by putting it at the start of the episode, not only gave it prominence, but made it the sole reason for Tissaphernes' decision to defend Karia. He seems to have adapted Xenophon's reference to deception at *Agesilaos* I.17 for this purpose.

The sources do not seem adequately to have explained the

thinking behind these moves, but a more rational account may be attempted. Agesilaos had made the truce - or renewed the truce made earlier with Derkyllidas - for the time still needed to complete the consultations with the King on the major issue, which could achieve the Spartans' main stated purpose of liberating the Ionian cities and neutralizing the need for the Persians' new fleet. He respected the truce, hoping for a favourable reply from the King, and reluctant to meet a formidable enemy so soon after arriving with inexperienced troops. Meanwhile, Tissaphernes wisely took precautions for the defence of Karia (and no doubt, although it is not mentioned, for Lydia) to ensure that Agesilaos did not take unfair advantage of the truce to surprise him. Then Agesilaos made use of the opportunity to give himself and his men time to become familiar with conditions in Asia Minor, to obtain provisions for the rest of the year, to avail himself of the intelligence and guidance of Spithridates, and to show his presence to the Greek cities and to the Persians in their rear. The story of deception would appear to have been made up for propaganda or braggadocio purposes, in retrospect, rather than currently related to military plans: Agesilaos could, at the later stage, claim credit for having deceived Tissaphernes in revenge for his treachery, and to cover his decision not to attack Karia. It in fact bears some resemblances to the events recorded again for the following campaigning season in the spring of 395. It does not affect the real work of the season in Phrygia, where the new objectives were carried out more or less successfully by Agesilaos. Even the minor cavalry defeat, which showed up a deficiency, taught him a lesson which he turned to his advantage during the following winter. According to Diodoros (XIV.79.3), Agesilaos went straight to the plain of the Kaÿster and even further on to lay waste Phrygia from a base at Kyme, with no talk of Karia or of deception, here or in XIV.80 for the next campaign. If his source depended on the Oxyrhynchos Historian, perhaps the straightforward Phrygian campaign was all that he found there. Nepos interestingly also has no deception by Agesilaos, who in *Phrygiam se convertit*, although he has Tissaphernes' deception over the treaty and his misjudgement of Agesilaos' movements (*Agesilaus* 2-3). Nepos puts Tissaphernes' movement of troops to Karia *postquam indutiarum praeteriit dies* (*Agesilaus* 3), which would not leave Agesilaos much time for more than a short campaign in Phrygia; but the fact that the later campaign of 395 (Xen. *Hell.* IV.i.1) began at the beginning of the autumn and extended to Paphlagonia before winter, indicates that there was sufficient time for the 396 campaign, even with

a late start.

Xenophon and Plutarch offer their own interpretations of motives, and the accounts possibly derived from Oxyrhynchos Historian offer a barer narrative. Agesilaos was perhaps not unwise in declining confrontation, but neither he nor Xenophon would wish to reveal any sign of weakness.

3: The battle of Sardis (Chapter 10)

The following attempt to illuminate the background of Plutarch's account of the Battle of Sardis is in three parts: (1) the topography of the area of the three rivers, (2) the routes reportedly taken by the two forces to their meeting place, and (3) the fighting that the various authorities report there. Much has been written on the last two subjects, which are generally agreed to permit of no certainty. V.J.Gray (1979) p.198, n.1, lists scholars supporting each author and those uncommitted: D.H.Kelly (1975), P.A.Cartledge (1987), and J.G.DeVoto (1988) may be added. Her own conclusion (ibid. p.198) is that either the Oxyrhynchos Historian's account of the battle or Xenophon's account of the whole campaign must be chosen, but the evidence is insufficient to allow any decisive arguments to be accepted by scholars generally as totally disproving the credibility of any of the ancient accounts. It is not possible to claim certainty for any suggestion made hereabouts, but by making topography the starting point, further discussion of the two other topics may be meaningful. Then the evidence from each author, considered on its merits and used in a reconstruction of the events, may show that possibly there was more than one engagement, one or other of which could be selected or omitted for the author's own reasons.

(1) The plain between the R. Hermos and the mountain range to the south is flat, broad and rich for the full length from Manisa (Magnesia, Kasaba) to well east of Sardis. By contrast, the citadel height of Sardis appears impregnable, likely to be a main defensive position and a threat to any attackers: not surprisingly, it was free from attack by Agesilaos, as was Tissaphernes' earlier position on the R. Maiandros, where he was guarding perhaps not only his private land but also the approach to his fleet base.

This plain seems to offer plenty of opportunity both for Xenophon's type of battle during the progress of troops plundering and for the ambush type, provided in the latter case that it took place near the foothills to the south, where apart from forest cover (not necessarily exactly as now), the low ridges and secluded valleys available would easily hide men and horses. Conditions for a successful ambush would appear to be: (a) the main force should keep close to the south edge of the plain, perhaps where a river-bed limits the width somewhat; (b) the ambushing light infantry, followed by the hoplites, should be able to reach the cut-off point without obstacles in their path; iii) the main force should progress beyond the ambushers'

site far enough to allow time for them to reach the cut-off point before the enemy can retreat past them. An ambush of this kind would be one of the available measures to counter interference with plundering activities.

Agesilaos is said by Xenophon (*Hell.* III.iv.20) to have planned to go from Ephesos by the quickest way to "the Sardinian *τόνον*", Tissaphernes to have had his army moved from the R. Maiandros area, and Agesilaos next to have seen the enemy cavalry, when they attacked his foragers after arranging their camp in the Paktolos area. Two routes may now be considered, one in the west and one in the east.

(i) From Ephesos the road across the plain of the Kaÿster is flat. The possibility of obstacles such as marshy ground and vegetation cannot be judged from present appearances, but Xenophon indicates that plains here were cultivated:

καὶ γὰρ ἦν βαθὺς ὁ σῖτος ἐν τῷ Μεάνδρου πεδίῳ (*Hell.* III.ii.17).

The same conditions continue all the way to the Hermos plain, if the route of the modern road to Izmir is followed, though there is high ground around that city itself. However, a shorter route into the plain of the Hermos uses the pass known as Kara Bel. This pass is reached via Selcuk, Belevi Gölü, Torbali and the road north to Kemalpasha, with what is now rich alluvial plain offering the potential for booty as far as the foot of the Kara Bel. The climb over the pass (1,575 feet) from south to north should present no problems of gradient, but vegetation, now in the form of old pine forest, new afforestation and undergrowth, would have had to be reckoned with. Water, too, would be a problem, but the climb up from the northern end took me only half an hour and the descent most of the way to the southern end was made in about the same time. The Kara Bel is a short, low-level pass and, although it is narrow, the safe passage of an army would be secured easily by a proper advance party. A few hours' march should be adequate, though the total time involved would depend on the length of the column passing through.

At the northern end of the pass the valley does not debouch immediately into the Hermos plain but widens into an area of low hills. These are not ordinary foothills continuing the gradual descent to the plain, but isolated hillocks through which several routes wind into the open plain. To the east are higher mountains, in the seemingly less penetrable Tmolos range, for most of the way to Sardis. To the north from Kemalpasha, and beyond the Hermos river, is the western end of the wide Hermos plain, and the distance to the mountain at its northern edge, Sipylos, is not too great for either Agesilaos'

plundering raiders to travel, or the use of the name as a rough point of reference to denote "at the western end of the Sardian plain".

The Kara Bel therefore appears to offer "the shortest route" to rich plunder in the area of Sardis, entering the plain at its western end, where the square formation for both defence and the reception of booty would be quite appropriate. Furthermore, and of great importance, perhaps, if Agesilaos used this route, there would be no difficult terrain to delay him in his initial progress as he moved away from the enemy's position on the R. Maiandros. The approach from Ephesos across the Kayster plain via Torbali, offering room for the square formation, is, besides, too short a distance to allow the Persian pursuers from the R. Maiandros to have overtaken Agesilaos in the open and still on the march.

(ii) The eastern route starts from the region of Aydin, almost as far east into the valley of the R. Maiandros as Sardis is into the Hermos valley, and it crosses two mountain ranges and the Kayster valley between them. From Ephesos, it is possible to join this route towards the southern side of the Kayster valley, using a road east through Camlibel and Ortaklar, but this entails using what appears to be a steep and narrow pass inland from Ephesos, in which the map shows a long tunnel on the railway line. If Agesilaos went this way, he was not only moving slowly in the enemy's area, but would be under easy observation, too, as he crossed the plain. It is, in addition, possible, from Ephesos, to join this route further north in the Kayster plain, in the region of Odemish, by striking east either through the narrow pass at Belevi Golu, or, more easily, further north still, nearer Torbali. This would again have taken Agesilaos into the enemy's path rather than out of his reach, and he would still have the difficult Tmolos range to cross to reach Sardis. These do not seem to be obvious choices for him, compared with Kara Bel.

Even for Tissaphernes, if his army was near Aydin (J.K.Anderson (1974) p.38), the journey to Sardis by an eastern route was not an easy one. The first part, over the ridge of Messogis between the R. Maiandros and Kayster valleys, is said to be "not a formidable obstacle like Tmolus" (ibid.), but my exploration did not entirely support this statement. From the modern road in the R. Maiandros plain, it is possible to distinguish, a few miles away to the north, a line of low foothills, broken only in two or three places, for instance, nearest Aydin, at Incirlioiva, and best, perhaps, further west at Germencik, though the pass from here to the north bends even further to the west. But through these gaps can be seen, behind the foothills, as

shown on the map, three or four more ridges to the north, which seem to make the journey to the Kayster a difficult one, and no modern public transport takes these routes. Exploration from the southern end thus proved impossible in the time available to me, but I approached the same routes into the Kayster valley from the northern side. One of these, the road from Incirlioiva, reaches the valley at the town of Tire. It could be a possible route for Tissaphernes, as it is the most direct, and the next, shown on the map as a difficult one, is well to the east. From the eastern end of the town centre of Tire, this road immediately begins to climb to the south, and continues to climb in a long series of zig-zags, without allowing any glimpse of the summit of a pass until a few hundred feet below what appeared to be a saddle, which the map indicates at well over 3,000 feet.

The map shows the approach to this saddle from the south as a very steep-sided valley, with its contours in a sharp "V" shape and very close together. This indicates, even though I was not able to explore it myself, that it would be a difficult climb, though less tortuous, perhaps. The descent on the northern side, which I did make by the modern track and observed from there, was over steep, irregular terrain, which appeared to be passable by cavalry at no more than a walking pace. Off the track, there were deep valleys which eventually reached the Kayster plain, but to follow any of these down would necessitate the negotiation of sheer drops and steep gullies, or frequent detours.

From Tire the journey northwards across the plain to Odemish, and eventually to the Paktolos valley which leads directly to Sardis, is again flat and easy, but the route from the plain to the top of the pass involves climbing to 3,494 feet, though I did not have the opportunity to explore it. The upper valley route has been said to be comparable with the journey through the lower Paktolos valley on the northern side, which I did explore, and found it to present no problems, "the normal route to Sardis" from the south (J.K.Anderson (1974) p.40 and note 54, pp.40-1, and H.R.Breitenbach (1970) 393ff.). However, at the northern end of the Paktolos the pass is too narrow for a "square formation", or for free use by an enemy marching army or for rich plunder, but appears viable for unopposed movement by troops familiar with the area, suitable therefore for Tissaphernes' army but not for Agesilaos, who would further have been deterred, perhaps, by a watch place, according to Strabo's notice, built on the summit of the pass (J.K.Anderson (1974) pp.33 and 34 n.31).

The possible alternative to the pass I explored, on the route from

Aydin to Tire, which was formidable (3,583 feet), is a lower route (3,166 feet) to Odemish shown on the 1913 Staff Map some distance to the east, but the mountains there nevertheless seem even more tortuous and formidable. In *The Times Atlas of the World, Comprehensive Edition* (1968), the modern road uses the pass to the south of Tire, suggesting that the more easterly pass, though lower, is more difficult.

The real comparison for us, however, is not between these two more direct eastern routes over the two mountain ranges, one of which, though it is not identified in the authorities, is likely to have been used by Tissaphernes, but between these and the Kara Bel, if Agesilaos used it. The greater difficulty of both the eastern routes suggests that Tissaphernes would not necessarily reach the Sardis area before Agesilaos, even allowing for time he spent plundering, for Tissaphernes had a later start, and "the cavalry's own march will have been delayed by the passage of the hills to a pace which pack-animals (including the famous camels) could follow" (J.K.Anderson (1974) p.49).

Xenophon's description of Agesilaos' destination has been misunderstood since Ch.Dugas (1910). He summarizes Xenophon's account:

Agésilas . . . annonce qu'il va envahir la Lydie . . . et marche sur Sardes. La quatrième jour, il voit apparaître les cavaliers ennemis (p.60).

This is not quite accurate. Xenophon used almost the same words in both his accounts, where they coincide, and in fact expresses the destination as ἐνὶ τὰ κρᾶτιστα τῆς χώρας (*Hell* III.iv.20, *Agesilaos* I.28), which is less definite than envahir la Lydie, and the march as εὐθὺς εἰς τὸν Σαρδιανὸν τόπον (*Hell* III.iv.21, *Agesilaos* I.29), which is less precise than sur Sardes. It is unfortunate that more notice was not taken of an early correction:

"One would interpret this too narrowly if one thinks it is said that he would march to Sardis by the shortest route. No more need be being said than that he would set off on the direct route to the heart of the land. By "best of the country" should not be understood only "the capital". Agesilaos now invaded the Sardian countryside where for three days he met no enemy and had abundant food - obviously plunder and requisitions" (F.Ruhl (1913) p.176).

The meaning of Xenophon's words, identical in his two accounts, representing Agesilaos' announcement of his intended destination, may, perhaps, be clarified by reference to what follows in the text: ὁπῶς αὐτόθεν οὕτω τὰ σώματα καὶ τὴν γνώμην παρασκευάζοιντο ὡς ἀγωνιούμενοι;

the rich countryside will fit them in body and spirit for the fighting. Agesilaos' aim was clearly not to get to grips with the enemy as quickly as possible. He had chosen not to fight in Karia, and he would not choose Sardis as an immediate destination if he wanted to build up his troops in body and spirit before meeting the enemy, for fighting could be expected there, if anywhere.

The troops were moving out of Ephesos. Promises of minimum hardship, maximum benefit and no immediate fighting would raise their spirits at the start, particularly those who were the new arrivals from Sparta. Not only does Xenophon not speak of the shortest route "to Sardis"; he also therefore cannot be saying that Agesilaos reached Sardis from Ephesos in three days (Ch.Dugas (1910) pp.60, 62). His phrase:

τρεῖς ἡμέρας . . . πορευόμενος πολλὰ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια τῇ στρατιᾷ πορεῖχε
(*Agesilaos* I.29)

does not designate Agesilaos' route or specify a three days' march to his destination. Xenophon's point here is that Agesilaos' men had the benefit of a three days' march "through a country bare of enemies so that he supplied his army with abundance of provisions" before they were intercepted by cavalry. Indeed the Greek text, ἐνέβαλε . . . καὶ πορευόμενος, should mean that Agesilaos invaded - and then marched. This was suggested by F.Ruhl (1913) p.161, but the suggestion was dismissed as "inappropriate" (unzutreffend) by another scholar, W.Kaupert (1924-31) pp.261-89, without discussing it.

The three days' march before interception then took place after Agesilaos reached τὸν Σαρδιανὸν τόπον and could easily have taken the Greeks towards the river Paktolos, plundering all the way. In this case the route indicated clearly for Agesilaos by Diodoros:

Ἀγησίλαος μὲν ἐξαγαγὼν τὴν δύναμιν εἰς τὸ Καῦστρον πεδῖον
καὶ τὴν περὶ Σίπυλον χώραν ἐδῶκε τὰς τῶν ἐγγχωρίων κτήσεις
(Diodoros XIV.80.1)

is likely to be the one indicated by Xenophon, too (cf. Oxyrhynchos Historian XV.4-6). V.J.Gray (1979), on the basis of Anderson's evidence, rejects the idea that the sources differ on the route that Agesilaos took to Sardis (p.193).

(2) There are divergences in the ancient accounts of the battle, too, which are well known and considerable. Xenophon refers to the arrival of the Persian cavalry and the baggage train at the river, only loosely, when he records the order for the baggage-train "to cross the Paktolos and encamp", while the cavalry immediately engage the Greeks foraging. He told of Tissaphernes' dispositions earlier in Karia, but

does not now indicate if these cavalry had come from there or were from the garrison in Sardis. For cavalry from Sardis a baggage train might be thought rather superfluous - perhaps, if they were operating at a distance, not entirely so - and would not be likely to be sent for safety to the other (west) bank of the river from Sardis. However, if they were from Karia, and had perhaps come down the left (west) bank of the Paktolos, or if, coming from Sardis, they had already crossed the river once to the west, then for safety they would properly now be sent across to the right (east) bank, nearer Sardis, holding the cavalry's even minimal equipment available for any contingency.

"The fact that the camp was small enough for Agesilaos to throw a cordon around it with the rest of his army when his peltasts turned to plunder also inclines one to think that it did not include the baggage-train of the whole Persian army" (J.K.Anderson (1974) p.50).

Xenophon does not say where the foragers were - certainly he does not say "on the banks of the Paktolos":

et fut rejoin sur les bords du Pactole par les cavaliers ennemis . . . l'endroit où il fut atteint par les Perses: c'est le Pactole (Ch.Dugas (1910) pp.62 and 64)

and he does not mention any Persian infantry there. Xenophon gives no location, but his engagement takes place at an early stage, involving only the cavalry. Time for any other engagement can therefore be found only after this first clash.

That Agesilaos set a successful ambush is reported by Diodoros and the Oxyrhynchos Historian. Diodoros says that Agesilaos formed his soldiers into a square when his scattered pillagers were attacked, and clung to the foothills of Mt. Sipylos. The distance between Sipylos and the river Paktolos is too great for these to be approximate references to the same site, but, again, the battle in Diodoros' account was not fought immediately. Once the Greeks were in square formation, Tissaphernes hesitated to attack for the rest of that day.

"Agesilaos over-ran the countryside as far as Sardis . . . turned back" [still being pursued, no doubt, and anxious to disengage himself] "and mid-way between Sardis and Thybarnai, sent Xenokles to set an ambush" (XIV.80.1-2).

Diodoros' account clearly has room for at least another kind of engagement in addition to its main one.

The Oxyrhynchos Historian's account has a fragmented start. Mention of the Kaystrian plain links this with Diodoros' source. Other fragmentary references include several nouns giving geographical,

military, and chronological details, and verbs denoting various military activities, and all before the continuous narrative begins. The picture is not complete, but these words show extension in time and space, rather than a brief preliminary to the main event. As in Diodoros next, an advance by Agesilaos begins at daybreak, thus making clashes on two successive days, and the Persians follow in loose formation over the plain. Xenokles comes out from the ambush, choosing the moment himself, and causes the flight of the enemy. Agesilaos engages with his light armed troops and cavalry, but the ensuing pursuit fails to contain the enemy, though 600 are killed and the camp is taken, the slackness of the guards allowing this and also the seizure of men and booty.

Diodoros surprisingly was able to describe the position of the ambush as between Sardis and Thybarnai (XIV.80.2), a name preserved nowhere else and unidentified. He adds other details, too, including the timing of Agesilaos' signal to the soldiers in the ambush - γενομένης δὲ κατεπαῖς μάχης. This phrase, often said to indicate the importance of the battle, does not, however, mark the climax of the action, which, for Diodoros, is surely the charge out from the ambush, with the chanting of the paeon. The phrase can indicate also sharp hand-to-hand fighting, contrasting the loose skirmishing of προσπίπτοντες ἀτάκτως and τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς οὐραγίας ἐξήκοντο. If this is so, there is nothing else to suggest that this was a "full-scale" or "great" battle or a "great" victory for Agesilaos (G.L.Cawkwell (1976) pp.62ff., I.A.F.Bruce (1967) p.152), except Diodoros' figure of 6,000 slain, which is invariably recognized as a mistake for 600.

These engagements were clearly a setback for Tissaphernes, none the less, and he wisely withdrew to Sardis, presumably in case Agesilaos moved in for what would have been a truly great military achievement, pressing home his advantage. However, neither Sardis itself nor Tissaphernes was attacked. Agesilaos contented himself with allowing the enemy to collect their dead and setting up a trophy, a detail mentioned nowhere else. The Oxyrhynchos Historian records that Tissaphernes was not overwhelmed but gathered forces to shadow Agesilaos on his next march. Xenophon speaks here of three days' plunder of the countryside τὰ περὶ τὸ ὄστυ (Agesilaos I.33).

The two main versions of the battle, that of Xenophon and that of Diodoros/Oxyrhynchos, are said to be irreconcilable, but it has also been conceded that the similarities are more significant than the differences (D.Nellen (1972) p.52). The choice of one account rather than the other, however, entails the admission of other problems, and

some recent writers have accepted the possibility of two separate engagements, despite the suggestion of the unlikelihood that either success would have been omitted (I.A.R. Bruce (1967) App.1 pp.152ff.). This has indeed been met by the recognition that each version reveals its author's interests and limitations: the Oxyrhynchos Historian's interest is in geographical detail and stratagems lacking in Xenophon, who alone records qualities of generalship and the course of negotiations (J.K. Anderson (1974) pp.51-3, V.J. Gray (1979) pp.186, 195-6, D. Nellen (1972) pp.45-54).

The possibility exists, then, that there were engagements from which each author could make his selection in accordance with his own historical interest. The importance of a crucial divergence has not been fully exploited, concerning the make-up of the Persian force. Xenophon specifies cavalry alone, Oxyrhynchos has both cavalry and infantry. If the Persians were following the Greeks from the R. Maiandros and Karia, there will have been an interval between the arrivals of their two arms. Even if the units were drawn from the garrison at Sardis, the same separation could have occurred. Once this is recognized the two accounts can be broadly accepted, but not as descriptions of the same battle.

Modern interpretations have erred in assuming an exaggerated importance of the military event and an exaggerated duration of no more than four days. In the first place, the importance of the engagement is not that of a direct confrontation in a set battle, for that was always avoided by both sides, despite announcements by each of aggressive intentions. We are not given the impression that there was a short, decisive clash. Whatever victory or victories Agesilaos won were only minor, and he defeated only a part of the enemy's army. The fighting that occurred did not leave him so victorious that he could thereafter assert himself freely in the area of the satrapy. Neither side was rendered impotent or was superior enough to press any advantage home. The execution of Tissaphernes, also adduced as an indication of the importance of his defeat, is said by Diodoros to have been further motivated at court, by a desire for revenge on the part of Parysatis, mother of Artaxerxes. Xenophon indeed writes of the affair at Sardis as an encounter action, and he does not suggest that the armies were carefully drawn up for battle (J.K. Anderson (1974) pp.47-8). Several minor encounters are likely, and in fact both authors' accounts suggest more than one kind of action - plundering clashes and larger engagements.

In the second place, the time scale: the three days' extent of time

is nowhere given or suggested as the maximum duration of Agesilaos' stay in the area, or for the whole episode. Xenophon gives a three days' march leading to a fourth for the meeting of the forces, Oxyrhynchos and Diodoros have a night between the two manoeuvres, and Oxyrhynchos has a wait of three days afterwards. That an even longer time was available is indicated also by the double journey of messengers leading to the execution of Tissaphernes, after which Agesilaos was persuaded by Tithraustes to depart, more than sufficient time for clashes in the plundering excursions in the plain. The ancient sources had their own reasons for being selective at this point (V.J.Gray (1979) pp.186 and 197), and it is unlikely that in a series of actions on the march, pillaging from Ephesos to Sardis, two or more authors or eye-witnesses, one possibly with access to command level information, the other perhaps at unit level, should include precisely the same incidents in a limited narrative. The large scale movements must be reconciled, but within those the accounts can be separate, each supplied with connecting links to create continuity with what precedes and what follows, for example, to indicate the places where the selected incidents occurred. The topography of the Hermos plain has been shown above to be suitable for battles of the two kinds. "It is . . . just possible to argue that the authors are in fact describing two different battles" (P.A.Cartledge (1987) p.215), even although most scholars presume that there was only one.

(3) A brief outline of the events including two main engagements would be as follows. Tissaphernes guarded Karia until forced to move to the defence of Sardis by the threatened presence in that region of Agesilaos. The Persian cavalry, whether it came from Sardis or from the R. Maiandros, contacted Agesilaos, who was already plundering in the area, before the infantry arrived. Agesilaos took advantage of this separation and won a success - but against only the Persian cavalry, not the full force. When the infantry became available, the combined force engaged Agesilaos' plunderers in the Hermos valley, somewhere between Sipylos and Sardis, perhaps between Sardis and Thybarnai. Agesilaos formed a square, protected his foragers and booty, but needed the ambush stratagem to extricate himself or to bring on an engagement. After the success of this, the Persians ceased to interfere, and Agesilaos made his way to the upper R. Maiandros through the mountains between Lydia and Phrygia.

Time is the factor which distinguishes the two received accounts, so that Xenophon refers to a time before the arrival of infantry, Diodoros to a time afterwards. Xenophon's events are in the interval

between the Greek departure from Ephesos - more precisely, their arrival in the plain of the Hermos - and the arrival of Tissaphernes' cavalry. A vital detail is Diodoros' movement of Agesilaos from Sipylos to Sardis before the battle. There were repeated attacks on the foraging units, to which Agesilaos responded in different ways. In the previous campaign, he had had a base at Kyme, from which he spent the summer in the pillage of Phrygia, and his base this year may have been initially near Sipylos. Xenophon describes one counter-measure before Persian infantry arrived, Diodoros another, later, adding the detail of the defensive formation of the square when Agesilaos moved across the plain towards Sardis.

Each description ends with the capture of a Persian camp, and there is no improbability in there being more than one camp between places about fifty miles apart. Neither Xenophon nor any other source gives anything to identify the Persian camp taken: it could be one of the permanent defences of Sardis, but more probably it would be a temporary cavalry camp beyond the Paktolos or even a marching camp near Sipylos. The further divergences, on the identities of the originator of the Greek attack and the commander who gave the order for the ambushers to move, can be explained by a difference in the sources of the reports of the details. If it was a member of the ambushing force, he may not have known of Agesilaos' signal to start; anyone else may have attributed the order to the highest command. Xenokles, Agesilaos' cavalry commander, may have been put in charge of the ambush, with, or, perhaps less probably, without, some of his cavalry.

The texts do not contain evidence which can lead to conclusive arguments on the Battle of Sardis. The above is no more certain than other known interpretations, and perhaps no less certain, but the suggestion that Tissaphernes divided his army and used two routes to the Hermes valley (J.G.DeVoto (1988) 41-53) is more complex. One other divergence, however, concerning the whereabouts of Tissaphernes, may be explained, if the engagement or engagements were really minor, for in that case, Tissaphernes himself could well not be in the field to command the army in person, but in Sardis, in general charge of the situation, and so to be held responsible. On the other hand, in the context, it is also possible to read "at Sardis" as meaning having returned to the area from where he had been - on the R. Maiandros.

The last part of the campaign is omitted by Xenophon in *Hellenika*, but is perhaps hinted at in *Agesilaos*, where he says he "prosecuted the campaign henceforward in complete confidence", and in Plutarch

there is the phrase "harry the country of the King without fear". Oxyrhynchos makes Tissaphernes gather forces to shadow Agesilaos from afar. Diodoros gives a summary in twenty words, recording the unfavourable sacrifices Agesilaos made, causing him to abandon his projected further penetration into the country. It is possible that Agesilaos was seeking a way through to the Persian fleet base and called it off when it became too difficult.

4: Sparta and the north (Chapter 16)

Spartan interest in these distant parts goes back a long way, although it rarely involved large military campaigns.

(1) In 519, according to Thucydides (III.68), or rather in 509 (W.G.Forrest (1971) p.85), Kleomenes proposed an alliance between Athens and Plataia, "in the hope," according to Herodotos (VI.108.2), "that he might cause trouble between Athens and Boiotia's leading city, Thebes".

(2) Later, after returning to Sparta following the Persian defeat, Leutychides, "at some time between 478 and 476" (W.G.Forrest (ibid.) pp.90 and 100) led an expedition against medisers (the Aleuadae, perhaps) into Thessaly, but was recalled for trial on a charge of bribery, and exiled to Tegea (Herodotos VI.72).

(3) Just before the earthquake of 465 (Thucydides I.101), Thasos may have won from Spartans hostile to Athens (W.G.Forrest (ibid.) p.102) a secret decision to invade Attika, though it was not implemented.

(4) The founding of a colony at Herakleia (Thucydides III.92), and Brasidas' expedition to Thrace (Thucydides IV.78 and 102), "the only important area of Athens' empire which could be reached by land" (W.G.Forrest (ibid.) p.111), continued the Spartan interest in the north.

(5) At Thucydides VIII.3.1, Agis, raising money for a fleet, operated in the area of Malian Gulf, plundering and taking hostages.

(6) Sparta's expanding interests immediately after the Peloponnesian War included action in Thrace, Chalkidike, Larissa, Pharsalos, Pherai and Herakleia, apparently in an attempt to ring Thebes in Boiotia (*Lysander* 16, 19, 20. Diod. XIV.38.3-4, 82; see S.Hornblower (1983) pp.186-7).

(7) Derkylidas avoided being a burden to allies in Asia Minor by wintering in Bithynian Thrace, and provided eleven towns with the protection of a wall across the Chersonese (Xen. *Hell.* III.ii.2, 11-12), a few years before Agesilaos went to Asia Minor.

Not all these activities will have made friends for Sparta, and Diodoros reveals widespread dissatisfaction with the Spartan presence in many areas, and much contraction of influence (XIV 81.2, 82.3). He records the death of Lysander in the siege of Haliartos, and then in 395, following the alliance of the Boiotians, Athenians, Corinthians and Argives, and the setting up of the Council of Corinth, he reports the dispatch of envoys to recruit members from among the allies of the Lakedaimonians. He mentions the Chalkidians of Thrace (οἱ πρὸς τῷ

Θρόκη) who joined, and, in the war between Medius of Larissa and Lykophron of Pherai in which 2,000 men were sent by the Council, he mentions Medius' seizure of Pharsala, previously garrisoned by Lakedaimonians (82.6). The Boiotians and Argives then took Heraklea in Trachis, killing the Lakedaimonians there, and restoring the Trachinians they had banished. Finally, further north again, Aenianians and Athamanians were won over by Ismenias, the Theban, and together the allies defeated the Phokians who were commanded by Alkisthenes, the Lakonian, slew nearly 1,000, but lost about 500 (82.10). This is part of the serious situation, with troops gathered in Corinth, which leads to the Spartans' recall of Agesilaos from Asia (XIV.83), but it also explains the difficulties faced by Agesilaos in the course of his return journey. The reader of Diodoros, therefore, is not surprised at 83.3 to read that some Thracians were drawn up against him, and that he met opposition further on, but Xenophon and Plutarch have left the hostility in this area unexplained at this point.

5: NARTHAKION (Chapter 16)

At the Hellespont, Xenophon defines Agesilaos' route as that taken by Xerxes (*Hell.* IV.ii.8; *Agesilaos* II.1), but he omits detailed reference to Agesilaos' route from the Hellespont until Derkylidas meets him at Amphipolis with the news of the Spartans' victory at Nemea. From there he merely reports that Agesilaos crossed Makedonia and arrived in Thessaly:

ὁ δ' Ἀγησίλαος διαλλάξας Μακεδονίαν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἀφίκετο
(Xen. *Hell.* IV.iii.3).

How accurately Xenophon knew Xerxes' route is unknown, and Agesilaos' entry into Thessaly may have been through Tempe, or by way of the valley of the River Haliakmon, or via Oloosson (Herodotos VII.128; W.W.How and J.Wells (1912) Vol.II pp.174f.). Diodoros (XIV. 83.3-4) devotes only three sentences to this part of Agesilaos' journey, mentioning opposition in Thrace, but referring thereafter only to the march across Makedonia and Thessaly and through the pass of Thermopylai, after which there is a lacuna in the text.

Although topographical details are often obscure in literature, accurate information was clearly available to those like Brasidas (Thucydides IV.78ff.) operating in these areas. Xenophon (*Agesilaos* II.2; *Hell.* IV.iii.4-9) describes only briefly Agesilaos' journey through Thessaly, but he records at greater length a battle fought against a force in which only the Pharsalian commander of the cavalry, Polycharmos, is given prominence. The Thessalian force, defeated by Agesilaos' cavalry, was eventually driven to retreat into Mt NARTHAKION. Agesilaos set up a trophy of victory between there and PRAS, and on the next day crossed the Achaian mountains of Phthia into friendly territory.

ἔστησαν δ' οὖν οὐ πρόσθεν, πρὶν ἢ ἐπὶ τῷ ὄρει τῷ Ναρθακίῳ
ἐγένοντο. καὶ τότε μὲν δὴ ὁ Ἀγησίλαος τροπαῖόν τε ἐστήσατο
μεταξὺ Πραντὸς καὶ Ναρθακίου (*Agesilaos* II.4-5).

A.W.Gomme (1979 Vol.III) on Thucydides IV.78.3 suggests that the River Enipeus near Meliteia formed the boundary between Thessaly and Achaia Phthiotis, and so the area of the friendly territory may perhaps be identified by reference to the list of cities which sent men to Lysander at Haliartos: Oetaians, Herakleots, Malians and Aenianians (Xen. *Hell.* III.v.6). However, relations between cities were not unchangeable, and the Malians (Xen. *Hell.* IV.ii.17), Aenianians (IV.iii.15) and Athamanians (Diod. XIV.82.7) are among the allies of the Boiotians.

William Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, (1834) puts this

mountain, Narthakion, immediately south of Pharsala, and Kiepert's 1844 atlas followed him. An inscription, described by B.Laticheff (1882), refers to archons of Narthakion, and the site of this town was thereafter determined in relation to where the inscription was found, much further south in the mountains which form the northern border of the plain of Lamia. Kiepert's map, in the 12th Edition of 1898, revised the positions of Narthakion and Pras, putting them at Limogardi and Divri, to accord with the position of the inscription, and this seems to have been followed ever since - except for E.S.U.E. (1963/72) and J.Koder und F.Hild (1976) (map).

Xenophon (*Hell.* IV.iii.4.) reports that Agesilaos led his army in hollow square formation: ὁ δὲ τέως μὲν ἦγεν ἐν πλαισίῳ τὸ στρότευμα, until lines were drawn up in the battle, ὥς δὲ πορετάξαντο ἀλλήλοις. This formation suits a march over a plain, and was perhaps used near Sardis, and my exploration revealed an appropriate route for Agesilaos to have followed south from Pharsala, skirting the plain of Pharsala, keeping close to the foothills on its eastern border, and passing, for example, Brysia, whose name indicates the available water supply, on the way to modern Domokos and Lamia. There is another route leading to the east of Larissa, discussed by Y.Bequignon (1937), but this not only involves a detour and territory less suitable for the square formation immediately before the battle, but also passes the powerful city of Pherai, which Xenophon does not mention. A.W.Gomme (1979 Vol.III pp.540ff.) on IV.78; ref. Philippson and Stahlin) indicates that the normal route between the lower Spercheios valley and Thessaly passed Meliteia, Lake Xynias, Thaumakoi and Pharsala. There is so little topographical detail in the sources that, while certainty is impossible, the normal route may best be assumed. At Larissa, according to Plutarch, Agesilaos seems to have made an arrangement with the Thessalians of Larissa, Krannon, Skotussa and Pharsala, to be escorted through their lands, while they perhaps held his ambassadors, Xenokles and Skythes, as hostages (c.16.3; but cf. Xen. *Hell.* IV.iii.3). This allowed a mainly peaceful passage, for which both he and they were likely to prefer the quickest route possible, for minimum expenditure of supplies and time.

The plain offers ground likely to have been suitable for Xenophon's description of the hollow square formation on the march, and of the lines of battle, and the subsequent operation of the cavalry. The slopes of the foothills near Pharsala on the south-west side of the town present no obvious difficulty or obstacles which might hinder the initial stages of the Thessalians' flight: φυγή τῶν Θετταλῶν ἐξαισία

γίγνεται; in which they did not stop until Mt Narthakion: *πρὶν ἐν Ναρθακίῳ ἐν τῷ ὄρει ἐγένοντο* (Xen. *Hell.* IV.iii.8). The hills, however, soon give what seems to be adequate protection from further pursuit, without the need for deep penetration. There seems to be no topographical objection to Leake's site.

The inscription naming Narthakion was reported in 1882 by Laticheff to have been found incorporated in the chapel of Ἅγιος Ἰωάννης at a short distance from Limogardi, and so F. Stahlin (1924) and E. Meyer (1965) put Narthakion and Pras in the vicinity of Limogardi or Divri, in the mountain range named Othrys by Stahlin, i.e. between the Achaian mountains to the north and the plain of Lamia to the south. The following considerations suggest that, even if the inscription proves the site of the town of Narthakion, it does not determine the position of Xenophon's mountain.

(1) Xenophon speaks only of the mountain Narthakion, not of a town.

(2) The name may be related to the presence of the fennel (νόρθηξ) and so may be an appropriate name for more than one place.

(3) The greater distance of this area from Pharsala than Leake's site seems to put it outside the territorial interests that the men of Pharsala would be concerned to defend in their plain.

(4) The more massive range of mountains that would have to be crossed before the battle was fought would expose the Thessalians to a superfluous climb, a long and difficult march home, and an insecure line of retreat if danger arose, particularly when the enemy they were shadowing was finally leaving their territory.

(5) The plain of Lamia offers less easy immediate access to the protection of the hills to the north. A retreating force of cavalry would meet instead immediate obstacles to their flight in the rough foothills bordering the plain, and could not penetrate far without much steep climbing over difficult ground. Their escape would involve stiff rear-guard fighting.

(6) Similarly, if Agesilaos had placed his trophy here, he, too, would have had to penetrate and climb difficult heights.

(7) An insuperable problem of the inscription site for the battle and the trophy seems not to have been sufficiently noticed. It concerns Xenophon's report that Agesilaos next day crossed the Achaian mountains of Phthia, an area which he has cause to mention several times in *Hellenika* (I.ii.18, VI.iv.28, 33). The atlases leave these mountains unmoved when they place the battle of Narthakion and the Pras of the trophy near the town to which the inscription gives its

name. There can be no doubt that Xenophon has put the battle to the north of the Achaian mountains, not to the south of them. The distance that Agesilaos' army had to march on the next day after the battle from the site nearer Pharsala, starting at the southern end of the plain, across these mountains - a straight line of about 20-25km. (about 15 miles) - seems to be well within its capabilities:

καὶ αὐτοῦ ἔμεινε, μάλα ἡδόμενος τῷ ἔργῳ ... τῇ δὲ ὕστεραίᾳ
ὑπερβαλὼν τὰ Ἀρχαῖκὰ τῆς Φθίας ὄρη τὴν λοιπὴν πᾶσαν διὰ φιλίας
ἐπορεύετο μέχρι πρὸς τὰ Βοιωτῶν ὄρια (Xen. *Hell.* IV.iii.9).

A.W.Gomme (Vol.III, 1979) records a day's hard march to Pharsala from Meliteia for Brasidas, but he was leading a newly assembled force of allies (Thucydides IV.78).

6: οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ (Chapter 23.4)

οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μηδίζειν ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ἀπεκρίνατο μᾶλλον τοὺς Μήδους λακωνίζειν.

The first four words form a connection frequently used by Plutarch. "A combination of particles giving a logical turn to the line of thought, not easy to render in English which does not always use an indicator" (J.D.Denniston (1954) p.28). It may be helpful to take the four particles separately.

- 1) οὐ marks a check or stop put to the preceding line of thought, though it need not deny the truth of it in general.
- 2) μὴν carries emphasis, raising expectations of something relevant that will follow.
- 3) ἀλλὰ introduces a line of thought which will replace the earlier one now abandoned, and may move in one of a variety of directions. There need be no limit to the number of possible directions, so that complete classification may not be attempted, but primarily the new thought may be on-going, but in a more forceful expression; then, too, it may reverse the expected succession of steps; thirdly, it may simply modify the original line of thought within these two extremes.
- 4) καὶ is forward-looking and intensifying, and may continue a list or bring a climax, but it indicates no further change of direction.

7: The trial of Sphodrias (Chapters 24-5)

Plutarch gives an adapted version of Xenophon's account in *Hellenika* of Sphodrias' trial regarding the raid into Attika, of which there is no mention at all in his *Agésilaios*. It may be that Xenophon has given the story as he believed it happened, but there are features which indicate that he received only an incomplete and, perhaps, very superficial version of the treatment of Sphodrias' case at Sparta. In the traditional Spartan friendship, as Plutarch explains, it was not only natural (ὥς εἰκός) that Archidamos should feel sympathy (συνηγωνία) and wish to help (βοηθεῖν); there was also a strong desire to oblige when asked for a favour, similar to Agésilaios' wish to gratify his son (τῷ παιδὶ χαρίζεσθαι βουλόμενος). Sphodrias was exploiting this sense of obligation when he asked his son to approach his friend Archidamos (Xen. *Hell.* V.iv.26). The pleas of Kleonymos and Archidamos and the obligations of friendship are presented by Xenophon as overpowering motivations, which determine the conflict of personal loyalties in the events immediately preceding the trial, and, although he has given as Agésilaios' reason for his final judgement, not friendship, but the city's need for soldiers like Sphodrias, in his emotional conclusion he still continues the subject of the personal relationship, when Sphodrias' son promises Archidamos that he will never be ashamed of their friendship. Xenophon even looks ahead to record that he died for them at Leuktra. However, despite this concentration, and the omission of any process of consideration behind the scenes, it cannot be supposed that there were no discussions of the wider implications of the Spartans' decision.

It is not clear on what grounds Sphodrias was charged in Xenophon. The embassy claimed that he had acted without the knowledge of the city, but this had not been sufficient to entail condemnation in the case of Phoibidas, for it was then established that the use of initiative was not prohibited, if it benefited the state. Agésilaios' first pronouncement was to condemn a man who harmed the state for his own profit, for which Xenophon had already prepared the way by recording the suspicion that the Thebans had bribed him. But it is difficult to see that the Athenians could so readily have rejected this simple explanation, or that they could confidently have joined the Thebans at V.iv.34, if they had suspected their sincerity. Agésilaios' final thought, reported by Etymokles, was that Sphodrias had done wrong (ὀδῖκεῖν V.iv.32), which, if interpreted as in Phoibidas' case, would mean only that his action, as it had turned out, had not been in the best interest of the city.

It is also not stated on what grounds Sphodrias sought Agesilaos' help: he seems to have felt that he was being made a scapegoat reluctantly, and his guilt was evidently maintained publicly to the end. That Sphodrias absented himself from Sparta, despite the ephors' recall to face their charges, does not indicate the nature of his crime or prove his guilt, but shows either that he expected to be punished or that he was not free to go. It served the Spartans' need for secrecy very well that he was absent during the proceedings, for his answer to the charge might have been embarrassing. However, his request for support clearly indicates confidence that he had some ground for expecting to be acquitted, and he continued to act honourably in every way until he fell at Leuktra (Xen. *Hell.* V.iv.33). It is likely that his confidence would be greater if he had been following higher authority than if he had taken a bribe or had acted without authorization. (See c.24.)

The authority that sanctioned the raid is equally open to conjecture. Xenophon gives no hint that Sphodrias was acting under orders and his view has been accepted (G.L.Cawkwell (1973) p.55), but Kleombrotos left him as harmost at Thespiiai, with a third of all his allied troops, and gave him all the money he had brought from home, bidding him hire a mercenary force (*Hell.* V.iv.15). Diodoros (XV.29.5) claims that it was Kleombrotos who persuaded Sphodriades, no doubt the same Sphodrias, without the knowledge of the ephors, to seize Peiraeus, which he attempted with more than ten thousand soldiers, and his view has also been accepted (A.MacDonald (1972) pp.38-44). None of the ancient traditions is susceptible of proof (R.M.Kallett-Marx (1985) p.150) but the impressions given by Xenophon and largely followed by Plutarch may not be realistic.

A secret mission is inevitably difficult to penetrate. The veil is not lifted by either Plutarch or Xenophon to reveal what negotiations were going on and what bargains were being made among the groups of Spartans, nor what considerations of foreign policy regarding Athens and Thebes were taken into account. Xenophon at *Hell.* V.iv.25 indicates three political groupings and shows at V.iv.32 that the temporary re-alignment of these determined the final decision. The significant alignments at Sparta are known: Sphodrias was appointed harmost at Thespiiai by Kleombrotos, whose friends, as associates also of Sphodrias, wanted to acquit him, but feared Agesilaos and his friends, all thought to be going to condemn Sphodrias (Xen. *Hell.* V.iv.32). Etymokles was one of Agesilaos' friends, and while Sphodrias was raiding in Attica, Etymokles was an envoy at Athens, and clearly

outraged by the affair. His mission is not disclosed, but can perhaps be assumed to have concerned Sparta's relations with Athens. There was an uncommitted third group. At the time there was no violation of the Peace, and Athens was not expected to be involved in hostilities with the Lakedaimonians (Xen. *Hell.* V.iv.20), although the Athenians had taken part in the attack on the Theban akropolis which led to the withdrawal of the Spartan garrison (Xen. *Hell.* V.iv.10-12), and clearly there was growing tension (see c.24). Differences between Athens and Sparta would be, following Thucydides' distinction, the real cause of crisis, and the acquittal of Sphodrias or the deed of Sphodrias was only the spark, or was symbolic. Xenophon (*Hell.* V.iv.34) clearly indicates that the preparations for war were begun only when the Athenians who favoured the Boiotian alliance pointed out that the plot against them had been commended by Sparta: until then (pace P.A.Cartledge (1987 p.137), it was not the case that "the *rapprochement* between Athens and Thebes could not now be prevented." If the Spartans had wanted to appease Athens, and to ensure that after their liberation the Thebans did not gain a powerful ally, whose sympathy with the liberators had long been evident, they could, as a first gesture, have exploited the suggestion of a Theban plot and turned the blame on to Thebes, or they could have condemned Sphodrias. The decision to acquit Sphodrias was taken in the clear knowledge that Athens would join Thebes and go to war. Just as Sphodrias' raid implied a clear intention to do something to injure Athens, and a disregard of the consequences of direct provocation of Athens (W.G.Forrest (1971) pp.126ff), so the Spartans did not avoid the consequences of the offence which their judgement would give. A new alignment of the three cities was no doubt the issue behind the veil, and its resolution in favour of the Thebans and the Athenians will have followed resolution of the political differences in Sparta. Whoever intended Sphodrias' raid to bring pressure on the Athenians, it failed to do so, and the enemies of Sparta used it in anti-Spartan propaganda, and benefited even further by exploiting the unjust acquittal of Sphodrias.

His condemnation for making the expedition would have symbolized the withdrawal of Sparta's influence in Central Greece. Agesilaos' condemnation of ὀδύκεῖν is then a recognition of Sphodrias' failure to achieve the full measure of the military success of the mission, but his decision for acquittal seems to have followed recognition of the failure of the two Spartan attempts to disengage Athens from Thebes, a diplomatic mission to Athens and a military demonstration, and is

further a recognition that war was Sparta's best option. The Athenians clearly were not impressed by the imputation of Theban complicity, and were not satisfied with the Spartan condemnation of the wrongdoing, without the symbolic punishment of the local commander, but they also had other, more vital, interests to consider in determining their foreign policy. They took immediate defensive action, and perhaps rejected the diplomatic initiative until the Spartan involvement in the raid had been dealt with. In Sparta, the interval of time before the acquittal would be spent in assessing the prospects for a new military solution to the underlying issues. What is significant, then, is not the verdict on Sphodrias, but the decision affecting the balance of power in mainland Greece.

Xenophon made it clear (*Hell.* V.iv.24) that in giving his account he was responding to the widespread opinion that "the decision in this case was the most unjust ever known in Lakedaimon", and the Athenians clearly took this view (*Hell.* V.iv.3). He seems to refer to the guilt of the man regarding Spartan interests, rather than to the offence against Athenian territory, referred to by the embassy. Yet despite this there is nothing but praise for Sphodrias. Xenophon presents two modest, unassuming, young Spartans making their requests, and a long encomium on the structure and values of Spartan society, and he records Agesilaos' decision without consideration of the case itself. He clearly was not reporting all the state secrets connected with the affair, but only what he was told, or what he selected for his purposes. He presents the course of events in terms of personal relationships, both individual and collective, although Agesilaos' pronouncement about Sparta's need for such soldiers finally defines the issue in terms of military needs rather than in terms of friendship. To accept Xenophon's account at face value excludes the possibility that the three political groups gave any consideration to the larger issue of the consequences that their decision would have for the continuation of the Peace. If the story is not to be considered exactly as a part of Sparta's political history, it contributes instead, perhaps, to its social history and historiography.

Perhaps Xenophon puts the emphasis, in the coda, on the loyalty of Spartan friendships, in an attempt to save Spartan self-respect. There is no blame here for anyone: Kleonymos is said now to be pledged to serve Archidamos and Sparta, and Xenophon can look ahead to record that he died for them at Leuktra: Sphodrias has something to be grateful for, having been acquitted, if he was guilty of having acted without orders: Kleombrotos need have no remorse concerning

Sphodrias, if he did give him the order for the raid. Perhaps Sphodrias would also have reason to be grateful if he was relieved of having to pay the penalty as the scapegoat for a Spartan policy which had gone wrong.

The disclaimer asserted by the envoys and the pronouncements of the ephors may indicate their ignorance of the venture, but they do not prove either this, or that there was no knowledge of the planned raid at Sparta. The concern of the friends of Kleombrotos may have been publicized as expressions of loyalty among the *ἐταῖροι* of Sphodrias, and Agesilaos may have given public reasons for his final judgement, but the military actions, which followed the affair, may rather indicate that there were underlying issues which would better explain the consciously taken risk of precipitating war.

Plutarch evidently saw unsatisfactory features in Xenophon's account, and supplies fear at c.24.5 to explain the failure of the raid, and a sense of shame at c.24.6 to explain the Spartans' attitude to Athens. At c.25.5, too, after Agesilaos' judgement of Sparta's need of men like Sphodrias, Plutarch reports his desire to favour his son, and explains his strong family affections. Plutarch thus presents an independent view of Agesilaos' motives, for Xenophon has no explanation of what influenced Agesilaos to change his mind and to regard Sphodrias as a special case exclusively released from the application of the rules of strict justice. Yet the admission that there was a debt of gratitude, to be repaid by devoted service, confirms, perhaps unintentionally on Xenophon's part, the personal element in the report of the process. Plutarch assumes the continuity of Agesilaos' motivation and makes Sparta's need of such soldiers a pretext. Indeed, Agesilaos and Archidamos each placed the obligations of friendship even before justice in very similar phrases, as reported by Plutarch at c.13, and by Xenophon in this case (*Hell.* V.iv.31). Plutarch was misled in his search for explanations, and puts the boys' initiatives independently of Sphodrias, displaying the power of friendship more forcefully. Yet Sphodrias, in Xenophon, will, no doubt, have been able to pass confidential information to Agesilaos through their sons, and this could concern the orders he was obeying, and include intelligence about the situation regarding Athens and Thebes. This would have to be considered in Sparta in secret, and there would be no record for Xenophon to hear about.

8: Casualty figures at Leuktra (Chapter 28)

The figures available allow a hypothetical reconstruction of the line of battle. Xenophon says that the formation of the Lakedaimonian *ἐνωματῖα* was in three files, which would give a front of 32 x 3 men for each *mora*, and for the whole contingent on the right wing, four times this, 384, to which may be added 25, if the 300 *ἰππεῖς* were also twelve deep. The Lakedaimonian line then contained 409 files, one third of these with 11 in the file, the rest with 12, making $1,408 + 3,072 = 4,480$, and with the 300 *ἰππεῖς*, 4,780 men in all. If there were 4,000 Thebans, drawn up 50 deep, their front would have been 80. It is easy to imagine that most of the Spartiate casualties were thus *ἰππεῖς*, providing a front of 25 men facing a Theban front of 80, leaving a mixed Spartiate and non-Spartiate front of 55 also engaged. Thus, with $409 - 80 = 329$ files not engaged, 642 other Lakedaimonians also faced the Theban phalanx and they were in the same situation of possible total annihilation. If the total of 4,480 contained $4,080 + 400$ Spartiates, giving a ratio of 10.2 to 1, there were 31 or 32 non-Spartiates and 4 or 3 Spartiates in each *ἐνωματῖα*. It might be that the Spartiates were in the front line (*Lak. Pol.* XI.8) and were annihilated, accounting for 55, more than half their total of 100 casualties. This extreme schematic possibility is to some extent illuminating, for the Theban massed phalanx might have found difficulty in manoeuvring to make contact with the rest of the line.

If the 700 Spartiates at Leuktra account for seven-eighths of the Spartiate membership of the four out of the six *morai* in the whole army in the original expedition to Phokis, as Xenophon's figures of thirty-five out of the forty age-groups for the call-up indicate (*Hell.* VI.iv.17), and if there were 100 in the remaining one-eighth of these four *morai*, when these 800 are added to the Spartiates in the two *morai* remaining at Sparta, and the 400 casualties are subtracted, the total of Spartiate soldiers now still available for service will be two hundred short of a thousand. The size of the annual supplement may be calculated by dividing the indicated figure of 1,200 for the full strength by 40, the number of age-groups, and so losses would be made good by only thirty each year. This calculation includes the *ἰππεῖς*, if that is the correct reading at *Hell.* VI.iv.14, and if they are οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ μαχόμενοι who enabled the king's body to be recovered. If, however, the *ἰππεῖς* are counted separately, there were 400 other Spartiates at Leuktra, and the number of Spartiates remaining would be 585, from the full strength of 985, and about twenty-four would be

added each year. If, remarkably, every Spartan lived for 70 years, the total male population would be either 2,100 or 1,680. It is clear that Spartiate status, that is membership of *syssitia*, was part of Spartan social and religious life, and probably not part of the military organization (J.F.Lazenby (1985) p.17), so that these figures will indicate, not the whole Spartan hoplite resources, but only those of the citizen body. However, the stress on casualties among Spartiates represents their importance for the survival of the essential fabric of Spartan society, for Spartiates were in a minority as regards, not only *perioikoi* and helots, but also those second-class citizens in between, who brought the number of Lakedaimonian hoplites at Leuktra up to 4,780 (the alternative figure of 2,540, with half the number of men in the *mora*, is surely too small, and to be rejected (J.F.Lazenby (1985) p.7).

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